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Abstract 
 
The changing dynamics of interstate conflict in the post-Cold War environment led 
scholars to debate the relevance of established security theory.  While traditionalists 
maintained that the state-centric theory should retain its primacy, others argued for a 
security agenda, not only broadened or widened to include other sectors, but one 
deepened or extended to include the individual and larger societal groupings as 
referent objects of security.  In the 1990s, the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 
developed a reformulated and expanded security agenda which recognized five 
dimensions of security – political, military, economic, environmental and societal.  
Societal security has been defined as the defence of identity with identity accepted 
as the way in which communities think about themselves and the manner in which 
individuals identify themselves as members of a particular community. The Institute’s 
research on societal security was further expanded by Paul Roe in his 2005 study on 
ethnic conflict in the Balkan states.   
The determination of successive Malaysian governments to inculcate Islamic 
values throughout its infrastructure and society was borne from the inter-communal 
violence in May 1969, a civil reaction to the unexpected election results.  The loss of 
parliamentary majority, for so long the domain of the Malays, confirmed a significant 
shift in political power and the increasingly influential role of the non-Malay voice in 
the political process.   The inter-ethnic hostility resulted in a Federation-wide state of 
emergency and the suspension of parliamentary democracy for 20 months during 
which time the country was led by the National Operations Council under the 
leadership of Tun Abdul Razak.  The National Operations Council and subsequent 
administrations progressively introduced policy to restore Malay political supremacy 
and redress societal imbalance. 
iii 
 
Despite the obvious success of Malaysia’s social transformation, research 
has indicated that policy introduced to lessen the economic and social inequality of 
the Malays has, in effect, led to a polarising of ethnicities.  Political historians and 
analysts are mindful that increasing ethnic tension along with tacit ethnic segregation 
are salient reminders of the violence of the 1969 ethnic riots. 
With the theoretical framework on societal security provided by the CPRI, this 
thesis proposes to analyse the impact of the post-1969 political paradigm on 
Malaysian society with particular focus on inter-societal relations. 
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Chapter 1                                                            Introduction                                          
 
   
 
Where can you feel the core of the earth and be soothed by its wonders 
or be in the presence of a stranger and yet feel so close 
Where can you mingle with the oldest races and be right at home 
Where can your wishes come true, a pocket full at a time - a place like nowhere else on earth 
Malaysia truly Asia.
1
 
 
 
 
The lyrics of Tourism Malaysia’s successful campaign entice travellers to its shores 
with promises of a sojourn in a land enriched by the many cultures which together call 
Malaysia home.  The broad tapestry of Malaysian society is woven, not only by the 
descendants of the primordial peoples of long ago, but also by the comparatively 
recent arrival of new groups, each ethnie contributing to create a vibrant, complex and, 
at times, problematic fusion. 
 
Historians have advanced various times traders from distant lands first appeared 
throughout the Malay Peninsula and Indonesian Archipelago.  While archaeological 
evidence in the tin and gold mining areas of the peninsula indicates a Chinese and 
Indian presence in prehistoric times, it was not until the 5th century that Chinese 
commerce was firmly established.2  From the 7th century, the powerful Hindu kingdom 
of Srivijaya, based in Sumatra, provided a mainstay for both Indian and Chinese 
traders.3  Burial markers and other stones led some researchers to theorise Persian 
and Arab merchants established trading links in this period, though Islam was not to 
become a major influence in the region for a further seven centuries.4  Those who 
dispute the veracity of this particular evidence, posit that the markers were possibly 
                                                
1 For lyrics see http://www.jewoley.com. 
2 Virginia Matheson Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia:  Linking East and West (Crows Nest:  Allen & Unwin, 
2003), pp. 36-38.   
3 Ibid., p. 46. 
4 Ibid., p. 5.  Currently in the National Historical Museum in Kuala Lumpur, the Terengganu Stone, inscribed 
with the date of 1303CE, is the earliest record of Islam in Malaysia.   
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brought from trading centres along the Indian coastline; cities which had provided 
refuge, in some instances, for those fleeing religious persecution in the Middle  East.5 
Irrespective of its origins, by the 13th and 14th centuries, Islam had become a 
dominant force throughout the region. With the arrival of the colonial powers – the 
Portuguese, French, Dutch, British and Spanish – each endeavoured to fortify their 
country’s economic base by containing Islam’s ideological and political dominance.6   
However, apart from the British who, perhaps more from expediency than anything 
else were to entrench Islam within the Malaysian Constitution all failed to alleviate the 
Islamic legacy to any significant degree.  
Two features of Islam particularly appealed to the Malay rajas, a title redolent 
of the influence of Hinduism.7  The first was the attraction towards the “Persian 
tradition of kingship”8 most obviously seen in the adoption of the titles ‘sultan’ and 
‘caliph’.  These inscriptions have been found on coins dating from the 15th century, and 
in Malay literature, there are several instances where the term ‘Shadow of God on 
Earth’ is used in reference to the rulers.9  Of concern to the purist among the faithful, is 
the Pahang translation of Sura XI, 30 “not that God placed Adam on earth as his 
representative, but that he had placed the Raja on earth as his representative”.10 
The mysticism of the Sufi was the second feature of Islam which attracted the 
raja.  Of particular interest was the doctrine of the ‘Perfect Man’ which appeared in 
                                                
5 G.W.J. Drewes, ‘The Coming of Islam to Indonesia’ in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin 
Hussain (Eds), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 
10; for a synopsis of the various theories discussing the origins of Islam in this region, see Johan H. 
Meuleman, ‘The History of Islam in Southeast Asia’ in K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali 
(Eds), Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 22-44.  
6 Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (Eds), Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 4. 
7 A.C. Milner, ‘Islam and Malay Kingship’ in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique and Yasmin Hussain (Eds), 
Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 25. 
8 Ibid., p. 27. Milner, in The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya:  Contesting Nationalism and the Expansion of the 
Public Sphere (Cambridge:  University of Cambridge, 2002), p. 146. 
9 Ibid.  Milner explains that when the caliphate “lost its monopoly of political and religious leadership”, the 
term “Shadow of God on earth’, an ancient Babylonian title, was appropriated by the new rulers wishing 
to adopt “ambitious titles” across the Middle East, India and through into Southeast Asia. 
10 Ibid. 
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Malay literature from the 15th and 16th centuries.11  Not only did the Malay raja have 
authority for the daily mundane chores of existence, he also had responsibility for 
metaphysical matters.  As such, he evaluated the benefits of “the latest spiritual 
doctrines or techniques”12 for possible acquisition by his people.  With a belief system 
receptive to the spiritual, the mysticism of the Sufi was embraced with ease – even if 
“reference to Sufism in Malay writings would often invite censorship on the part of later 
Malay copyists”.13 
European colonial expansion throughout Southeast Asia brought the first of the 
British adventurers to the region in the latter half of the 19th century, almost 250 years 
after the arrival of the first European explorers, the Portuguese, who took control of 
Malacca in 1511.14  In a virtual ‘carve-up of spoils’ the rivalrous nature of the various 
European powers, each vying for control not only of trade but of the islands that 
constituted the region, resulted in a series of treaties guaranteeing the monopoly of 
particular trading regions or settlements.    The treaties were often negotiated without 
the involvement of the local rulers, resulting, in some instances, in conflict between the 
indigenous tribes and the local ruler, the raja, or the tribal communities, on the one 
hand, and the colonial power and the raja on the other.15   
The vagaries of conflict between the colonial powers, which fought each other 
in Europe thousands of miles distant from their possessions in Southeast Asia, led to 
consequential ‘transfers of treaties’ from one power to another. In the late 1700s and 
early in the 19th century, as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain gained control of 
                                                
11 Ibid., p.29.  Milner writes that the Perfect Man is the myth of the “saintly figure who has fully realised his 
essential oneness with the Divine Being and who, bodhisattva like, guides his disciples along the path he has 
trodden”.Considered integral to Sufi belief is the concept of the Perfect Man perceived as an individual no 
longer separated from the creator through the effects of Adam’s fall, but rather one, according to 
Professor E.H. Palmer, perfect in works, deeds, principles and the Sufi sciences. (http://muslim-
canada.org/sufi3.htm). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia:  A Political Profile (South Melbourne; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 266. 
15 Nicholas Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Melbourne, Vic:  Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 48-
51. 
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Sri Lanka, large areas of the Indonesian Archipelago and on the Malay Peninsula, 
Malacca, colonies formally held by Holland.16  With their fortunes restored a decade 
later, the Dutch returned and renegotiated new treaties and contracts with the 
Indonesian-Malayan states.17  In response to growing protest from merchants whose 
enterprises had become established during the “British interregnum”18 in March 1824, 
the British signed a treaty with the Dutch which, in effect, proclaimed the two European 
powers to be “exclusive Lords of the East”.19  The Straits Settlements, Penang, Melaka 
and Singapore would be British possessions, while the Dutch maintained a “Java-
focused empire”.20  This region is fortunate in having a rich cultural heritage which has 
created a syncretised montage of religious belief; an indigenous animist belief system 
with subsequent ‘layerings’ of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity with a final 
dusting of European colonialism.   
 
This thesis has its origins in a conversation with a Chinese Malaysian friend now living 
in New Zealand.   Caroline related to me how, when she first started working in 
Malaysia in the mid-1970s, her Muslim colleagues would, on occasion, come to her 
home for a meal where they would all eat the same food.21  Over the time, slight 
changes began to take place in Caroline’s relationship with her colleagues.  While they 
continued to come to her home, her friends began contributing halal food for the meal, 
preferring to use their own utensils rather than Caroline’s.  Finally, the subtle distancing 
resulted in the cessation of shared meals entirely; her Muslim colleagues no longer 
visited her home. 
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 50. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  Sir Stamford Raffles, former governor of Java, also argued that it would be to Britain’s advantage to 
secure not only the route to China but that Britain itself “should create an empire in the archipelago.” 
19 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Pseudonym used. 
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This conversation intrigued me.  Why would Caroline’s Muslim friends no 
longer share a meal in her home?  What could have happened in Malaysian society 
which would prevent or at least dissuade her friends and colleagues from sharing a 
meal with a non-Muslim friend? If societal fragmentation had occurred in Malaysian 
society, what had precipitated it?  Was it the result of government policy?  Was it the 
outcome of a growing sense of unease, within the non-Muslim population, at the 
steady Islamising of Malaysia? Was it simply the inevitable product of a cultural diverse 
society?  Ultimately, the question to be asked was whether Malaysian society was 
vastly different from other multi-cultural societies?  Is it an impossibility for communities 
composed of differing ethnicities or cultures to co-exist harmoniously within the same 
society? 
With these questions in mind, this thesis has two objectives.  First, it proposes 
to examine Malaysia’s political development from the establishment of the Federation 
in September 1963 until the March 2008 General Election within the contextual 
framework of societal security theory as developed by researchers from the 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (CPRI).  In doing so, this thesis joins a body of 
similar research namely Paul Roe’s 2005 study on conflict in the Balkans which 
expanded the work of the CPRI and Claire Wilkinson’s 2007 research on the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan which critiqued the applicability of the theory.22  Second, in 
determining whether societal fragmentation has occurred, analysis will be directed 
towards identifying recurrent themes within the economic, political and cultural spheres 
of the Malay and non-Malay identities which may have contributed to a polarising of 
ethnicities within Malaysian society. 
Chapter Two, ‘The Security Discourse’, provides a synopsis of the 
reconceptualisation of security theory from its classical origins to the contemporary 
                                                
22 Paul Roe, Ethnic Violence and the Social Security Dilemma (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005) and Claire 
Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan:  Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside 
Europe?’, Security Dialogue 2007; 38(5). 
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dynamic.  Over the past 30 years or so, a fundamental shift in the typology of issues 
with the potential to cause insecurity has occurred.  While the end of the Cold War was 
not, in itself, the sole reason for this reconfiguration, it was, nonetheless, causal to the 
expanded security agenda.  In the 1990s, researchers based at the CPRI led by Barry 
Buzan and Ole Waever developed an expanded agenda which recognized five 
dimensions of security – political, military, economic, environmental and societal with 
this final dimension defined as the measures a group adopts to ensure the survival of 
its identity – in itself a contestable term but incorporating those aspects which together 
form the unique identity of a particular collective. 
Moving from the theoretical and conceptual framework of chapter two, chapters 
three, four and five will analyse, within the context of defined time periods, the 
applicability of the societal security concept in a case study on Malaysia’s political 
development.  Chapter Three, ‘The Formative Period:  1963-1969’, overviews the 
historiography of the Malay and non-Malay identities before discussing whether the 
existence of a societal security dilemma precipitated the bitter inter-communal conflict 
of May 1969.  Chapter Four, ‘The Tun Razak Legacy:  1970 to 2003’, in outlining policy 
implemented by successive administrations to restore and maintain inter-ethnic peace, 
will determine whether the initiatives alleviated inter-societal tension or further 
heightened societal insecurity.  The final of the case study chapters, Chapter Five, 
‘Unity in Opposition:  2004 to 2008’, in giving a brief account of Malaysia’s political 
culture under the leadership of Abdullah Badawi, will theorise the political future of the 
state - the continuation of an entrenched hegemonic model where one ethnicity 
dominates to maintain order and stability or the dawning of a new political climate with 
the potential to give greater voice to the state’s plurality. 
 
 
7 
The final chapter, in summarising the thesis, concludes with comments on 
Malaysia’s changed political landscape speculating whether the creation of a two-party 
parliamentary system could be undermined by politicians who forsake those who 
elected them by crossing the floor to join opposing parties. 
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Chapter 2                                           The Security Discourse                          
 
   
 
The sustained study of the ‘security problematique’ raises more questions than it 
resolves, questions about role of the state, the implications of regional and global 
governance, the primacy of the state or the individual, the permeability of states in the 
light of existing and developing regional structures such as the European Union with 
the introduction of a common currency and passport.  The following chapter provides a 
brief synopsis of the idea of security examining the dominant themes in the debate 
over its conceptualisation.  The chapter concludes with an overview of societal 
security, drawn from research undertaken by analysts based at the Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute – an independent research unit which merged with the 
Danish Institute for International Studies in January 2005.    
 
2.1  The Commonality of Fear 
There is little doubt that most people will experience feelings of happiness or sorrow, 
wonder or ambivalence, sometime during their lifetime.  The difficulty in formulating 
definitive statements for these various abstruse notions is that the concepts are, in 
many cases, subjective.  What humanity has in common is not the intensity or 
motivation which generates the sensation, commonality exists because the emotions 
are universally encountered. 
The concept of security is equally complex and profound and, as such, defies 
simple explanation.  While it is generally accepted that the desire to exist free from the 
threat of harm is fundamental to the human condition, it is inevitable that people, 
collectively or individually, will, at some point in their lives, experience periods of 
ominous ineluctable fear.   
 
9 
 
The degree and cause of insecurity varies within society and between societies.  In 
reality however, an existence totally devoid of fear, or the threat of future harm, is an 
impossibility, the permutations of the security/insecurity dichotomy too vast to negate.  
The best that humanity can perhaps hope for, supposing a security/insecurity 
continuum was envisaged, is to work collectively towards effecting a society which 
approaches a state of being the most secured possible.   
 
2.2  Classical Security Theory 
The problem confronting security analysts today is to identify which threats constitute 
the greatest risk to the continuance of humankind.  This is not to presuppose that all 
has already been done to provide the best environment for humanity.  It is an 
indictment on the global community that, in many regions of the world, large-scale 
human rights abuses result in heightened insecurities for significant numbers of 
people, those with differing religious views, minority ethnicities, and people of 
difference sometimes referred to as the other.  
The abrupt and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought to an 
end the Cold War dynamics which had dictated the tenor of security theory for the 
previous half century.  With the likelihood of large scale conflict between nations 
significantly reduced, analysts now debate the impact of such issues as environmental 
degradation, transnational crime, the effect of prolonged civil war and the current 
topical discourse, climate change, all of which, though evident before, present an 
increasing threat today.23 
Threat determination is dependent on the particular level of security being 
promulgated; whether the primary referent object of security is the individual or 
collectively, larger groups such as societies, ethnicities or sovereign states. 24  
Historically, security has been concerned with defending the sovereignty of the state, 
                                                
23 Roland Dannreuther, International Security:  The Contemporary Agenda (Cambridge, UK:  Polity, 2007), p. 13. 
24 The primary referent object of security refers to that level at which the focus of security analysis shall lie. 
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primarily from military threat, by maintaining the state’s political autonomy and 
territorial integrity.  Broadly defined, the realist approach, which regards the state as 
the primary referent object of security, asserts that states, whether they are seeking 
“freedom, security, prosperity, or power”,25 do so through the pursuit and acquisition of 
power in its various manifestations in an environment viewed by realists as anarchical 
and predatory.26 
Realism, with its origins in the theory of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Thomas 
Hobbes, is sustained by the belief that humankind's search for a utopian existence is a 
mere chimera.27  In reality, the human condition, with its innate drive to acquire power 
and security, makes the desired state an unachievable goal.28  Despite individuals 
aspiring to think kind thoughts of each other, the uncertainty of never really knowing 
the other's thoughts leads inevitably to a sense of doubt and mistrust.  This baleful 
state is encapsulated in Hobbes’ Leviathan: 
 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live 
without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall 
furnish them withall…
29
       
 
This sense of doubt and mistrust is evident at all levels of the familiar analytical 
hierarchy - the individual, the state, and, globally, the international community of 
sovereign states.  Just as individuals may, at times, doubt the intentions of others, the 
realist preoccupation with ensuring state security through increasing power – leading to 
activities such as weapons acquisition or engaging troops in military manoeuvres - 
may create a reciprocal sense of insecurity within fellow states provoking them to, in 
                                                
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations:  The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, 2006), p. 29. 
26 Edward A. Kolodziej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 
127-150.  See Kolodziej for the prevailing stances within the realist school which he has further defined as 
pessimistic realism and optimistic realism; also Dannreuther, 2007, p. 38 for discussion on offensive-
defensive realism. 
27 Kolodziej, 2005, p. 127. 
28 Michael Sheehan, International Security:  An Analytical Survey (Boulder, Colo.:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 
2005), p. 15. 
29 Richard E. Flathman and David Johnston (Eds), Leviathan:  Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, Interpretations / 
Thomas Hobbes (New York; London:  W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 70. 
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turn, take retaliatory measures.  Such offensive-defensive measures can range from 
arms racing to pre-emptive attack. The manner in which states misperceive each 
other's intentions gives rise to the security dilemma which was initially identified by 
Butterfield and Herz in the early 1950s.30    
 
2.3  The Broadening Spectrum of Security  
From the 1970s, political realism, which had traditionally prescribed inter-state 
relations for the best part of half a century, became the subject of increasing debate; 
debate which would, over time, see the formation of new schools of thought in the field 
of security studies.   Of contention, for analysts not so deeply entrenched in the 
classical perception of security, was the view that realism’s somewhat narrow focus on 
securing the state against military threat should no longer remain the dominant 
paradigm.   Technological advances and the development of globalisation, with its 
attendant economic concerns, were altering peoples’ perceptions of their world.  This, 
along with the decreasing salience of military threat in the closing decade of the Cold 
War allowed “previously marginalized issues to emerge from the shadow of 
superpower rivalry”31 along with a growing awareness of human rights issues.32   
The 1980s saw the publication of several volumes analysing differing security 
perspectives including Barry Buzan’s seminal work People, States & Fear in 1983 
(First Edition)  which introduced scholars to terms that would become synonymous 
with the changing dynamic of security - widening, broadening, deepening and 
expanding.33  Traditionalists maintained the view that the realist conception of security 
must retain its primacy.  Others, however, posited that not only should the dimensions 
of the security agenda be widened or broadened to include other sectors but that the 
                                                
30 Roe, 2005, pp. 3-4. 
31 Peter Hough, Understanding Global Security Second Edition (London, New York:  Routledge, 2008), p. 7. 
32 Richard Falk,‘Reframing the Legal Agenda of World Order in the Course of a Turbulent Century’ in 
Richard Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz and R.B.J. Walker (Eds), Reframing the International: Law, Culture, Politics 
(New York; London:  2002), p. 58. 
33 Barry Buzan, People States & Fear, Second Edition:  An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War 
Era (Harlow, England:  Pearson Education Ltd, 1991) 
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referent object of security should be deepened or extended expanding its focus from 
the state alone to include the individual and collective units identified by Dannreuther 
as ranging from “identity-based social forces, regional and international institutions, 
and even the planet as a whole”.34  
Despite the opposing views, it would be incorrect to assume that analysts were 
divided into two camps: those wishing to retain the classical view and those working to 
effect wholesale revision of security concepts.  Buzan, for example, despite advancing 
a wider approach to security by encompassing areas traditionally neglected by 
analysts, which has been regarded by some as a “radical and important departure”,35 
advocated his neo-realist view that as far as deepening the security agenda was 
concerned, the state should remain of prime concern.  For all its imperfections, the 
sovereign state had “evolved over several centuries to become the principal unit of 
political organisation”36 with a monopoly over violence which was reinforced and 
legitimised by a growing body of international law.  It must be acknowledged, however, 
that in 2003 Buzan and Waever declared “…it is for history to decide how central the 
state is to security compared with other possible referents”.37  
 
2.4  Human Security 
To analysts who advocated a broadening of the security agenda with the inclusion of 
further sectors apart from the traditional military and of "many different levels, such as 
the individual and the international”,38 the appeal lay in the ability to address a more 
comprehensive range of security concerns than were currently being met by classical 
theory.39  Human Security and Critical Security Studies are two conceptions of security 
which particularly embraced the focus on the individual as opposed to the state. 
                                                
34 Dannreuther, 2007, p.43. 
35 Sheehan, 2005, p. 48. 
36 Kolodziej, 2005, p. 128. 
37 Sheehan, 2005, p. 51. 
38 Ibid., p. 58. 
39 Ibid., p. 57. 
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Human Security originated in discussions following the release of the 1994 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report which called for a shift in 
focus from nuclear security to the concerns of humanity. 40   The UNDP report 
commented on four main features of the concept of human security: 
 
It is a universal concern, relevant to people everywhere because the threats are 
common to all; its components are interdependent since the threats to human 
security do not stay within national borders; it is easier to achieve through early 
rather than later intervention; and it is people-centred, in that it is concerned with 
how people ‘live and breathe’ in society.
41
 
 
The UNDP report argued that despite the historical perception of human security  
being bound up in freedom from both fear and want, it was in fact endemic in virtually 
every area of human existence:  economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political.42  Subsequent reports refined the initial meaning with the 
1997 definition “introducing the distinction between income poverty and human 
poverty”.43 
In response to calls by the then UN (United Nations) Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan, the Commission on Human Security was established with a mandate to protect 
and empower people.44  The Commission’s 2003 report echoed a call for “a new 
security framework focused on people and aimed at ensuring their security”. 45  
Caroline Thomas, a leading proponent of human security, defined the concept as 
requiring that basic material needs are met in tandem with the achievement of human 
dignity.46   
 
 
                                                
40 Steve Smith, ‘The Contested Concept of Security’ in Ken Booth (Ed.), Critical Security Studies and World 
Politics (Boulder, Colo.; London:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 51. 
41 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994 cited by Smith, 2005, p. 52. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 53. 
44 "Commission on Human Security Report" [ March, 2002] 
      (http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/index.htm) 
45 Ibid. 
46 Smith, 2005, p. 54. 
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2.5  Critical Security Studies 
Considered by Steve Smith to be “the most sustained and coherent critique of 
traditional security studies”,47 Critical Security Studies (CSS) takes a diametrically 
opposing view to the traditional model by rejecting the concept that security lies in the 
accumulation of power and instead argues that because “states with similar notions of 
social justice and economic wealth do not go to war against one another, here lies the 
basis of security”.48  In common with Human Security, CSS “…replaces power with 
emancipation”49 advocating that security is achieved by instituting systems which 
remove poverty and political oppression, that is, through freedom from want and fear.50   
Proponents for state-centric security concepts argue that broadening the 
security agenda carries the risk of creating an incoherent concept of security.51  
Human Security and CSS both reconceptualise security in wider dimensions than 
solely the military sector while concomitantly raising the security of the individual above 
that of the state.  Those advocating a reformulation of the security agenda turn to 
statistical data indicating that "…32.5% of all deaths are from communicable diseases 
which cannot be thought of as inevitable…"52 while only 0.4 percent of the world's 
population die from collective violence.53  By the same token, however, the Foreign 
Policy website posted, in November 2007, statistical information on The World's 
Biggest Military Buildups which noted that while "most of the world's militaries have 
downsized…in recent years, a few countries have been bulking up".54  There is no 
doubt that the threat of violent conflict along with the debate over the contestability of 
security is far from over. 
                                                
47 Ibid., p. 40. 
48 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues, (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003), p. 3.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 This point is made in several treatises on security expansion. 
52 Hough, 2008, p. 16.  The statistical data is drawn from 2001 figures. 
53 Ibid., p. 17, defines collective violence as "wars and all 'organized’ killings including international war, civil 
war, political massacres (e.g. genocide), non-state violence (terrorism) and gang crime". 
54 "The List: The World's Biggest Military Buildups" in Foreign Policy [November 2007] 
(http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4051&print=1) 
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2.6  Securitisation 
Prior to a discussion on the substantive research generated by the Copenhagen 
School’s post-Cold War analysis of the multi-sectoral approach, it is timely to consider 
the research of Ole Waever who, during the 1990s, defined the meaning of the term 
‘securitisation’.55  Securitisation is a complex process which can either have a negative 
or positive impact on the issue at hand.  In essence, securitisation involves a leading 
actor, generally the state but increasingly powerful non-state actors, presenting an 
issue as an existential threat to the populace.  Once accepted as such, the state (or 
leading non-state actor) can enact various measures, which ultimately impinge on the 
individual’s civil liberties, ranging from the adoption of curfew hours, the 
implementation of stringent border controls to the monitoring of the media or activist 
groups which it contends pose a threat to the security of the population.   The 
measures are imposed not only to ensure the security of the population but also to 
promote and protect the national security of the state.  This then introduces the aspect 
that the state itself may act as a security threat to the people it purports to protect.56 
Governments will generally commit significant financial resources to an issue 
which they consider sufficiently serious to securitise.  A contemporary instance of a 
securitised issue is evidenced by the actions of the United States’ (US) government in 
the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.  The American people accepted the 
existential threat posed by terrorism.  The Bush administration then instituted far-
reaching policy and directive change.  Billions of US government revenue has been 
allocated to fight, domestically and internationally, the ‘war on terror’. 
For groups within society fighting for causes with little recognition from either 
the public or government, securitisation can appeal.  The securitisation process may 
access financial resources previously withheld and heighten societal awareness.  On 
                                                
55 Ole Waever, then Senior Research Fellow with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 
56 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security:  A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.; 
London:  1998), pp. 23-26. 
16 
 
the downside, concern is expressed that securitisation could be “…counter-productive, 
because they…[issues such as the environment and migration] will end up being 
colonized by a military mind-set rather than being addressed in a holistic and politically 
progressive manner”.57 
 
2.7 The Reconceptualisation of Security:  An examination of the               
Copenhagen School’s Societal Security Formulation. 
 
The increasing prevalence of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War period, 
contributed to a call by International Relations' scholars to consider expanding the 
focus of security to encompass other areas traditionally neglected by analysts.58  The 
expansion of security was reflected in the emergence of a more multi-sectoral 
approach first elucidated by Buzan, in People, States, and Fear.59  In addition to the 
established military-centric focus of security, Buzan advocated that political, economic, 
societal and environmental dimensions be included.60   
Whilst it was generally agreed that the classical approach to security was in need 
of review, and that a broader definition was preferable, analysts from the CPRI 
debated the decision to advance Buzan’s initial model with its proposed expanded 
security agenda.  In 1993, Ole Waever advanced a reconceptualisation of security, the 
premise of which suggested a “duality of state and societal security”:61 the latter was 
“retained as a sector of state security, but it…[was] also a referent object of security in 
its own right”.62  Whereas the traditional formulation of security was concerned with 
ensuring the survival of the state, societal security was “all about threats to identity”.63  
                                                
57 Sheehan, 2005, p. 53.
58 Roe, 2005, p. 4. 
59 Sheehan, 2005, p. 2. 
60 Buzan, 1991, p. 19. 
61 Roe, 2005, p. 43. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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A society which lost its identity would not survive; and a state ran the risk of becoming 
destabilised by “threats to its societies”.64   
Just as in the more traditional form of security in which one state’s (or collective 
of states) attempts to ensure its autonomy and integrity may be misperceived by others 
thereby creating a sense of insecurity, so similar misperceptions may occur in the 
societal security sector.   In plural societies, societal security dilemmas may arise 
“when the actions which groups take to secure their identity”65 are viewed as a threat to 
the identity of other groups which together constitute that particular society.  If that 
particular society has a history of identity contestation, the probability that the sense of 
insecurity will transition to some form of conflict is elevated.  Dominant groups, or those 
who maintain a preponderance of societal power, have the ability to legislate severe 
repressive measures designed to ultimately “deprive societies of beliefs and practices 
vital to the maintenance of their culture”,66  leaving the less powerful, often times the 
minority groups, with few options to defend their identity.   
 
2.7.1  Societal Security:  A Question of Identity   
Societal security is essentially about survival – the survival of what makes ‘our’ 
community ‘us’.  Societal insecurity exists when a given society feels that its ‘we’ 
identity is under threat by external developments or potentialities the community itself 
has defined “as a threat to their survival”.67  To the CPRI, the key to society is:  
 
those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group…[It 
is] about identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying 
themselves as members of a community…distinct from, although often entangled 
with…political organizations concerned with government.
68
   
 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p.73.
66 Ibid., p. 58. 
67 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 119.    
68 Ibid. 
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Society is not defined in terms of nations but as “large-self-sustaining identity groups”69 
and in today’s political environment, “the most important referent objects in the societal 
sector are tribes, clans, nations (and nationlike ethnic units, which others call 
minorities), civilizations, religions and race (sic)”.70   
The CPRI’s decision to collectivise and identify these groups has not been 
accepted without debate.  Critics assert that the units have constructed 
“simplistic[ally]” 71 or “”conceived as a social fact, with the same objectivity and 
ontological status as the state”.72  The mounting incidence of intra-state conflict in the 
final decades of the last century however, was causal to a rethinking of security.  At the 
heart of conflict was not so much the maintenance of the “state’s levers of power, but 
rather the identity of that state and the shape of its borders”,73  With this in mind, as an 
alternative, Sheehan proffers the term ‘identity security’ – a concept which, doubtless, 
would also attract a measure of criticism from those mindful of any amendment to the 
traditional concept of security.74 
 
2.7.2  Threats to Societal Security 
In categorising threats to societal security in three main strands – migration, horizontal 
competition and vertical competition - the CPRI also considered a possible fourth 
strand, depopulation.75 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 123. 
71  Martin Shaw (1993) “There is No Such Thing as Society:  Beyond Individualism and Statism in 
International Security Studies.”  Review of International Studies 19, pp. 159-175 cited in Sheehan, 2005, p. 85. 
72 Bill McSweeney (1996).  “Identity and Security:  Buzan and the Copenhagen School.”  Review of International 
Studies 22, pp.81-93 cited in Sheehan, 2005, p. 86. 
73 Sheehan, 2005, p. 85; see Sheehan for content on analysts and scholars critical of the work of the CPRI, pp. 
84-88. 
74 Ibid., p. 84.  For further information on the stance of Buzan et al see Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 
(1998),  pp. 119-120. 
75 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121. 
19 
 
2.7.2.1  Migration  
Migration presents as a threat to a societal grouping when the community is at risk of 
being overwhelmed by such a sudden or consistent influx of people from elsewhere 
that the composition of the original community will, over time, alter.  The reasons 
people shift habitats are varied and, in many incidences, not made through personal 
choice.  Significant numbers of people are enforced through economic necessity, 
environmental catastrophe or violent conflict.   
 
2.7.2.2  Horizontal Competit ion 
Horizontal competition refers to the threat that a community’s identity will alter under 
the impact of the more dominant identity of a neighbouring societal grouping.76  With 
the pervasive reach of 21st century technology however, the stronger identity need not 
be merely next door, but may be geo-politically placed far distant.  Witness the impact 
of global franchises, the growth in social networking sites following in the wake of the 
internet provider and mushrooming consumerism propelled by mass media. 
 
2.7.2.3  Vertical Competit ion    
Vertical competition is the term adopted for the threat that the societal identity of a 
particular community will be impacted to such a degree by either being subsumed 
within a greater regional confederation, such as the European Union, or the 
establishment of a national homeland, such as Palestine or Kurdistan, that it will cease 
to exist.77  The CPRI states that the former pulls the communities in wider identities 
while the latter creates a narrower perception.78 
 
2.7.2.4  Depopulation 
Depopulation is also recognised as a further threat to identity and can result through 
either natural catastrophe or the conscious acts of humanity.  Waever et., however, 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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comment that generally these threats impact on the individual and it is only if they have 
the potential to lead to the breakdown of society that “they become societal security 
issues”.79   
 
2.7.3  Sector Threat 
The CPRI posit further that aspects of the four remaining dimensions of security - 
military, political, economic and environmental – may also pose a threat to the 
continued maintenance of particular societal identities. 80  
 
2.7.3.1  Military 
An external military threat to a state does not mean that, in every case, there is a 
concomitant threat to its societies.  While on the one hand, “military threats to societal 
security can be seen mainly in terms of depopulation,” in some instances, a state’s 
vulnerability to military attack may liberate minority ethnic groupings repressed by the 
ethnic elite.  Internally, military aggression arising from conflict between the elite and 
its repressed minorities also threatens to jeopardise societal security.81   
 
2.7.3.2  Polit ical  
Typically, a political threat is generated by the state against its own minority ethnicities 
to which multi-ethnic states are the most prone.  Legislation can either ensure societal 
identity is protected or act against ethnic diversity by prohibiting or suppressing a 
state’s minorities.82  
 
2.7.3.3  Economic  
A state’s economy can threaten societal identity in two ways.  First, traditional identity 
can be eroded by continual exposure to the capitalist system: global products, attitudes 
                                                
79 Ibid. 
80 Roe, 2005, p. 49. 
81 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
82 Ibid., p. 50.
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and style.  Second, free market collapse “can also cause economic depression and 
unemployment which might hinder societies from enjoying their traditional (normal) 
way of life”.83 
    
2.7.3.4  Environmental    
The existence of a society which has strong ties to a particular region may be 
imperilled if the area is threatened by the adverse affects of “pollution, climate change, 
deforestation, desertification, and so forth”.84 
 
2.8  The Defence of Societal Identity 
While it is theoretically plausible to consider the options a minority group could take 
when confronted by a threat, sometimes the option of choice is not available.   
Communities may be instrumental in attempting to resolve contentious issues through 
legitimate means by effecting government policy or directive.    There is the chance 
however, that the reverse may result and the threat level is increased.  At the non-state 
level, minority groups not wishing to secede from the state but to exist coterminously 
within the state, “strive for one of three basic options: to dominate the existing regime; 
to form their own government or simply to be left alone”.85 
 
2.9  The Link to Ethnic Conflict 
The manner and the form in which threats to ethnic identity manifest themselves 
depends upon whether the main ethnic group wishes to accommodate or eliminate 
ethnic difference.86  Ethnic difference is accommodated or managed by adopting 
policies which acculturate various elements of the minority communities within the 
larger ethnicity with the aim of creating a cohesive group identity.  An ethnic hegemony 
                                                
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London; New York:  
Routledge, 1993), p. 4.
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which does not wish to accommodate ethnic difference adopts policies and strategies 
to homogenise society, ultimately removing or eliminating difference.  Both elites may 
have similar aims, strong group identity, but the former incorporates aspects of 
minority ethnicities within while the latter removes any trace of ethnic diversity. 
The most extreme form in which ethnic homogenisation manifests itself is 
ethnic cleansing; that is, the physical elimination of any unwanted group from an area 
either by committing genocide or by forcibly removing them from a region.  Both 
methods prevent and/or impede the transmission of cultural heritage to the future.  
Policies which attempt to assimilate ethnic diversity may be more passive than ethnic 
cleansing, but the ultimate goal remains the same, the elimination of a society’s 
identity.   The dominant ethnic group may impose legislation restricting or prohibiting 
the use of a minority ethnicity’s cultural production defined by Roe as “the control of 
one’s own schools, museums, newspapers, religious institutions, even to have one’s 
own television and radio broadcasts”.87 
 
2.10  CPRI Research Expanded 
In 2005, Paul Roe expanded the research of the Copenhagen School on societal 
security in a study on ethnic conflict in the Balkan states.  Roe’s major contribution to 
societal security theory (SST) lies in the area of the societal security dilemma which he 
advances can be identified as one of three formulations.  This, he suggests, enables a 
“more nuanced conceptual tool”.88  First, tight security dilemmas which are “resolvable 
short of war”,89   second, regular security dilemmas which Roe asserts, are “difficult to 
resolve short of war”90 with the third category, loose security dilemmas, “irresolvable 
short of war”.91   Roe posits loose security dilemmas as the most problematic because 
                                                
87 Roe, 2005, p. 64. 
88 Ibid., p. 3. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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this dynamic considers the notions of power-seeking and security-seeking equally.  As 
he states in a 2001 Security Dialogue article, “it appears not to matter whether actors 
are security seekers or power seekers”.92 
In as much as Roe’s study on the Balkan conflict provides the template for the 
study on Malaysia, the thesis does not define the security dilemma as tight, regular or 
loose but rather examines the Malay/non-Malay paradigm in terms of their status as 
either power or security- seeking.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
92 Paul Roe, ‘Actors' Responsibility in `Tight', `Regular' or `Loose' Security Dilemmas’, Security Dialogue 
2001 32: 109.  Roe’s formulations are also discussed in his Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, 
pp. 2-3. 
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Chapter 3                         The Formative Period:   1963-1969 
 
   
 
On 15 May 1969 bitter inter-societal violence resulted in the declaration of a state of 
emergency throughout the Malaysian Federation.  In determining whether the conflict 
can be attributed to an emerging societal security dilemma, this chapter first 
establishes unique aspects of Malay and non-Malay identity then explores contending 
power relations between the Malay-dominant central authority and the governments of 
the states on the periphery:  Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah.  The concluding section 
focuses on the May 1969 elections identifying issues which set in motion an escalating 
dynamic, the outcome of which led to the inter-communal conflict and the subsequent 
suspension of parliamentary democracy.  
 
3.1  Malay Societal Identity 
Malay identity is predicated on the belief that as Bumiputera, the Malay people have a 
pre-eminent position throughout the Federation.93  This belief was woven into the 
Malay political ideology with the founding documents of the Federation of Malaya in 
February 1948.  Malay pre-eminence was unchallenged and affirmed by the non-
Malay political leaders at Merdeka (Independence) in August 1957 and again, in 
September 1963, with the promulgation of the Constitution of the Malaysian 
Federation.94  
Malay political authority is encapsulated in Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu 
Bersatu (United Malays National Organisation, UMNO) the Federation’s most 
influential political party formed in 1946 to abrogate Britain’s intention to create a 
                                                
93 Bumiputera – in Hindi, literally ‘original sons of the soil’.  The development of the concepts of ‘Malay’ and 
‘Malayness’ are traced by Shamsul A.B., ‘Text and Collective Memories:  The Construction of “Chinese” 
and “Chineseness” from the Perspective of a Malay’ in Leo Suryadinata (Ed.), Ethnic Relations and Nation-
Building in Southeast Asia:  The Case of the Ethnic Chinese (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2004), pp.116-122. 
94 Merdeka – means freedom in Malay. 
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Malayan Union.95  It was envisaged that, while effectively transferring the sovereignty 
of the Malay rulers to the British Crown, a union of states would introduce a degree of 
uniformity in law and administration and make available to members of other 
ethnicities the “privileges which had previously been reserved for the Malays”.96  The 
proposal was not welcomed by the Malay nationalists who were more intent, in the 
post-war period, on independent self-rule. 97   Intense opposition to the concept, 
interpreted by many as a neo-colonialist attempt to re-assert control over the states, 
mobilised and politicised the Malays.98   
Following the demise of the Union in February 1948, it was with the restored 
Malay leadership alone (the Malay rulers and UMNO) that Britain negotiated the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement.   In effect, the unitary state and qualified multi-ethnic 
equality the Union proposed was replaced by a federal system which embedded Malay 
dominance in the new nation-state.  
Malay paramountcy was enshrined in the Merdeka Constitution in 1957 and 
sustained by the British who countered suggestions by UMNO leadership that the new 
name of the nation-state be Malaysia, directing, instead, that it should be known as 
Persekutuan Tanah Melayu – ‘the land of the Malays’ – Malaya.99 
The Merdeka Constitution (the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya later 
amended to accommodate the greater Federation of Malaysia), is regarded as 
consisting of four elements:  the Sultanate; the Islamic religion; the Malay language 
                                                
95 Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London:  Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1976), p. 115n. 
96 Hooker, 2003, p. 187.   
97 Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London:  Tauris 
Academic Studies, 1996), p. 14. 
98 Hooker, 2003, p. 188.  Widespread resistance from within the Malay community led, in March 1946, to the 
inaugural meeting of the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress under the leadership of Dato Onn Jaafar.  It was at 
this conference that UMNO was formed.  In the face of the opposition, the Colonial Office was 
compelled to abandon the Malayan Union. 
99 Cheah Boon Kheng, ‘Ethnicity in the Making of Malaysia’ in Wang Gungwu (Ed.), Nation-Building:  Five 
Southeast Asian Histories (Singapore:  ISEAS Publications, 2005), pp. 99-102.  Malaya was in fact a name put 
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and Malay privileges.100  Of note is Article 153 which requires the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to reserve for the Malays "positions in the public service, scholarships and 
grants or other educational facilities, and permits and licences for business and trade 
operations".101  Despite the Constitution being amended in excess of 40 times in the 
period since its initial promulgation in 1957, Article 153 and others which endeavour to 
protect aspects of Malay identity, including religion and language, are virtually inviolate 
and, as such, have engendered a degree of discontent within the communal groups 
excluded from the provisions’ coverage. 102 
UMNO’s rival for the Malay vote is the Parti Islam Se Malaysia (the Pan-
Malayan Islamic Party, PMIP, commonly referred to as PAS).  Formed in the early 
1950s as a “religious and Islamic welfare movement”,103 PAS was initially unaffiliated 
to any political organisation.  It was not until the 1955 elections that steps were taken 
to register the organisation as a political party.104  Staunch proponents of Malay 
nationalism, PAS has consistently accused UMNO of compromising Malay pre-
eminence by granting concessions to non-Malay. 
 
3.2  Non-Malay Societal Identity 
Non-Malay identity can be delineated into three separate groupings:  the Chinese, 
Indian and the Bumiputera of the former Borneo states – Sarawak and Sabah.105  
History records the presence of Chinese and Indian traders in the region as early as 
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the 5th century.  It was not until the late 19th/early 20th centuries however, as Malaya 
progressively came under British administration and protection, that the numbers of 
Chinese and Indians (primarily Tamil) grew substantially.  The expansion of the 
economy under the direction of the British colonial authorities led to increasing export 
demand for the country’s raw materials and the assisted immigration of both Chinese 
and Indian labourers.  The Chinese developed trading centres and settled in the tin 
mining settlements with the Indians employed as indentured labourers in the rubber 
plantations and for the construction of new rail and road networks.   
The Chinese and Indian groups were accommodated within the existing 
structures of the new land with varying degrees of success and independence.  
Religious diversity was tolerated by the colonial authorities and as the people settled, 
temples and shrines and other symbols of their religious traditions gradually appeared 
within their particular societal enclaves.  Whereas the Chinese established and 
maintained their own schools, the introduction of Labour Laws in the 1920s regulated 
not only recruitment but the working conditions of Indian migrants.  The government 
legislated, and provided partial funding, for estates to provide schooling where there 
were more than ten school-age children on site; the same provisions extended to the 
children of Indian government employees.106   
The Chinese continued to practise the traditional patriarchal clan system and it 
was with the leading clans that the colonial government placed limited political 
authority.  The clans, through their secret societies, enforced law and order and 
provided a form of welfare in the isolated Chinese communities.  However the 
devolution of authority, albeit de facto, to the clans was the cause of intermittent 
conflict for economic and political control between the Chinese and Malay leaders.107  
Despite being proscribed by the 1889 Societies Ordinance, the stronger of the secret 
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societies evolved: some became the vehicle for illegal criminal activity (still in evidence 
today); others re-organised and emerged to become powerful political movements.  
Means traces the development of the Kuomintang, and the subsequent divisions in 
membership which led to the formation of the Chinese Communist Party in 1925 and 
the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1930.108 
In 1937, the Indian government cancelled all labour assisted schemes for 
migrant workers to Malaya.109  Until this time, indentured labourers had been recruited 
to work for a fixed period of between three to five years.110  The fact that the majority of 
the Indian community was intent on returning home meant that there was little interest 
in forming political organisations in Malaya: their focus was primarily on the political 
struggles of the Indian nationalist movement over the issue of national 
independence.111  However, in the turbulent post-World War II (WWII) period as the 
Malays mobilised to counter Britain’s intentions to restore a form of colonial authority, it 
became apparent to Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders that the Indian 
community would likewise benefit from the establishment of a cohesive organisation to 
facilitate greater participation in the future civil and political affairs of Malaya.  Thus, 
following an August 1946 conference to consider the issue, approval was given for the 
forming of the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).112   
In July 1948, the strong communal identity the Chinese sustained under 
colonial rule was tested by an armed insurrection against the British instigated by the 
MCP.113  The more conservative Chinese leadership could foresee the likelihood that 
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the communist-led insurgency could effectively preclude the Chinese from involvement 
in the political future of the state.  This fear, along with that of Chinese merchants 
whose businesses were not immune from hostile attack, led to the forming, in February 
1949, of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).  Party leadership “pledged full 
cooperation with the government” 114  demonstrated by the integral role the new 
organisation played in the enforced resettlement of some 1.2 million rural dwellers, 85 
percent of who were Chinese, in a scheme referred to as the Briggs Plan.115    
In 1952, the ad hoc arrangement the MCA and UMNO had negotiated to 
contest the Kuala Lumpur (KL) municipal elections held in February the same year was 
formalised at the national level.116  Two years later in 1954, after much debate, the MIC 
leadership elected to unite with UMNO and the MCA to form the Alliance.  While both 
the MCA and MIC were regarded the junior partners in the Alliance coalition from the 
outset, it would be fair to say that the latter, the MIC, was the more junior of the two.  
This is supported, in part, by Vasil’s comment that the MIC was jokingly referred to, 
during this period, “as the ‘May I Come’ (into the Alliance) party”.117  
The MIC was never truly representative of the Indian community: Allen in fact 
asserts that only one tenth of the community was represented by the organisation.118  
                                                                                                                                      
no longer forced to stay out of sight in the jungle, assumed control of the local government of many 
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A factor which inhibited the appeal of the MIC was its constitutional provisions 
restricting membership to Indians only: effectively excluding potential members of 
Ceylonese or Eurasian extraction.119  For a party endeavouring to portray itself as 
representing the majority of the Indian community, these exclusive provisions were 
counterproductive.  
The Peoples’ Progressive Party (PPP) proved to be the MIC’s rival for the 
Indian vote.  With an inclusive multi-ethnic ethos, the PPP was consistently a thorn in 
the side of the MIC.  The party called for the resignation of MIC leadership and 
contested seats held by the MIC, at times attracting a greater portion of the Indian 
popular vote which inevitably raised tension between MIC and UMNO leadership.  
Intra-party dissension along with tense relations with the PPP further impeded the 
development of the MIC as a strong political voice for the Indian community.   
For both the MCA and MIC, their close liaison with UMNO jeopardised their 
relationship with the communal group they represented.  It was the UMNO view that its 
junior partners should deliver the communal vote in support of the Alliance while the 
constituents themselves felt their political elite was more in tune with the Malay 
leadership than with the people they had been elected to represent.   
Independence from Britain was a long-held objective for the Alliance: an aim 
achieved with the announcement that party leadership and British officials had agreed 
that 31 August 1957 was to be “the official handover date”.120  An independent 
constitutional committee, the Reid Commission, was tasked with undertaking a period 
of intensive consultation with major political organisations and community groups to 
consider amendments to the 1948 Malayan Agreement.  It was proposed that the 
amended agreement would form the basis of the 1957 Merdeka Constitution.   
Underpinning the Constitution, promulgated on 31 August 1957, was an “ethnic quid 
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pro quo”121 agreement, a social bargain agreed by leaders of the three member-parties 
of the Alliance:  UMNO, the MCA and MIC.   In return for acknowledgement and 
acceptance of the Malays ‘special position’, the non-Malays received a review of 
citizenship regulations.  Of special significance was the granting of jus soli which 
ensured that future generations of children would automatically receive citizenship 
irrespective of the nationality of their parents.122 
 
Before the concept of a federal structure merging the Borneo states with Malaya, and 
Singapore briefly, was proposed by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in May 1961, 
there was little contact between the peoples of the peninsula and those on Borneo, the 
distance being too great.  In common with Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah were also 
governed by British interests.  In September 1841 James Brooke was proclaimed 
Rajah of Sarawak for his services to the Sultan of Brunei in contending with the chronic 
problem of piracy in the islands.123  In the case of Sabah, Bastin and Winks detail the 
beginnings of British business interest in the region from the late 1870s.  The North 
Borneo Chartered Company, initially administered by men described as “too weak to 
be arrogant, too poor to be powerful”124 were replaced by others whose questionable 
tactics incited the Mat Salleh Revolt. 
Sarawak and Sabah are truly multi-ethnic states comprising in excess of 50 
different groupings, the majority being the Dayak, Melanau, Kadazan-Dusun, Chinese 
and Malay.125  The natural barriers of jungle, river and steep mountain ridge restricted 
contact between groups though inter-tribal fighting occurred to right a wrong.   The 
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tribes also traded to supplement a largely subsistence existence.126  The strong 
animist belief system of the tribes was subject to extensive proselytisation with the 
arrival of Christian missionaries in the middle of the 17th century and in the north, from 
Muslim groups.127   
The Chartered Company provided a level of education and health care for the 
people under its protection despite its focus on increasing the returns for its 
shareholders based in London.  In Sarawak, the European dynasty of the White 
Rajahs provided schooling in the vernacular for the Malays and Iban for the first five 
years of elementary schooling.  During this period, English was also taught but as a 
second language.  At Standard IV, English became the medium of instruction.128  
In 1946 Sarawak and Sabah were ceded to Britain becoming Crown Colonies 
in spite of the principles of the 1945 UN Charter urging “member nations to foster self-
government of non-self-governing territories under their control”.129  After four years of 
Japanese occupation, the task of restoring the Borneo states seemed insurmountable 
to the aging Rajah Vyner Brooke and to the North Borneo Chartered Company.130 
The British government continued to administer its new colonies in similar vein 
to the previous rulers.  Britain’s failure to actively pursue political and constitutional 
advancement led to a population which, by and large, had little political 
understanding.131  Despite an acceleration in the pace of political development towards 
the end of the 1950s, the disparity between Sarawak and Sabah and its more 
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politically-adept neighbour Malaya, was never more obvious than in the initial talks 
towards the formation of a Malaysian Federation. 
 
3.3  Malay/Non-Malay Relations:  1963-1969 
Within the six-year period this chapter covers, inter-societal relations were tested and 
in the case of Singapore, fractured, as leading political organisations sought to 
maintain dominance, seek equal status or achieve a greater degree of political 
credibility in the new federal structure.  
 
3.3.1  The Establishment of a Greater Malaysian Federation 
The Federation of Malaysia, established following the signing of the Malaysia 
Agreement on 16 September 1963, initially comprised the states of the Malayan 
Federation, the British territories of Sarawak and Sabah (formerly North Borneo) and 
Singapore.   
From the outset formidable challenges tested the fragile inter-societal relations.  
The Malays, despite the acknowledgement of privilege the Constitution guaranteed, 
remained vulnerable to perceived threats from external forces which might usurp their 
dominance in the Federation.  Political leadership, vested in UMNO, was conscious 
that the Chinese presented a tangible and ever-present challenge to Malay pre-
eminence.  Financial acumen along with the traditional familial dynamic which fostered 
group cohesion facilitated a political development and articulation in advance of other 
organisations, though tradition had to be adjusted to comply with developing 
democratisation in the first decade post-WWII.132   
The composition of federal states reflected not only three differing perspectives 
- those of Malaya, Singapore and Britain, but also the Cold War climate in which the 
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ideological threat that communism purported to pose was most palpable.133  The 
Tunku’s 1961 proposal was made against a backdrop of concern that the Chinese-
populated Singapore, once independent, could be led by a communist-dominated 
administration.134  Analysis of Singaporean politics had revealed a continuing trend 
towards the left, orchestrated by radical Chinese elements.135  There was also a fear in 
the minds of Malaya’s Alliance Coalition that a communist-administered Singapore 
could “become an ideological base from which the Malayan communists could subvert 
the mainland”.136  The better option was to “accept Singapore as a member of the 
Federation of Malaysia”,137 containing the problem rather than having to contend with 
the external threat of a communist-led state just across the Straits of Johore.  
Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee KuanYew, had voiced support for the proposal 
to merge with the neighbouring states.  To him the merger proffered political survival 
for the governing party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), and, equally important, the 
economic survival of the island state.138  The proposal was, however, a divisive issue 
for Singapore with the potential to destabilise the government.  While the moderates 
within the PAP welcomed the proposal having, since the mid-1950s, debated the path 
to independence through merger with the Malayan Federation, the radical pro-
communist element had no desire to fall under the rule of a central government with 
little sympathy for their cause, particularly with the knowledge that the Internal Security 
Act (ISA) “would be rigidly enforced”.139 
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Mounting dissension spurred Lee Kuan Yew to demand a vote of confidence 
from the legislative assembly.  Although successful, the result of the July 1961 election 
decimated the PAP’s majority, created a split within the leadership and led to the 
formation of the opposition party, Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front, BS) – a powerful 
party with substantial support.140  The narrow win for the PAP highlighted the danger 
that the PAP government could still fall to the BS and other extreme left-wing parties.  
For this reason, both the Malayan Prime Minister and Lee Kuan Yew worked 
steadfastly towards ensuring that Singapore became a constituent state within the 
Federation.   
To the ruling elite in Malaya, the merger raised the spectre that Singapore’s 
predominantly Chinese population (of the approximate total of 1.7million, more than 75 
percent were Chinese) would create an ethnic Chinese majority in the proposed 
federation.141  To counter the problem, attention turned to the inclusion of Sarawak and 
North Borneo where the indigenous population of the Borneo territories would, in 
effect, redress the ethnic imbalance. 
The Tunku’s 1961 announcement, however, had been greeted with opposition 
in Sarawak and British North Borneo as neither was developed politically to any 
degree.  Although the British Colonial Office had considered the concept of a 
federation from the early 1930s, it was not until 1947 that greater emphasis was placed 
on the formation of federal systems to better foster the economic and political viability 
of its smaller colonies.  An initial proposal to construct a federation of North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Brunei was extended, in 1953, to include Singapore and Malaya.  By late 
1954, however, it became evident that Brunei wished to pursue independence as a 
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single state.  Further attempts to form a federation of North Borneo and Sarawak was 
pre-empted by the 1961 announcement.142 
In January 1962 the British and Malayan governments established a joint 
Commission of Enquiry to “ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and 
Sarawak”143 on the question of the proposed merger.   The following June a copy of 
the Commission’s final report, the Cobbold Report, was delivered to the prime 
ministers of both governments,  the Right Honourable Harold Macmillan and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman.144   From the evidence given by the 4,000 or so individuals who 
accepted the open invitation to present submissions, the Commission was able to 
identify those matters which were of major concern to both the various ethnic 
groupings and the newly forming political parties.145    
While the Commission was able to reach consensus on many points for entry, 
diverging on the contentious issues of religion and language, the publication of the 
Cobbold Report resulted in the setting up of an Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) 
tasked with “defining the structures and contents of the future constitutions of the 
federation and of the states of Sarawak and Sabah”.146  
In February 1963, the IGC released the Twenty Point Report which itemised 
safeguards for the proposed merger of the Bornean states with Malaya and 
Singapore.147  Of prime importance were concerns over religion, immigration, the 
Borneanisation of the civil service, secession, financial autonomy, and finally the 
special rights of the Malays which the report recommended should be extended to the 
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indigenous peoples of both states. 148  Ultimately, the extensive consultation and 
negotiation process determined that Sarawak and Sabah received favourable terms of 
entry, more so than Singapore particularly in terms of representation to the federal 
legislature.149  By extending the provisions concerned with the special rights of the 
Malays to the Bornean Bumiputera, the societal identity of the tribes was subtly 
redefined attesting the assertions of theorists who claim that societal identity is not 
static but fluid in nature responsive to contemporary challenges. 
 
3.3.2  Confrontation:  Sukarno’s Aspirations for a Greater Indonesian   
Federation 
Regionally, the proposal to form a Malaysian Federation was greeted with 
disagreement by the Philippines and antagonism by Indonesia.  While the Philippine 
Government disputed ownership of North Borneo (Sabah), Indonesia’s disagreement 
was more ideologically driven and communally based.150  President Sukarno, who had 
long wished to establish a greater Indonesian Federation, asserted in February 1963 
that if “the Malaysia plan was pursued, Indonesia would have no choice but to face it 
with political and economic ‘Confrontation’”.151   
Rhetoric between the Tunku and Indonesian President became increasingly 
vitriolic as relations worsened between the two respective governments.  President 
Sukarno’s claims that Britain’s support for a Malaysian Federation was an attempt by 
the former colonial power to regain control of the region’s material resources were 
countered by claims that his anti-Malaysian stance was fuelled by the Partai Komunis 
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Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI).152  Singapore’s BS had forged links 
with the PKI and other groups opposing the proposal in the months following the 
Tunku’s announcement.  Fears of communist involvement, and thus increasing 
Chinese dominance in the region, were fed by the alleged covert actions of the 
Clandestine Communist Organisation (CCO) in Sarawak.153 
Attempts to mediate by the United Nations led to a secondary proposal to form 
a “Confederation of nations of Malay origin…to be called Maphilindo”154  along with 
agreement to ascertain the true feelings of the Borneo people towards the merger.155 
The notion to pursue the ‘Maphilindo concept’, which would have excluded Singapore, 
was greeted with dismay by Lee Kuan Yew.  
Hostilities escalated sharply following the inauguration of the Federation in 
September 1963.  On 21 September, the Indonesian Government initiated “a special 
‘Operational Command for Crushing Malaysia’” 156  calling for volunteers from 
throughout the Indonesian Archipelago.  In response to increasing guerrilla attacks in 
Malaysian territory, the Federal Government “set up a Malaysian Defence Council”157 
assisted by troops from Britain, Australia, New Zealand and units of Nepalese 
Gurkhas.158   
The chief ministers of both Sarawak and Sabah declared their states’ 
unequivocal support for central government actions.  For several months, people in the 
villages neighbouring the Indonesian border had contended with irregular forces 
crossing into Sarawak under the guise of liberating the people from the neo-colonial 
clutches of the British.   The insurgents also made contact with the underground 
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communist movement, the CCO.  In addition to the local native trackers who assisted 
the Commonwealth forces in the task of containing the guerrillas in the difficult terrain, 
particularly along the Sarawak/Indonesian border, many Borneans registered for 
national service.159 
The impact of Confrontation on Indonesia’s economy was severe.  
Furthermore, the ascendancy of the PKI was not sanctioned by all the state’s elite who 
“deplored the waste and probable futility of Confrontation”.160  In the aftermath of an 
attempted coup in October 1965, the details of which remain clouded, control to 
restore order was given to the relatively unknown General Suharto.161  In July 1966, 
General Suharto was “given full authority to form a new cabinet”162 and the following 
month a peace agreement was ratified by Malaysia and Indonesia bringing 
Confrontation to an end.163 
 
3.3.3  Centre-Periphery Relations 
If a period of consolidation was hoped for at the inauguration of the Federation, this 
was not to be the case.  Whereas Confrontation was concerned with attempts by an 
external actor to forestall the formation of a Malaysian federation, and post-September 
1963, to bring about its violent disintegration, it was an internal crisis which culminated 
in the irreparable fracture of the Federation.  The decision of the Singapore leadership 
to contest Malaysia’s first general elections strained relations with central government 
to such a degree that, in August 1965, the former British colony withdrew from the 
Federation.164  In addition, the desire of the newly independent Borneo territories to 
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forge a path of unique independence within the federal structure was contrary to Kuala 
Lumpur’s intention to foster a sense of national unity.  The outcome of these initial 
challenges to Malay political dominance was to weight the power-share firmly in the 
hands of UMNO. 
 
Optimistic hopes for a smooth transition and a normalising of political relations 
between Singapore and the predominantly Malay federal government were ruled out 
by the course of events immediately prior, and subsequent, to the inauguration of the 
Federation in September 1963.  Long-standing political tension between the two 
governments was further exacerbated by the contentious nature of most aspects of 
Singapore’s entry.165   
In reality the terms and provisions of the Malaysia Agreement, as far as 
Singapore was concerned, were not as beneficial as those granted Britain’s Crown 
Colonies in Borneo.   While it was agreed that matters of defence, security and foreign 
affairs would be left to the federal government, in return for a degree of autonomy over 
finances, labour and education, Singapore was allocated 15 seats in the federal 
legislature, 10 fewer than entitled on a per capita basis.166  In effect, the cost to 
Singapore of retaining greater autonomy was reduced representation which, in turn, 
impeded political participation in central government.   
Various viewpoints have been posited to explain the PAP’s decision to take a 
more definitive role in federal politics by contesting the elections in April 1964.  One 
suggestion that the party decided to do so in retaliation for the UMNO-inspired 
Singapore Alliance campaign, six months earlier, in the Singapore elections – political 
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tit for tat.167  It is more probable, however, that its genesis lay in the opposing 
ideologies of the PAP and the UMNO-led Alliance:  the PAP’s pan-Malaysian 
orientation anticipating a PAP-Alliance coalition in the federal government as opposed 
to UMNO’s focus intent on preserving Malay pre-eminence.168   
Singapore initially asserted it would not field candidates in the election.  
However, with expectations that the merger would bring a degree of power-sharing 
dimmed by the lack of PAP leadership appointed to senior positions in central 
government, Singapore rescinded its initial decision.  Party leadership was further 
aggrieved in view of the PAP’s overwhelming success in Singapore’s elections held 
shortly after the Federation’s inception on 21 September.169   
As previously mentioned in the section on Confrontation, the original date for 
the establishment of the Federation was postponed from the end of August 1963 to 
mid-September.  In response, Lee Kuan Yew stated that “Singapore was not bound by 
the terms of the Manila Conference, and that…[the state] would insist upon 
independence on August 31…regardless of the delay or fate of Malaysia”.170  His 
intentions made clear, Singapore was duly declared independent.  On 4 September, 
Lee Kuan Yew called a snap election for 21 September.   
With the defection of “about two-thirds of the PAP membership and most of the 
party bureaucracy”171 to form the BS in July 1961, the decision to hold the September 
election compelled the party to rebuild the organisation.  Restored PAP membership 
was achieved by recruiting a significant number of Malay and Indian members: a fact 
which displeased both Singapore UMNO and party leadership in KL.172 Nor was the 
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Malay shift in loyalties entirely welcomed by Lee Kuan Yew.  It ran counter to his 
intentions “to work in alliance with UMNO in the central government”,173 in effect to 
replace the MCA as the “second partner in the Malaysian Alliance”.174 
UMNO discontent was further compounded by the PAP’s overwhelming 
election success – an election also contested by the recently formed Singapore 
Alliance, a party which brought together the Singapore branches of UMNO, the MCA 
and MIC along with the Singapore People’s Alliance.175  With an expectation that the 
Alliance would win “three predominantly Malay seats”176 the lack of success in all three 
seats devastated UMNO leadership.177 
The PAP’S decision to contest the April 1964 elections did not deliver the same 
success as those held the previous September -  the outcome was a virtual repeat of 
the Singapore Alliance result - the party ill-judged the strength of support for the MCA 
within the Alliance with success in only one seat.  To the UMNO leadership, the PAP’s 
participation in the elections confirmed their fears that the party intended to politically 
challenge the Alliance, despite Lee Kuan Yew’s assertion that the party only wished “to 
replace the ‘feeble and corrupt’ MCA”. 178   The decision was “interpreted as a 
fundamental political challenge to the Alliance also perceived in communal terms as a 
Chinese challenge to Malay supremacy”.179 
A groundswell of dissatisfaction amongst the Singapore Malays at the lack of 
benefits expected with the merger resulted in calls for a review of legislation and the 
granting of special concessions.  In a departure from constitutional provisions for 
Malays living in other states, Singapore Malays did not receive ‘special privileges’ 
because Lee Kuan Yew was “convinced that Malay special rights were not the solution 
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to Malay poverty”.180  The merger agreement did, however, acknowledge their ‘special 
position’ as Bumiputera in Singapore.  The increasing communal tension was 
exacerbated by an inflammatory media campaign and calls from the Malay-extremist 
wing of UMNO, the ‘ultras’, who mounted a hate campaign in Singapore in an attempt 
to woo back the Malay voters.181   
Attempts at appeasement by Lee Kuan Yew and the intervention of the Yang 
di-Pertua Negeri met with little success.182  In the volatile and tense climate created by 
the ongoing hostilities with Indonesia, communal tension between Chinese and Malay 
youth erupted into violence in the latter half of 1964 which left 22 people dead and 
hundreds injured.183  
The PAP, ideologically broader in outlook and not wishing to be drawn into a 
communal model of politics, promoted its democratic socialist policy.  In May 1965, the 
PAP formed a coalition of opposition parties from across the Federation - the 
Malaysian Solidarity Convention - adopting the slogan “a democratic Malaysian 
Malaysia”.184 The previous month, the Alliance parties from Malaya, Singapore, Sabah 
and Sarawak had merged to form the Malaysian National Alliance Party.   Once again, 
attempts by the PAP to aver a non-communal political stance were refuted as the party 
attracted a non-Malay membership, largely Chinese.  Instead of closing the communal 
divide, the Malaysian Solidarity Convention widened the rift. 
In an increasingly terse exchange across the Straits, Malay extremists called 
for Lee Kuan Yew’s imprisonment and that of other Singapore politicians.185  During 
the Tunku’s attendance at a British Commonwealth conference in London, an absence 
extended by ill-health, Lee Kuan Yew and the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul 
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Razak, met in attempt to resolve the developing crisis but to no avail.186  With no 
compromise possible, and concern that “he [the Tunku] was losing his grasp over the 
extremists in his own party,”187 the choice was to be made between either “depos[ing] 
the Singapore government or eject[ing] Singapore from Malaysia”.188  The former 
solution was discounted as the “move would have been resisted by the British and 
Australians”189 and thus the latter became the only option available.  On 9 August 
1965, Singapore was proclaimed an independent republic and admitted to the United 
Nations the following month. 
 
The ‘political divorce’ may have solved the immediate problem for UMNO’s party 
leadership - the PAP challenge to its primacy as the leading political party in the 
Federation – but it did not address the fundamental cause of the communal conflict nor 
recognise the potential for further intra-federal dissension with the East Malaysian 
states. 
For the Borneo leadership, wary of the concept of a merger from the outset, the 
expulsion of Singapore heightened political unease; a mistrust not lessened by the fact 
that KL omitted to inform either state of Singapore’s impending departure.  Not only 
was there a distinct possibility that promised economic aid financed by Singapore 
might not eventuate, the sense of frustration and grievance was compounded by the 
reality that, with the separation of Singapore’s Chinese-majority population, the “pro-
Malay politics of the Alliance were not likely to be successfully challenged”.190  
The juxtaposition of two opposing perspectives lay at the heart of the Borneo 
discontent.  On the one hand, there was the federal government’s determination to 
instil a sense of national unity – in essence a Malay nationalism inclusive of other 
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ethnicities – while, on the other, there was the desire of the Borneo states to retain their 
unique sense of identity.191  Just as the Borneo states were intent on retaining the 
favourable concessions granted them under the Federal Constitution - provisions not 
totally welcomed by, nor acceptable to, all political parties – the federal government 
was just as determined that they should “come into line with the policies of peninsular 
Malaysia, on the argument that nation-building demanded uniform policies throughout 
the federation”.192   As in all relationships, the degree to which one or other party is 
prepared to compromise and accommodate the opposing wishes of the other is not 
static but shifts in response to prevailing circumstances.  What had yet to be tested 
was the degree to which the federal government or the East Malaysian state 
governments would yield when confronted with contentious matters. 
Within months of the merger, federal government intentions to influence the 
direction of East Malaysian administrative development were evident in the decision to 
second and appoint staff from Peninsula Malaysia to the Borneo administrations.  One 
of the earliest appointments was that of a deputy federal secretary who mediated all 
federal issues between KL and East Malaysia.  These positions were additional to 
those of the Federal Ministers of Sarawak and Sabah Affairs, both held by indigenous 
East Malaysians during this period.193   Over the next two years, East Malaysian staff 
attended training sessions in Petaling Jaya “designed to foster administrative 
understanding and uniformity between…[central government and the East Malaysian 
states]”.194  
At issue was the lack of progress towards implementing a programme to 
Borneanise the public service sector – in effect to replace British expatriate officers with 
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local officers.  To the Borneo leaders, ‘local’, meant Bornean – “not just Malaysian”.195  
The difficulty, however, lay in the fact that there were insufficient numbers of suitably 
educated candidates who could have been appointed to positions vacated by the 
expatriates.  The low priority placed on secondary school education during the colonial 
period meant that those who could be considered by appointment to the public service 
“were non-natives”.196  The decision to appoint or second West Malaysians was 
contrary to Article 153 of the Federal Constitution which provided the indigenous 
peoples of Borneo “the same special position of the Malays”.197  What appeared to 
gradually develop was not a Borneanisation, but a Malaysianisation of the public 
service sector. 
One of the most vocal opponents of federal encroachment was Sarawak’s 
Chief Minister, Stephen Ningkan.  Ningkan, leader of the Sarawak Nationalist Party 
(SNAP), had been a thorn in the side of the federal government by tending to settle 
disputes within the state without recourse to KL.198  He co-operated over issues of 
economic development but resisted attempts which would have diluted some of the 
concessions Sarawak received in choosing to become a state in the new 
Federation.199  In 1965, Ningkan proposed land reform legislation which would have 
enabled the indigenous, on acquiring full title to their customary land, the option of 
disposing of it how they chose.200  The concern for the Malay parties within the 
Sarawak Alliance (SA) was that the proposed reforms would have allowed “greater 
land use by the immigrant communities”;201  in this instance the Chinese.  Their 
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preference was to see Sarawak adopt the system of ‘Native Reservations’ patterned 
after the ‘Malay Reservations’ established on the peninsula.202  To thwart Ningkan’s 
intentions to foster land reform and remove him as chief minister, attempts were made 
to split the SA by forming a ‘Malay-native coalition’.203 Ningkan’s decision to withdraw 
the land reform proposals led to Temenggong Jugah withdrawing his support for the 
Native Alliance (the intended name for the new coalition) and the proposal to form the 
new coalition went into abeyance.204  
Federal authorities had been unable to act in 1965 with the withdrawal of the 
legislative reform proposals.  The following year, however, tension between Kuching 
and KL had increased to the point that the latter was “more determined to engineer the 
overthrow of the Ningkan government”.205   Attempts by the Tunku in February 1966 to 
revive the three-party ‘Native alliance’ “under the guise of a United Malaysian National 
Organisation”206 were unsuccessful – the ethnic alliances were simply too strong.  
Responding to rumours of the ‘Federal plot’ to “undermine his government,”207 
Ningkan’s dismissal of BARJASA’s secretary-general proved divisive with members of 
the SA being either pro-Ningkan or pro-KL.  Despite Ningkan’s refusal to acquiesce to 
the Tunku’s call for his resignation, “Pesaka member and an Iban”208 Penghulu Tawi 
Sli was nominated as Sarawak’s new chief Minister by the Malaysian Alliance National 
Council in KL.   
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Ningkan’s lawsuit appealing his removal was upheld by the High Court in 
Kuching.  The damage, however, had been done.   Ningkan was no longer able to 
“count on majority support in the Council Negri”.209  His announcement that general 
elections be called to allow the people to decide their representatives was opposed by 
KL.  A second letter of no confidence was issued but still Ningkan remained. 
The failure of the federal government to remove the recalcitrant chief minister 
culminated in the declaration of a state of emergency in September 1966 on the 
grounds that “Sarawak was being exploited by Communists and subversive 
elements”.210  Under “clause 150 of The Federal Constitution of Malaysia …all state 
powers were transferred to the Federal authority”.211  Within days, the Malaysian 
Parliament had passed amendments to the Sarawak Constitution granting the 
governor of the state greater authority over political institutions.  That same week, “a 
no confidence motion”212 was passed against Ningkan and Penghulu Tawi Sli was 
reappointed as chief minister for a second time. 
Following the ousting of Ningkan, Sarawak was to be administered by a 
government more compliant and “acceptable to the centre than was the former 
Sarawak oriented SNAP leadership”.213  In November 1966, BARJASA and PANAS 
merged to form the Islamic Party – Parti BUMIPUTERA Sarawak.214  Sarawak retained 
this form of coalition, under the leadership of two successive chief ministers, for the 
following three decades. 
 
As previously stated, concern over the Borneo territories’ vulnerability to both the 
Philippines and Indonesia contributed to their inclusion within the greater Malaysian 
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Federation.  In Sabah, the least advanced of the federal states, it also prompted the 
uniting of the state’s emerging political parties to form the Sabah Alliance.215  While 
central government supported the state’s economic development, it was the degree of 
political autonomy under the leadership of first Chief Minister, Donald Stephens, which 
caused the greatest concern.   Constant wrangling between the state’s two political 
leaders, Stephens and Mustapha Harun, the Yang di-Pertua Negeri, resulted in direct 
intervention by the Tunku and senior members of the federal government.   
In common with neighbouring Sarawak, Sabah’s major political parties were 
virtually ‘umbrella’ organisations representative of the state’s communal groups who 
had strong tribal affiliations to particular regions.  In 1964, the United National Kadazan 
Organisation, Sabah’s largest political party founded by Donald Stephens, merged with 
its rival for the indigenous vote, the United National Pasok Momogun Organisation, 
forming the United Pasokmomogun Kadazan Organisation (UPKO).216  Mustapha, a 
Muslim from the Sulu Archipelago, led the United Sabah National Organisation 
(USNO), the political organisation which represented the various Muslim groups – not 
solely the Malays as there were few Malays in Sabah at this stage.217   Mustapha and 
Stephens would become the two central figures around which Sabah’s political future 
would evolve.   The Chinese were represented by the Sabah Chinese Association, the 
result of the merging of the United and the Democratic Parties with the Sabah Chinese 
Party after the Federation was formed.218 
Proposals by Stephens to finance state-wide economic reform by re-
introducing the concept of long-term timber concessions tested the unity of the Sabah 
Alliance.219  While the combined opposition from the Sabah Chinese Association and 
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USNO forced Stephens to back down over the land reform, he was not so amenable or 
prepared to accept a gradual ‘watering-down’ of the ‘safeguards’ and ‘guarantees’ 
granted Sabah with the creation of the Federation.220  The August 1962 ’20-point’ 
memorandum which listed “major political and constitutional demands were the 
territory [Sabah] to become part of Malaysia” 221  formed the basis from which 
successful negotiations, in which Stephens had been instrumental, had resulted in 
favourable concessions such as those granted Sarawak.  The ‘guarantees’ opposed 
by Mustapha were those “which restricted government support for Islam, guaranteed 
the continued use of English, delayed the introduction of Malay as the national 
language, and gave Sabah control over immigration from Malaysia and abroad”.222   
In 1964, to resolve a disagreement between the political leaders over the reach 
of each other’s position, Stephens agreed, “under extreme pressure”,223 to accept the 
lesser position of Federal Minister with responsibility for Sabah Affairs and Civil 
Defence.  It was an appointment short-lived.  In August 1965, Stephens was censured 
for his open criticism of federal government’s neglect in not informing the East 
Malaysian states of Singapore’s impending departure.   When discussion turned to 
reviewing the status of the territories within the Federation, whether they should remain 
or follow Singapore, the Tunku visited the leaderships of both Sarawak and Sabah 
intent on restoring loyalty and morale.224  While calls for UPKO to dissolve were 
rejected, Stephens was forced to resign from Cabinet and following a “ritualistic public 
pledge of loyalty to Tunku Abdul Rahman”225 returned to Sabah’s domestic political 
arena as president of UPKO. 
Despite USNO and the Sabah Chinese Association receiving direct assistance 
from UMNO and MCA in the lead-up to the 1967 state elections, UPKO was the 
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highest polling party.  The party’s popularity, however, did not guarantee 
representation in the state legislature or in the federal cabinet.  Mustapha, appointed 
chief minister, informed UPKO leadership that “it must accept a subordinate role in the 
government, and prove its intentions of ‘good behavior’ by a pledge of complete loyalty 
to Mustapha’s Government”.226  Mustapha’s decision to exclude UPKO was made with 
the Tunku’s approval. 
With UPKO effectively sidelined from any decision-making role, the decision 
was taken to resign from the Sabah Alliance and withdraw to the opposition.  Attempts 
by Stephens to effect a federal review of the political scene in Sabah were rebuffed, 
with KL responding that its mandate was to “build an integrated Malaysian nation”.227  
This was followed by veiled threats from Deputy Leader Abdul Razak that “the 
government might use its emergency powers under the Internal Security Act to deal 
with ‘disloyal critics’”.228   
Stephens and the UPKO leadership continued to seek options for a viable 
future for the party over the coming months including discussions with Sarawak’s 
opposition party SNAP.  The defection of two assemblymen was closely followed by 
the announcement that UPKO would dissolve with membership advised to join 
USNO.229  
In 1967, Stephens was appointed Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia.   
With his departure, the internal division which was symptomatic of the differing 
perspectives for the future of the state, ceased.   Mustapha, with the support of his 
close association with central government, was able to institute a style of rule that had 
a definite pro-Malay bias.   With the virtue of hindsight, the future would reveal that 
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Mustapha’s determination was not always in tune with the wishes of the federal 
government.230 
 
Singapore’s departure may have fractured the initial federal composition, but KL was 
determined to ensure that neither of the East Malaysia states followed suit.  Diverse 
communal interests would be accommodated but central government was determined 
to pursue a course which would ensure Malay supremacy was preserved.   
 
3.4  Malay/non-Malay Relations:  A Societal Security Dilemma? 
On 15 May 1969, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong declared a state of emergency 
throughout all states of the Federation.  Two days earlier, tension, which had been 
mounting in the lead-up to the general elections, had erupted into violent inter-
communal clashes between Malay and non-Malay (Chinese/Indian) groups in the 
federal capital.  
The unexpected outcome of the elections, which denied the Malays the crucial 
two-thirds parliamentary majority, was viewed as a direct assault on Malay political 
supremacy.  While conflict between Malaysia’s major ethnic groups was not a new 
phenomenon, this outbreak had the potential, if left unchecked, to destabilise the 
Federation shattering the fragile state-building process. 
 
3.4.1  The 1969 General Election:  Communal Repercussions 
Policy implemented in the aftermath of the 13 May 1969 communal riots, specifically 
with the aim of restoring and maintaining inter-ethnic peace would result, over time, in 
a society further divided and fragmented.  It is doubtful whether analysis into the 
recently declassified documents concerning this tragic event, often referred to as a 
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‘watershed’ in Malaysian history, will result in a consensus as to the true reasons 
which underpinned the violence.231  It is generally accepted, however, that the riots, 
and the recurrence of conflict towards the end of June/early July, originated in clashes 
between groups celebrating the unexpected result of the elections and bystanders 
uneasy with the electoral outcome. 232  Confident that its mandate to govern would be 
confirmed by the general elections on 10 May, the unforeseen outcome, which saw the 
UMNO/Alliance coalition win less than half the vote and lose control of three seats, 
indicated that “the electorate had become somewhat more ethnically polarized than in 
previous elections”.233   
The Alliance coalition, formed during the 1950s and sustained by the “unity and 
cohesion…[it fostered with] its partner organisations”,234 was severely tested by the 
introduction to Parliament, in September 1967, of legislation which would initiate the 
complete switch-over to Malay as the sole national language.235  While Article 152 of 
the Constitution acknowledged Malay as the sole national language, it allowed the use 
of English as an official language for a period of ten years after independence.236  In 
late 1966, Malay extremist politicians, the ultras, mobilised to ensure that constitutional 
amendment was proposed which would confirm that Malay alone was the Federation’s 
national language.   
Fundamental to the actions of the ultras was the belief that a single language 
was an essential ingredient for national unity, their vigorous promotion of Malay was a 
matter of economic priority.  The special provisions constitutionally accorded the 
Malays had failed to ensure the fulfilment of Malay expectations in the financial and 
                                                
231 Official documents on the May 1969 riots held at the Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, London were 
recently declassified following the lapse of the 30-year secrecy period.  Social scientist Kua Kia Soong 
posits his view that the riots were a “planned coup d’etat by the ascendant state capitalist class against the 
Tunku-led aristocracy” rather than a “spontaneous outburst of violence between Malays and Chinese”.  
See Kua Kia Soong, May 13 Declassified Documents on the Malaysian Riots of 1969 (Selangor:  Suaram 
Komunikasi, 2007), back cover. 
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economic sectors.  Despite securing preferential opportunities in employment and 
education, the non-Malays continued to dominate “in the economic and professional 
life of the country”.237  By legislating Malay as the sole national language, they believed 
that the “non-Malay supremacy in various sectors of the economy”238 would be broken. 
The move to entrench Malay as the sole national language was not supported 
by the non-Malays.  The Chinese, who wished to have Mandarin acknowledged as 
both a national and official language, had “already sustained major political defeats 
when the government decided to convert to a uniform system of national schools to 
replace the four separate linguistic school systems”.239  As far as East Malaysia was 
concerned, the Cobbold Report had earlier shown that the question of a national 
language was complex and of concern to communal groups in Sarawak and Sabah.240  
Beleaguered Chief Minister Ningkan had declared that “Sarawak would not be ready 
for a change in language policy until 1973”.241  The proposal to legislate in favour of 
one language over all others was viewed by the non-Malays as evidence of further 
erosion and a devaluing of their own identities.   There was little, however, they could 
do to effect a reversal of the policy apart from signifying their displeasure in the 
forthcoming general elections.  
In hindsight, the decision to review constitutional provisions on the national 
language impacted to a greater extent on Malaysian society as a whole and on the 
final outcome of the elections than on the ensuing constitutional amendment.  The 
1967 National Language Bill amended the Constitution marginally in that though it re-
affirmed Malay as the sole national language, it permitted English to be used “for some 
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official purposes…Similarly, Chinese and Indian were tolerated for non-official and non-
governmental purposes”.242 
Dissension, caused by the discussions, polarised the nation.  Voters, who were 
disaffected by the established political parties which constituted the Alliance coalition, 
turned to the new hybrid of political parties: those with a more communal aspect set 
apart from the traditional organisations with ties to the established political elite.  
Of the coalition partners, the MCA experienced the greatest switch in voter 
loyalty losing heavily to three political organisations:  newcomer Gerakan Rakyat 
Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Movement), a multi-ethnic party formed in April 1968; 
the Democratic Action Party (DAP) established two years earlier in March 1966; and 
the PPP, a political party with a similar manifesto to the DAP.243  The DAP election 
manifesto called for democracy in three areas:  political – equal status for all citizens; 
social and economic – the eradication of exploitation; and cultural – the recognition of 
non-Malay languages; and an integrated education system.244  
As previously mentioned, Kua Kia Soong, in his 2007 publication, theorised 
that the riots were orchestrated to remove the Tunku as prime minister.245  The 
accepted version, however, has it that jubilant DAP and Gerakan supporters, as they 
paraded through KL streets, exchanged verbal taunts with morose Alliance supporters.  
Despite the police declining to give permission to UMNO youth to hold a march the 
following night, Malays gathered in preparation outside the home of Selangor’s mentri 
besar, in “the belief that Malay power in government was being challenged”.246  Many 
were armed with weapons of various descriptions and were “determined to teach ‘the 
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Chinese a lesson’”.247  Violence, including “killing, looting and burning,”248 quickly 
erupted in the Chinese and Indian sectors of the city. Only streets apart, the conflict 
spread into the Malay areas as Chinese and Indian shopkeepers retaliated.  The 
arrival of the police quelled the initial violence but outbreaks occurred sporadically over 
the next few days.249  Towards the end of June, communal conflict flared up in the 
Indian quarter of KL with outbreaks in other peninsula states also.  A curfew was 
imposed at the outset of the violence, restricting movement in many parts of 
Malaysia.250 
On Thursday 15 May, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong imposed a state of 
emergency.  At the same time, the whole of Malaysia was declared a security area 
under section 47 of the ISA, 1960.  Under emergency ordinances, the Federal 
Constitution was suspended and the National Operations Council (NOC), headed by 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, was established.  The composition of the 
NOC was controversial in itself.  Of the nine members of the NOC, which governed the 
country during the emergency period, seven were Malays with the Chinese and Indian 
communities represented by the leaders of the MCA and MIC; no members of the 
opposition parties were represented.251  A consequence of the riots was that the 
elections which were to have been held in Sarawak and Sabah the following month 
were also suspended.   
The societal cost of the communal riots remains a matter of dispute.  Official 
statistics record approximately 200 fatally injured, the majority Chinese, with many 
injured and between 6,000 to 10,000 refugees.  Extensive amounts of property and 
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personal chattels were destroyed along with thousands arrested for breaking the 
curfew.252 
The NOC, which administered the country during the 20-month emergency 
period, systematically introduced an integrated range of strategies and initiatives with 
the aim of restoring and maintaining inter-ethnic peace.  Covered in greater detail in 
the following chapter, the first component of the recovery package was the 
development of the Rukunegara, or national ideology, formulated with the aim of 
engendering a sense of national unity in Malaysia.  The second involved the 
progressive adoption of policy which gave preference to the Malays (initially the New 
Economic Policy and latterly the National Development Policy) instituted to redress the 
political and economic inequality of the Malays.  The final component involved the 
passing of legislation which proscribed the questioning, by individuals and political 
organisations, of a number of “sensitive issues” ranging from citizenship to national 
language.253   
 
3.5  Conclusion 
Malay societal security is predicated on the belief that, as Bumiputera, the Malay 
people have a pre-eminent position throughout the Federation.  This belief was 
enshrined in the Merdeka Constitution by the framers of this founding document, the 
British and first Malay politicians.  The Constitution accorded the Malay special rights 
and privileges in recognition of their paramount position and to redress the economic 
and social inequality which had developed during the British colonial administration.254   
Malay societal security requirements were (and continue to be) articulated 
through the policies of UMNO, the political organisation formed to abrogate the neo-
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colonialist attempts of the British in 1946.  The agreement, by the leaders of the MCA 
and MIC, UMNO’s partners in the Alliance coalition, to the privileged status of the 
Malays formed the basis of a social bargain for which the citizenship requirements of 
the non-Malays were reviewed.   UMNO maintained the unity and cohesion of the 
Alliance due, in large part, to the constitutional provisions which stipulated that 
legislative amendments must be supported by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.  
The outcome of the 1969 general elections and the ensuing conflict indicated 
the existence of a societal security dilemma.  While Malay societal security 
requirements were clearly manifested in the resolve of the determined Malay 
politicians to ensure constitutional provisions were amended confirming Malay as the 
sole national language, for the non-Malay, little if any attempt was made to provide 
constitutional protection for Mandarin, Tamil Indian or English as additional national 
languages.  Non-Malay societal security requirements were not being met by the ruling 
coalition, in particular the MIC and MCA partners.  The disaffection of the non-Malay, 
and others critical of the Alliance, resulted in a swing away from the government to 
opposition parties whose manifestos professed a greater accommodation of linguistic 
diversity.  The drop in popular support for the ruling coalition undermined the 
prerogative the UMNO/Alliance had retained since 1957, of effecting unilateral 
amendment of the Constitution.  Inter-societal tension had risen to the degree that a 
clash, whether it be with words or swords, was inevitable.   
In summarising Malaysia’s development, from the inception of the Federation 
in September 1963 until the establishment of the NOC in May 1969, this chapter has 
attempted to explore the manner in which the dynamics of Malaysian societal identity 
have manifested themselves.  More specifically, this chapter has focussed on the 
security seeking behaviours of the Malay and the non-Malay reaction.  
From the outset, the fledging Federation was confronted with a multiplicity of 
challenges.  Regionally, it had to contend with military threats from neighbouring 
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Indonesia which threatened to destabilise the Federation.  In addition, the need to 
resolve intra-federal discord, which had the potential to fracture inter-state relations, 
was proven by the departure of Singapore and by the increasing political intervention 
of the federal government in the East Malaysian states.  Policy adopted and 
implemented under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, who, to all intents and 
purposes, assumed tacit control of the Federation in May 1969, and pursued by 
Malaysia’s longest serving Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, gave rise to new 
dilemmas and additional problems.  Analysis of the systemic effects of the evolving 
paradigm of Malaysian politics and the various mechanisms employed form the 
content of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4                        The Tun Razak Legacy:  1970-2003 
 
   
 
Societal discontent rising since the early days of the Federation and fomented by the 
demands of the Malay extremists reached crisis point with the unexpected election 
outcome in May 1969.  The loss of three states was viewed as a significant shift in 
power from the UMNO-Alliance coalition to the non-Malay opposition.  The grip the 
Malay-dominant government had maintained on the state, particularly since 
Singapore’s secession, was at risk of failing.  Inter-ethnic violence, largely in Peninsula 
Malaysia, led to the proclamation of a state of emergency which, while it contained the 
violence within the first month, suspended parliamentary democracy for a further 20 
months.    
Written in three parts, the following chapter first outlines the array of initiatives 
implemented to restore Malay political supremacy during the administrations of Tun 
Abdul Razak   (1970-76), Tun Hussein Onn (1976-81) and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad 
(1981-2003).  The second part discusses the position of the non-Malay groups situated 
in the increasingly coercive and authoritarian climate with the concluding section 
considering the degree to which the initiatives alleviated or exacerbated inter-societal 
tension. 
 
4.1  Tun Abdul Razak Hussein 
In September 1970, Abdul Razak was sworn in as Malaysia’s second prime 
minister.255  In reality, however, his term of leadership commenced 15 months earlier in 
May 1969 when he was appointed head of the NOC.  As Director of Operations he 
effectively deposed the Tunku who remained more as a titular figure, with the Cabinet 
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in purely an advisory role.256   As the press was informed on 16 May by General 
Ibrahim Hamzah, NOC member: 
An effective government is now in the making, but it is probably the intention to 
maintain an extra-parliamentary autocratic regime for some time to come.  The 
present attempt to impart some multi-racial flavour may not last.
257
 
 
The crisis effectively crystallised a two-fold problem for the government.  The first 
concerned the stability of the state.  The inter-communal violence had the potential, if 
left unchecked, to destabilise the Federation.  For the third time since its founding, the 
fragility of the merger was evident.258  In this instance, however, the possibility existed 
that the Federation could implode as a result of the violence, centralised mainly in KL, 
with isolated sporadic outbreaks along the west coast of the peninsula.   
The second problem related to the results of the general election.  The loss of 
Penang, Perak and Terengganu, along with half the seats in Selangor’s state 
assembly, confirmed that the ruling Alliance majority had fallen below the two-thirds 
threshold required to effect unhindered, constitutional amendment. 259   
Despite Malay pre-eminence institutionalised by the Merdeka Constitution, the 
more resolute Malay politicians considered the ‘social bargain’, which underpinned the 
1957 Constitution, had failed the Malay in three areas.260  First, the special privileges 
granted the Malay had gradually been eroded by concessions to non-Malay, one of the 
most controversial instances being the National Language Bill.  Second, the economic 
rewards the agreement promised had not eventuated.  Analysis indicated that 
economic disparity between the major ethnies, Malay and Chinese, was significant.  
And finally, as the results of the election indicated, Malay pre-eminence had been 
undermined. 
                                                
256 Kua, 2007, p. 106. 
257 Ibid. 
258 The two previous instances concerned Confrontation with Indonesia and the second, the secession of a 
member-state, Singapore.  
259 Means, 1976, p. 396. 
260 For information on the ‘social bargain’, refer to the section on the Non-Malay Societal Identity in Chapter 
3. 
62 
 
To address these issues, Razak progressively instituted a new political agenda 
with a determined Malay-centric focus.  The integrated and comprehensive package of 
reforms had two major aims:  to transform Malaysian society by improving the socio-
economic position of the Malays and to effect major political restructuring to restore 
UMNO’s political dominance.  The first objective would be achieved by adopting Malay 
preferential policy in employment and education.  It was envisaged that the success of 
the UMNO-inspired policy would attract a renewed membership thus regaining the 
Malay majority and restoring the party’s mandate as the major political organisation in 
the Federation.   In 1974, Razak’s skilful and dogged negotiating abilities came to 
fruition with the establishment of a greater Alliance coalition, the Barisan Nasional, 
which further cemented UMNO’s leadership.261  
 
4.1.1  The Rukunegara 
While the core of the reforms was not implemented until after parliament was restored 
in February 1971, in July 1969 Dr Ghazali Shafie, the head of the newly established 
Department of National Unity, announced that a national ideology was being 
formulated.262   The Rukunegara, promulgated in mid-1970, was envisaged as a 
document which would provide “the basis for creating a basic consensus on communal 
issues”. 263   With no public consultation and severe penalties for breaching its 
principles, in reality the declaration, with stated ideals of unity, democracy and justice, 
was regarded as no more than a “list of do’s(sic) and don’ts…[to] prevent another 
outbreak of racial strife”.264   Its detractors further claimed the ideology was “too 
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contrived or superficial to capture the public imagination”.265  Its compliance, however, 
was mandatory for those aspiring to political office.266 
 
The launch of the Rukunegara was closely followed by the NOC’s decision to assert 
greater political control through a series of legislative amendments.  Until such time as 
parliament was reconvened and the Constitution itself formally amended, the NOC 
declared that the Sedition Act would be extended, prohibiting the public discussion and 
questioning of ‘sensitive issues’. 267   Provisions considered ‘sensitive’, and 
subsequently incorporated in the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971, were those 
“relating to the Rulers, the National Language and the use of other ethnic languages, 
Malay privileges and citizenship”. 268   Compliance with these amendments would 
ensure that “traditional or Malay elements and the legitimate interests of other 
communities…[were] put beyond the reach of communal politics”. 269   The NOC 
leadership considered this restriction on the freedom of speech a prerequisite for a 
return to normalcy: a move taken ostensibly to avoid a recurrence of inter-ethnic 
violence.  Means writes that “the passage of these amendments…[not only] marked the 
beginning of a new era in Malaysian politics”270 but further extended the legal powers 
available to the ruling executive. 
 
4.1.2  The Resumption of East Malaysian Elections 
In June 1970, the East Malaysian elections, suspended by the violence on the 
peninsula, resumed.  The NOC not only prohibited electioneering in any form, the 
Minister for Home Affairs, Tun (Dr) Ismail also warned that should “the results of the 
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elections…not give the Alliance a two-thirds majority in Parliament, there could be no 
return to parliamentary democracy”.271  It was imperative for Razak and his cohort of 
‘new order’ politicians to regain the crucial majority which would allow the unimpeded 
passage of planned legislative amendment through parliament.   
While the outcome of the Sabah elections could be predicted with ease, there 
being no meaningful opposition to the Sabah Alliance, the same could not be said for 
Sarawak.272  Sarawak’s major political parties were all ethnically-based.  To further 
complicate matters, each ethnic grouping had two parties representing their interests.  
This catered for division within the ethnie arising in some cases from tribal tension 
and/or geo-political difference.  In addition, federal-state relations were often strained 
as Sarawak leadership objected to perceived KL interference in state affairs.  The 
situation was further complicated by residual grievances over the imposition of the 
1966 state of emergency.273  
In contrast to Sabah’s simple and uncomplicated election, Sarawak’s election 
was contested by five strong communally-based parties:   the three Alliance partners - 
the Malay Parti Bumiputra, the Iban PESAKA and the Chinese party SCA; along with 
the two opposition parties, the Chinese party – the Sarawak United People’s Party 
(SUPP) and the Iban party - SNAP.  The direct involvement of Razak in a convoluted 
post-election process of shifting alliances resulted in the formation of a new state 
coalition government comprising Parti Bumiputra, two members of PESAKA who 
defected from their party and SUPP.274   Strategically, the support of the SUPP 
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members, of which there were five, “gave the Alliance the two-thirds majority it 
sought”.275 
Sarawak’s revised state government altered the standing of SUPP from 
opposition party to integral member in the new Alliance coalition.  SUPP had opposed 
the integration of Sarawak within the Malaysian Federation and voiced criticism over 
the federal government’s handling of political detainees. However any reservations the 
party leadership may have had were put aside for the sake of the state’s future; 
particularly over Tun Razak’s choice for chief minister.   Tan Sri Ong writes that both 
Iban and Chinese regarded the chief minister designate, Abdul Rahman Yakub “as a 
Malay racialist but as he [Razak] had no one else in mind, we…[were] forced to accept 
him and hope he …change[d] his outlook”.276  When instructed by Razak to tell Rahman 
himself, Tan Sri Ong turned to him with the words “we have agreed to accept him not 
because we love him but because we love Sarawak more!”.277 
 
Razak’s confirmation as prime minister, in September 1970, saw a further shift in 
governance as the Tunku’s consensual style was steadily replaced by one “more 
solicitous of Malay interests and concerns than those of the non-Malays”.278  All senior 
positions in Razak’s first cabinet were filled by UMNO members apart from that of 
Minister of Finance which was held by Tan Siew Sin, President of the MCA until his 
resignation, in April 1974, due to illness.  He was succeeded by Hussein Onn.279  
The composition of the new cabinet not only echoed the overtly Malay/UMNO-
centric formula seen in the NOC but evidenced the further sidelining of ‘Old Guard’ 
loyalists.280  The cabinet also saw the return to mainstream politics of Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad, Musa Hitam and Hussein Onn, son of UMNO founder Dato Onn Ja’afar.  
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Both Mahathir and Musa Hitam had been censured and expelled from UMNO by the 
Tunku, in August 1969, for direct criticism of his actions and their involvement in a 
campaign calling for his resignation.281   
 
4.1.3  New Economic Policy 
In July 1971, without parliamentary approval, the Razak government progressively 
adopted the most provocative and controversial series of reforms in Malaysia’s political 
history.   The New Economic Policy (NEP), instituted to redress the social and 
economic inequality of the Malays, represented not so much a major change in policy 
as an intense refocusing of policy directed at fulfilling Malay expectations.   Introduced 
within the context of the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-75), NEP had two stated 
objectives: poverty reduction for “all Malaysians, irrespective of race”;282  and the 
restructuring of Malaysian society so that ethnicity could not be identified by 
occupation.283   It was envisaged that by 1990, (the Fifth Malaysia Plan:  1986-90), 
these aims would be achieved with 30 percent of the corporate sector either owned or 
managed by Malay or other Bumiputera.284 
Britain’s decision, in the mid-19th century, to diversify and expand Malaya’s 
economy led to the assisted immigration of Chinese and Indian workers to meet the 
shortfall in the labour market.  An unintended outcome of this policy was the 
delineation, over time, of the major ethnicities into discrete economic occupations.  
Whereas the immigrant labourers were employed in and around the tin mines and 
rubber plantations, the expansion into the export market impacted little on the 
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traditions of the Malays.  The appeal of “lower real incomes”285 in these industries was 
not sufficient to draw the agrarian Malays who now contended with the increasing 
demand for rice and other food staples generated by the growing population.   
Brown refers to the ‘clustering’ of Chinese in commerce and tin-mining, the 
Indians ‘clustered’ in the rubber plantations with the Malays “clustered in the rice-
farming peasantry” 286  a development causal to a society defined on “racial-
occupational lines”.287  This “racial compartmentalization”288 was further reinforced by a 
colonial education policy which, while providing the majority of Malays with 
“elementary vernacular education…favoured the Chinese and Indians in the urban 
areas”.289  This divisive policy, not only further entrenched identification of occupation 
by ethnicity (or ethnicity by occupation), but with a lack of educational training, there 
was little tangible opportunity for the Malays to make the transition to other areas. 
 
NEP was a bitter pill for the non-Malay despite its sugar coatings of social justice and 
the promise of inter-ethnic harmony.  In essence, the policy demanded non-Malay 
acceptance of an expansion of the controversial special rights and privileges accorded 
the Malays by constitutional provision.  Whereas the initial provisions covered issues of 
native land ownership and access to government employment and services, NEP 
proposed a new formulation to include a quota system for government employment 
and access to higher education.  Legislation which stipulated Malay as the 
language of instruction facilitated Malay entry to federal universities.  Over time, 
the private sector would also fall within Malay privilege.  Assurances that non 
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Malay wealth would not be expropriated, or employment opportunities affected, 
did little to ease their disquiet.290 
 
4.1.4  Barisan Nasional 
The level of support the Alliance party had retained since coming to power in the 1955 
legislative elections was severely reduced by the 1969 general election results.  The 
significant drop in voter popularity indicated that the party was not sufficiently inclusive 
to contend with the societal problems confronting the Federation.  While the East 
Malaysian elections had guaranteed the Alliance the crucial two-thirds parliamentary 
majority, the major opposition parties, with their ability to mobilise the public over 
contentious issues, were considered a threat to the smooth implementation of 
economic reform.291  The concept of building a broad political base by forming coalition 
agreements with some of the more moderate parties would not only “neutralize the 
Opposition”,292 it would introduce a semblance of political consensus.293  In addition, as 
the provisions of the Sedition Act 1949 (amended 1969) proscribed public discussion 
of ‘sensitive issues’, criticism could be channelled and contained within the structure of 
intra-coalition discussions and bargaining, away from public gaze. 294 
In February 1972 Razak announced that the Alliance and Gerakan had agreed 
in principle to form a coalition government in Penang.295  This coalition agreement was 
the first in a series which would form the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) a name 
specifically chosen to engender a sense of patriotism amongst the people.296  With the 
offer of various inducements and patronage, the BN expanded both the Malay and 
non-Malay representation of the ruling Alliance party.    
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The negotiating process was not without discord. Dissension developed on 
both sides of the Malay/non-Malay divide as factions disagreed with the concept of 
forming a broad multi-ethnic ‘grand coalition’.  The first agreement between the 
Alliance and Gerakan led to a split within Gerakan and the establishment of a new 
multi-ethnic party, Pekemas (Social Justice Party).297  Pekemas consistently refused to 
become a member of the BN as its leader Dr Tan Chee Khoon, was a firm advocate for 
the role of an opposition in parliamentary democracy.298 
In the second instance, the decision to align the MCA within the BN angered 
the more aggressive members of the party who “argued that the party should be more 
assertive in representing and defending Chinese interests”.299  Continued agitation 
“invoked party discipline”300 and the expulsion of members who subsequently joined 
Gerakan.301 
The most protracted and taxing negotiations were those concerning the Malay 
Islamic party PAS.  The concept of aligning with UMNO was “opposed by a militant 
and uncompromising faction”.302  First mooted in December 1970, the discussions for 
the final agreement continued intermittently over the following two years.  In the new 
political climate, however, PAS agreed to the coalition terms in December 1972.   
For Razak, the expanded coalition was the quintessential ingredient in the 
strategy to transform Malaysian society.   Registered in June 1974, the BN initially 
composed eight parties several of which were themselves amalgams of various 
political parties:  UMNO, the MCA, the MIC, PAS, the PPP, Gerakan, BN Sarawak and 
BN Sabah.303  The overwhelming success of the BN in the general elections the 
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following month gave Razak the “decisive mandate to carry on with his political and 
socio-economic policies”.304  
 
4.1.5  Student Unrest 
The 1970s witnessed a world-wide resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism, most 
apparent in countries with large Muslim populations.  In Malaysia, the re-awakened 
interest in Islam and its fundamental tenets was evident in the increase in number of 
dakwah movements, organisations which promoted the doctrine of the Islamic faith.  
The method and manner of the organisations defined their categories.   At one 
end of the spectrum were groups proscribed by the government for their deviationist 
activities – those considered “subversive to Islam”.305  Apposite were the “government-
sponsored Islamic bodies and associations”306 such as the Pertubuhan Kebajikan 
Islam Malaysia (Islamic Welfare and Missionary Association of Malaysia, Perkim) 
founded in 1960 and headed by the Tunku.  Standing apart were the independent 
Islamic groups, the most significant being Jemaat Tabligh, which originated in India in 
1925, and two organisations formed in 1971,  Darul Arqam and Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia (the Malaysian Youth Islamic Movement, ABIM) – the former founded by 
Ustaz Ashaari Muhammed and the latter by Anwar Ibrahim.307 
The politisation of ABIM coincided with the appearance, in many western 
countries, of a variety of youth movements mobilised by an array of social issues.  For 
ABIM, and other Malay student organisations, this rising political consciousness 
combined with the ethos of dakwah led to protest action in support of the marginalised 
in Malaysian society, in particular those groups faring poorly as an outcome of NEP. 
Dr Mahathir, newly appointed Minister of Education, warned that persistent 
repeated criticism of government policy would not be tolerated.  Furthermore, the 
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government also considered that students, whether in Malaysia, Australia or New 
Zealand, along with university staff, should not be involved in political activities.  
Attempts by the government to curb student protest had little effect.  In December 
1974, in response to allegations that peasants in Kedah and Perak were starving due 
to changes to the rural economy, demonstrations were held on the campuses of 
several major universities with the largest protest occurring on the grounds of the elitist 
“Selangor Club in the heart of Kuala Lumpur”.308  The intervention by the Federal 
Reserve Unit of the Police resulted in over “1,100 students, the majority of whom were 
Malay, being charged with unlawful assembly”.309 The leaders of the demonstration, 
both students and lecturers, were arrested under the provisions of the ISA.  Among 
them, Anwar Ibrahim, who remained in preventive detention until 1976.310 
In April 1975, legislation was introduced to parliament amending the 
Universities and University Colleges Act with the intention of curbing “political activities 
at all institutions of higher learning”.311  The spectre of communist infiltration also 
reappeared with the government’s White Paper, Communist Party of Malaya Activities 
within the University of Malaya Chinese Language Society. 
Student unrest during the Razak administration was not restricted to the 
Muslim groups influenced by the dakwah ethos.  Malay and non-Malay students alike 
were opposed to the political elite.  From the non-Malay/Chinese students’ perspective, 
antipathy stemmed from a fear that the government’s intention to implement Malay 
affirmative policy could impinge upon their economic future.  For the rural Malay 
students, while government policy had promoted their admission to universities in 
urban centres, it did little to acknowledge the ensuing sense of alienation many 
students experienced.312  Both groups were able to focus their uncertainties and 
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criticisms on the apparent failings of the government’s policies under the new NEP 
climate.   For the goals of NEP to be successfully achieved, it was imperative that the 
government maintain control in every sphere.  The students’ actions highlighted an 
undercurrent of unease which challenged “the integrity and legitimacy of the 
government”.313 
 
Tun Razak’s comparatively short term as prime minister, a mere five years, 
insufficiently acknowledges the depth of his legacy to the Federation.  The powerhouse 
and mastermind behind Malaysia’s social and political transformation, Razak’s 
determination to restore and reaffirm Malay pre-eminence directed the state’s political 
development.  With the objectives of NEP as the template for future government policy 
and directive, it was to be the task of future Malaysian prime ministers to pursue the 
successful achievement of its political and economic aims. 
 
4.2  Tun Hussein Onn 
In January 1976, Hussein Onn acquired the unenviable task of succeeding Abdul 
Razak as the Federation’s third prime minister.  Throughout the five-year term of his 
leadership, Hussein had to contend with crises on several fronts.  Politically, factional 
disputes amongst members of the UMNO Supreme Council surfaced in the power 
vacuum created by the absence of Tun Razak’s authoritative leadership.  In addition, 
when PAS disapproval over its status within the ruling coalition led to the party’s 
withdrawal from the BN in December 1977, Hussein’s critics credited the change in 
UMNO leadership with the failure to maintain a cohesive multi-party alliance.314   
Hussein’s task was not made easier by the fact that his return to the UMNO 
political fold was relatively recent.  Son of Dato Onn Jaafar, founder of UMNO, Hussein 
had withdrawn from the party when his father resigned as leader to form the 
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Independence of Malaya Party in 1951. 315   He rejoined UMNO shortly before 
successfully contesting the 1969 general elections, was appointed deputy prime 
minister in 1973 and, three years later, to the position of prime minister on the death of 
his brother-in-law, Tun Abdul Razak.  His rapid rise through the UMNO ranks meant 
that Hussein had little time in which to cement solid relationships to weather the 
political storms that continued to come his way over the course of his leadership.316 
 
4.2.1  The Economy 
In terms of economic growth, Hussein was as determined as his predecessor to 
achieve the prime objective of the economic reforms:  an increased share of the 
economic pie for the Malays - a view stridently shared by the ultra-UMNO faction.   
Despite a review of the Third Malaysian Plan (1976-80) indicating that the economy 
was on target to surpass the growth rate achieved by the previous administration, the 
UMNO extremists campaigned vociferously for a greater rate of progress towards the 
achievement of NEP goals.  In response to their persistent calls, and Hussein’s own 
resolve, the government adopted strategies which further expanded and refined those 
of the previous administration.   
To promote and finance Malay ownership in the corporate sector, a vast 
conglomerate of quasi institutions and agencies was established at both state and 
federal level.317  Government funds available for investment were also channelled from 
sources such as Malaysia’s national oil company Petronas.  Regarded as Hussein’s 
“most significant contribution to the economy”,318 Petronas allowed the government to 
negotiate a series of successful lucrative “production-sharing contracts”319 with several 
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foreign oil companies including Shell and Esso.  Petronas’ success was such that 
within a short period, the petroleum industry was “the single largest contributor to the 
national economy”.320   
The success of the schemes to promote Malay/Bumiputera ownership by 
making available shares in companies at preferential rates was undermined by the 
practice of on-selling the shares immediately to non-Malays at market rates.  When the 
scheme was abandoned in 1980, analysis revealed that individual ownership “had 
risen to only 4.3 percent”.321 
The focus to reduce poverty levels was initially in rural areas where 89 percent 
of households considered poor (in Peninsula Malaysia) were situated.  Of these 
households, 74 percent were Malay. 322   Despite various strategies instituted to 
modernise rural development, statistical analysis showed that the incidence of poverty 
had fallen at a greater rate in urban than in rural areas.  That aside, the household 
income of all major ethnic groupings improved as a result of the economic reforms 
adopted in the decade from 1970:  most markedly amongst the elites and the growing 
middle classes. 
 
4.2.2  Industrial Co-ordination Act 
A factor contributing to the reduction of poverty was an increase in the level of 
employment courtesy of the controversial Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA).  Passed in 
1975, the ICA made it mandatory for businesses in the industrial and commercial 
sectors, with a “paid-up capital of RM250,000 and employing more than twenty-five 
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workers” 323  to ensure that the staff numbers included a 30 percent Malay 
representation.  The ICA also included provisions which called for the promotion of 
Malay workers “in appropriate sequence to supervisory and management positions”.324  
Compliance with this legislation was a proviso for the issuance of a permit to operate a 
business.   
 
4.2.3  Islamic Revival 
During the latter half of the 1970s, the Hussein administration became aware that the 
unity and cohesion engendered by the societal reforms was at risk of being 
undermined by the intensity of the more radical dakwah groups mobilised by the wave 
of Islamic religiosity sweeping the world.  The administration was concerned that not 
only could the religious fervour of the groups exacerbate the cleavage between Malay 
and non-Malay - a rift the government had been working to narrow since the early 
1970s - but the Malay could themselves be polarised between those that adhered to 
the call for a return to a purity of the Islamic faith and those who practised a more 
secular lifestyle.  In addition, with Malay Muslim society largely Sunni, the Shi’ite 
ideology of particular dakwah organisations challenged the existing orthodox view.  
Violence which threatened to undermine the veneer of inter-ethnic harmony 
engendered by the Rukunegara such as that which occurred at Ulu Selangor, Alor 
Setar and Johore in late 1970/early 1980 confirmed the government’s unease.325   
Neither was the government prepared to entertain organisations which 
purported an ideology which conflicted with UMNO’s leadership in Islamic affairs.  In 
an attempt to manage or contain the more troublesome groups, “the Hussein 
government adopted a two-pronged conciliatory approach”. 326  Sponsorship was 
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offered to those “that were prepared to abide by its criteria”327 while those groups not 
offered sponsorship were allowed to “carry on but with the proviso that their activities 
were subject to close oversight for deviationist tendencies and if any were found, the 
organization would be immediately proscribed”.328 
Many of the groups the government banned for promoting a strict interpretation 
of Islamic law were based in the PAS stronghold states of Kelantan, Terengganu and 
Kedah.329  PAS, UMNO’s challenger as “upholder of Islam and Islamic values”,330 had, 
from its inception, called for the establishment of an Islamic state.331  In the period 
following the 1974 elections, PAS discontent over such issues as the allocation of 
parliamentary seats and positions within the state and federal administrations strained 
relations between the Islamic party and the government.332 The proclamation of a state 
of emergency in Kelantan in response to a PAS vote of no confidence in Kelantan’s 
mentri besar, an UMNO affiliate, further exacerbated the situation, resulting in PAS 
expulsion from the BN in December 1977.     
The need for heart surgery in February 1981 precipitated Hussein’s retirement 
later that same year.  Largely removed from political circles prior to his success in the 
1969 elections, Hussein had been tasked with the further fleshing out of the social and 
political reform initiated by his predecessor Tun Abdul Razak.  His administration was 
also complicated by intense factional wrangling within UMNO along with mounting 
pressure from radical Islamic organisations.  The prime objective for his successor, Dr 
Mahathir Mohamad, would be the successful achievement of NEP goals while 
maintaining inter-societal harmony within a Malay dominant context.    
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4.3  Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad 
Mahathir was determined to pursue and extend the Malay preferential policies of his 
predecessors.  A staunch Malay nationalist, Mahathir’s increasingly authoritarian 
stance, a preparedness to introduce further restrictive constitutional amendment, 
including the role of the Malay rulers, and to cross swords with the judiciary, not only 
produced dissent within UMNO but further exacerbated the growing inter-ethnic divide: 
a polarisation acknowledged by Mahathir himself in the final years of his governance.  
In considering Mahathir’s lengthy administration (1981-2003), this final section has 
endeavoured to restrict discussion to issues and events which had a substantive 
impact on inter-societal relations in Malaysian society.  
 
Mahathir’s accession was, in itself, uneventful.  It was however, causal to and 
surrounded by, issues which heightened political and civil tension.333  On the one 
hand, the attention and energies of UMNO activists were focused on potential 
candidates to succeed Mahathir as deputy president of the party.334  On the other, civil 
tension, heightened by the passing of amendments to the Societies Act which 
legitimised political intervention in organisations that challenged government policy, 
was further increased by the uncertainty regarding the change in federal leadership.335  
Would Mahathir, in light of previous criticism of government policy, usher in a more 
liberal political environment or pursue a regime reminiscent of Tun Razak? 
Means proposes the call for an early general election in 1982 lay in the 
government’s need to have “a renewed mandate to bolster its legitimacy in anticipation 
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of new public policy initiatives”.336  It was also, from the perspective of the BN, an 
opportune time politically.  There was little prospect that the non-Malay vote would go 
to the opposition party DAP now that disputes over MCA leadership had been 
settled.337  In addition, the MIC, a party which had, for several years, been afflicted by 
ongoing internal leadership challenges, was also more settled with agreement to a 
power-sharing arrangement between competing factions.338 
Ever the skilful tactician, Mahathir, continued to strengthen his authority and 
control over the state’s political processes.   First, he increased his dominance of the 
ruling party by ensuring that UMNO candidates for the election “were either selected or 
co-opted by himself”.339  Not only was this new generation of Malay politicians more 
receptive to the ideas of Mahathir, their presence provided leverage “to check the 
balance of power within UMNO”.340  
Second, in a move to anchor the 40,000-strong ABIM membership, it was 
announced, shortly before the election, that Anwar Ibrahim, the organisation’s leader, 
had joined UMNO and would contest the Permatang Pauh seat (held at that stage by 
PAS) in the upcoming elections.341  The student protestors, having graduated from 
their universities, were now considered a floating constituency.342   
Anwar’s decision was not given unanimous approval by ABIM.343  Founded 
initially as an apolitical Islamic organisation focussed primarily on social issues, in 
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1978 ABIM central leadership had contested the elections as PAS candidates.344  
While most were unsuccessful, PAS, in recognition of the value of the candidates, 
offered positions of leadership within the organisation itself.  Thus for a period, in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s, ABIM became politically aligned with PAS and, by association, 
with the view promoted by PAS that Islam was the panacea for all ills confronting 
Malaysian society. 
In the months leading to the poll, ABIM underwent a change in focus once 
more, declaring that it would no longer support any political organisation, preferring to 
return to its apolitical origins.  It was not surprising, therefore, that the announcement 
that Anwar would contest the elections, led to a schism in the ABIM from which the 
organisation never truly recovered. 
 The 1982 elections were contested within the restrictive climate created by the 
Sedition Act and the threat of detainment under the ISA.345  The election outcome 
indicated no major shift in voter loyalty.  The BN gained two further parliamentary seats 
giving it a total of 132 of which UMNO won 70.  Of the non-Malay parties, the MCA 
recorded its most successful result, with DAP, while it gained a greater proportion of 
the vote in this election than in 1978, received three fewer parliamentary seats.346 
 
4.3.1  Islamisation 
 
Mahathir’s recruitment of Anwar Ibrahim into UMNO had twin benefits.  Not only did his 
co-option add a contingent of loyal Anwar supporters to the UMNO vote, in Anwar, 
Mahathir gained a committed young leader who could work towards implementing 
Islamic principles within an UMNO/Mahathir framework rather than from within the 
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alternative – a PAS political structure.  Whether Anwar’s charismatic personality and 
determination would in fact lead to his political downfall a decade later is a matter of 
conjecture.  That aside, following the success of the 1982 elections, Anwar was 
appointed Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department with responsibility for 
Islamic Affairs. 
With a mutual commitment to assimilate Islamic principles in Malaysian society, 
particularly “the power of learning, the quality of thrift, and…the dignity of work”,347 
Mahathir and his protégée launched several innovative institutions with an Islamic 
focus:  institutions to further inculcate Islamic values across Malaysian society.  The 
establishment of the Islamic Teachers’ Training college in 1982 was followed a year 
later by the renowned Universiti Islam Antarabangsa (International Islamic University, 
IIU).348  Mahathir, in announcing the government’s intention to found the IIU stated that 
though the institution would be located in Malaysia, it would be owned by the Islamic 
world.349  It was envisaged that staff and students would be both Muslim and non-
Muslim with the proviso that “the latter ‘accept this [universal] concept and use Islamic 
philosophy as a basis [for learning]’”.350  In contrast to the state’s other universities, 
which were legislated to instruct in Bahasa Malaysia, the IIU’s languages of instruction 
would be Arabic and English.351 
The Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, “considered the brainchild of Anwar”,352 was 
launched in July 1983.  With a mandate to operate on strict Islamic principles, which 
included a prohibition on the charging of interest or riba, the Islamic Bank developed 
“mechanisms of profit-sharing and dividends…so that both borrower and lender 
earn[ed] the approximate equivalent of market interest rates offered by regular 
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banks”. 353   Other Islamic economic institutions included a restructured Islamic 
Economic Foundation which, amongst other functions, collected and disseminated 
“contributions to charity”354 and the Islamic Insurance Company in 1985.355 
Apart from promoting the development of the Islamic Bank, Anwar was 
instrumental in founding the “well-funded Institute of Policy Development…in 1985”.356  
Echoing ABIM’s ideals of strengthening the individual’s faith through education, the 
Institute provided “human development training for student leaders, youth activists, 
junior managers and public servants”.357  A review of Islamic jurisprudence was also 
undertaken during this period.  Where amendments were promulgated, these were of 
a more fundamental aspect viewed by some as a return to a more traditional focus.358 
 
4.3.2  NEP Init iatives 
With the desired mandate delivered by the elections, Mahathir’s commitment and 
determination to achieve the NEP goals by the targeted date, now only eight years into 
the future, led the government to institute a range of policy initiatives directed 
specifically at the successful attainment of the stated economic and social objectives – 
a task made more difficult by the global economic downturn.359  
In 1982, the government recorded a budget deficit of RM10 billion.360  The 
diminishing return of the country’s export commodities due to the recession was 
insufficient to meet the government’s continuing investment in an increasing number of 
Bumiputera corporations and trust agencies; an initiative commenced under the 
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Hussein administration.  By 1983, the government was channelling funds “through 57 
institutions, 115 statutory boards, and corporations that in turn controlled or had joint-
ventures in 500 subsidiary companies”.361 The mounting financial crisis, unlikely to 
alter in the immediate future, saw the implementation of a range of measures to 
remedy the situation.   
First, the decision to increase the government’s share of foreign investment 
was effected by acquiring “a controlling interest in a number of key British corporations 
operating in Malaysia”.362  The predatory manner in which the shares were acquired 
led the British government to impose a fees hike across several sectors impacting 
directly on Malaysian students living in Britain and by Malaysia’s national carrier, 
Malaysian Airline System (MAS), with increased landing charges. 363    Mahathir 
retaliated by calling for a boycott of British goods.  His ‘Buy British Last’ policy lingered 
until March 1983 leading the government, in the interim, to closer relations with 
neighbouring Japan and South Korea and the ‘Look East’ policy.   
Second, as a consequence of its increased level of interaction with the highly 
industrialised states, the government initiated plans to “accelerate the pace of 
industrialization”.364  An Industrial Master Plan, inspired primarily by the success of 
Korea’s economic growth, was adopted.  The plan incorporated the Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) formulated by Mahathir in 1980 when he was 
Minister of Trade and Industry.365  It was envisaged that HICOM would act as the 
conduit through which foreign investment would flow into Malaysia, on a joint-stock 
basis, to fund several large scale national projects.  The agreement with the Mitsubishi 
Company to form the Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional or the National Automobile 
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Industry Corporation which produced Malaysia’s first car, the Proton, is considered 
HICOM’s most controversial venture.366 
 
4.3.3  Privatisation 
In January 1983 Mahathir announced an innovative scheme which would see the 
gradual transfer of particular “government enterprises to the private sector”. 367 
Privatisation, according to Mahathir, was the “opposite of nationalisation”.368 Whereas 
“the objective of nationalisation…[was] for government to take over the ownership of 
private enterprises… privatisation…[meant] the transfer of government services and 
enterprises to the private sector”.369  Despite the fanfare which accompanied the 
launch of Malaysia Incorporated and speculation about which services and enterprises 
were likely to be transferred to private ownership, the concept eventuated in little 
tangible shift in ownership causing analysts to question whether privatisation had 
occurred at all.  
The same year, Fleet, a new corporation formed with Malay and Chinese 
investment, and with UMNO as the major stockholder, was granted of a licence to 
operate the television channel TV3.370  The involvement of UMNO begged the question 
as to whether the party could stand outside its membership in BN, as an independent 
investor or whether, in fact, the government itself had become “indirectly a party to the 
new venture”.371  
Two years later, the government announcement that public shares in MAS 
were to be sold to raise RM650 million “needed for new capital investments”372 did not 
precipitate a flurry of private investors.  Public reticence over the purchase of shares in 
MAS stemmed from the government’s intention to retain a majority share in the carrier. 
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In September 1986, Mahathir announced that NEP “would be held in abeyance”.373  
Despite the vestige of success portrayed by the grand industrialisation drive, the 
impact of the global recession in the mid-1980s resulted in a decline in foreign capital 
investment from “its highest level of RM3,262 million in 1982…[to] RM1,262 million in 
1986”.374  By suspending NEP, Mahathir was able to introduce measures to stimulate 
economic growth: initiatives which, in promoting increased foreign investment, might 
have appeared contrary to NEP’s Bumiputera equity objectives.375  
 
4.3.4  Industrial Co-ordination Act Amendment 
The ICA, the cause of Chinese discontent since its inception a decade earlier, was 
amended in December 1985 and again in September 1986.376  The 1985 amendments 
doubled the threshold at which companies had to meet the 30 percent 
Malay/Bumiputera representation.  The paid-up capital increased to RM1 million and 
50 workers and again in 1986, to RM2.5 million with 75 employees.  Tax incentives for 
“the manufacturing, agriculture and tourism sectors”377 received legislative protection 
with the passing of the Promotion of Investments Act in May 1986.  This was followed 
by the launch of a New Investment Fund which would provide funds, at preferential 
rates of interest, for new projects in these same sectors.378  
 
4.3.5  Operation Lalang 
On several fronts, 1987 proved a taxing year for Mahathir.  The resignation of the 
deputy prime minister and the challenge to Mahathir’s presidency of UMNO resulted in 
intense factional struggles which split party elite into two camps:  Mahathir’s Team A 
and Team B led by Tengku Razaleigh.  With success in UMNO’s April general 
assembly elections, albeit slim, the fall-out over Mahathir’s leadership challenge saw 
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those who allied themselves with the opposing camp purged from UMNO and federal 
leadership.  Mahathir’s wrath was also meted out to members of the judiciary 
subsequent to the legal challenge concerning the validity of the UMNO election 
outcome.379   
While a degree of inter-ethnic tension sustained Malaysian society, by October 
1987, communal relations had deteriorated to the point that fears were held for a 
repeat of the inter-societal violence last witnessed in 1969.  The cumulative effect of a 
number of disputes had polarised the community, placing the Malay and non-Malay on 
either side of the divide.   
A number of factors contributed to the rise in inter-ethnic tension.380   In 
September 1987, the government appointed several non-Mandarin speaking Chinese 
teachers to senior positions in Chinese-medium schools, in Malacca, Penang, 
Selangor and Kuala Lumpur.381  Despite mounting resistance to the postings from a 
number of groups including a combined protest from the MCA, Gerakan and DAP, 
Anwar, as Minister of Education, refused to rescind the appointments.382 
This episode was not a random event but rather the final one in a sequence, 
each instance further straining relations between the government and those 
endeavouring to sustain societal integrity.  Murmurings of dissent had been building 
since April 1987 when “the Malacca state government instituted the practice of having 
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all schoolchildren take a pledge during regular school assembly”.383  The pledge was 
viewed by Chinese associations and political parties as containing “Islamic 
overtones”.384  The following month, the MCA threatened to leave the BN if the 
government refused to support a ‘dollar for dollar’ refund scheme to the failed deposit 
taking co-operatives (DTC)  and in June, the University of Malaya elected to teach 
“first-year elective courses in the English, Chinese, and Indian Studies departments”385 
in Malay.   
Over the intervening months, other issues aggravated the tense situation.  
Rumours circulated that the government had established an all-Malay committee to 
review the Education Act 1961.  The MCA “protested the use of the songkok and 
tudung for graduands”386 and Chinese leaders in Johore Bahru were instructed to 
remove Chinese characters from signage.  The increasingly confrontational nature of 
the disputes placed pressure on the collaborative structure of the BN; the 
consociational aspect, even the appearance of, was rapidly diminishing.   
Mediation to settle the contentious issue of the appointment of the non-
Mandarin speaking staff failed.387   On 11 October, political parties and Chinese 
educationalists held a meeting in KL, attended by approximately 2000 people, to 
support a boycott of education institutions.388  In response, UMNO activists organised a 
greater show of force at a rally two days later, followed by a “’civics course’ for 8,000 
divisional delegates”389 the next day. In addition, a massive 500,000 people were 
expected to celebrate UMNO’s anniversary on 1 November.   
To forestall the distinct possibility of inter-communal violence and to shore-up 
relations between the member-parties of the ruling coalition, on “27 October 1987, the 
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police launched ‘Operation Lalang’”.390   Over the next two months, a total of 119 
persons persons considered a threat to the security of the Federation were arrested 
and detained under the ISA.  Among those arrested were politicians from DAP, MCA, 
Gerakan, Permuda UMNO, Christian group members, Muslim teachers, 
nongovernmental organisation activists, media representatives and Chinese 
educationalists.391   Khoo notes that arrests were made in Sarawak “where local 
environmentalists and anti-timber-logging natives were also detained”.392  It may have 
been Mahathir’s intention, apart from quelling the threat of inter-ethnic violence, to 
bring into line the more recalcitrant politicos and while this was achieved to a degree, 
the anti-Mahathir faction within UMNO continued with their judicial challenge which 
was placed before the High Court in KL in January 1988.393 
 
4.3.6  Vision 2020  
In February 1991, at the inaugural meeting of the Malaysian Business Council, 
Mahathir outlined his vision for the future of Malaysia.  In a speech entitled ‘The Way 
Forward’  he pictured a country, that by the year 2020, would be fully developed - “a 
nation at peace with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and 
full and fair partnership, made up of one ‘Bangsa Malaysia’ with political loyalty and 
dedication to the nation”.394  
Mahathir’s utopian vista for Malaysia quickly seized the public’s imagination.395  
Just as the Rukunegara had been employed to evince greater acceptance of NEP, so 
Vision 2020, or Wawasan 2020, sweetened the strategies of the new economic era.  
The concept of Wawasan was popularly used by Anwar in the 1993 UMNO party 
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elections, and by the business sector, continuing to appear on large canvasses high in 
KL’s city centre a decade later.396    
 
4.3.7  National Development Policy 
Speculation which had been mounting concerning the direction of Malaysia’s political 
economy post-NEP was partially resolved, in July 1991, with the adoption of measures 
introduced to achieve the aims of Vision 2020.   
While in essence the new initiative, the National Development Policy (NDP) 
remained the same as NEP - a reduction in the degree and incidence of poverty along 
with the removal of identification of race with major economic function - in practise it 
differed from its progenitor in three main aspects. First, the new policy was broadened 
to encompass “nine central objectives” 397  Mahathir believed that Malaysia must 
overcome in order to achieve the desired status as a fully developed nation: 
to establish a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared 
destiny; to create a psychologically liberated, secure, and developed Malaysian 
Society; to foster and develop a mature democratic society; to establish a fully 
moral and ethical society; to establish a matured, liberal and tolerant society; to 
establish a scientific and progressive society; to establish a fully caring society and 
a caring culture; to ensure an economically just society; and to establish a 
prosperous society.
398   
 
Second, in contrast to NEP’s prescriptive attention to specific quotas and target dates, 
neither was included in the new development plan.399  The exclusion of these details, 
which under NEP was causal to the introduction of Malay-affirmative policy, was 
welcomed by non-Malay/non-Bumiputera but was critically regarded by the more 
radical UMNO/Malay element.  
The final point in which NDP diverged from NEP was in its dimensional shift in 
focus.  Whereas previous strategies to restructure Malaysian society had attempted a 
broad brush approach, under NDP, the focus would be concentrated on further 
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developing a “viable and robust Bumiputera commercial and industrial community 
[BCIC]”.400  Mahathir spoke of the “need to ensure the creation of an economically 
resilient and fully competitive Bumiputera community so as to be at par with the 
NonBumiputera community”. 401   Suitable candidates for “important business 
positions” 402  would be specifically identified and “groomed into middle-class 
Bumiputera entrepreneurs”.403  There would be more an emphasis on quality rather 
than “on quantity”404 to achieve the same aim. 
The urgency for a strong diversified and competitive economy, the financial 
rewards of which would correct the imbalances of the past, called for a greater 
investment in “human resource development”.405  Detailing the economic management 
of NDP, the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) acknowledged the high failure rate of 
Bumiputera enterprises and anticipated the need for training in the management of 
wealth and business ethics.406 
Several initiatives introduced under NEP were retained or extended under 
NDP.  The acceleration of the Privatisation programme enabled the increased 
allocation of “a substantial proportion of the equity”407 to the Bumiputera/Malay.  In 
addition, to fill the shortfall in domestic investment, the continued relaxation in 
legislation would facilitate the inflow of foreign funds required for the expanded 
industrialisation programme.408  Islamic-based institutions also had a place within 
NDP.  Consultation and research would ensure that their activities would be integrated 
within the “national planning effort”.409 
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Finally the reliance on the private sector was also retained with Mahathir’s 
proviso that “companies must have a high sense of corporate duty”.410  Upgrading and 
retraining staff would build more competitive businesses which in turn would create 
greater opportunities for a larger numbers of Bumiputera to be employed.  
 
4.3.8  Barisan Alternatif 
Malaysia’s steady economic growth through the 1990s was halted, in the last quarter 
of the decade, by the impact of the East Asian Financial Crisis.  The sudden 
devaluation of the Thai baht, in July 1997, triggered economic collapse in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Singapore and the Philippines.411  
Malaysia’s financial recovery was, at the same time, impeded and prolonged 
by associated political turmoil reminiscent of the previous decade; in this instance, 
mounting civil and political unrest surrounding the removal of Anwar as deputy prime 
minister.412  Anwar’s public humiliation, orchestrated by Mahathir, was regarded by 
many as contradicting accepted mores that underpinned Malay society.  In particular, 
the deeply ingrained concept for “honour and the avoidance of shame”.413  The 
dishonour Mahathir sought to attribute to Anwar was, as Khoo wrote, “distended into 
the disgrace of the entire community”.414  It was shameful to be Malay. 
Continuing revelations of Anwar’s alleged behaviour, the judicial trials along 
with details of his physical abuse in police detention fuelled support for Reformasi, a 
movement empowered by Anwar which called for “social and political reforms”.415 For 
a large section of Malaysian society, Mahathir’s standing as prime minister was 
undermined by both his handling of the financial crisis and his involvement in Anwar’s 
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public disgrace.416  Reformasi appealed not only to the disillusioned and disenchanted 
but to an increasing number of opposition parties and social organisations.   
In October 1999, shortly before the November general election, the Reformasi 
movement gave rise to a new political party Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA).  
Drawn together by the appeal for social change, the coalition united diverse groups 
such as UMNO’s rival for the Malay vote – PAS, the DAP, Parti Rakyat Malaysia 
(Malaysian Peoples’ Party, PRM) – one of Malaysia’s oldest Socialist parties and Parti 
KeADILan Rakyat (Peoples’ Justice Party, PKR), a new party  led by Anwar’s wife 
Wan Azizah. 
Setting aside allegations of gerrymandering, the impact of patronage politics 
and the fact that the eight-day electioneering period was not conducted on a level 
playing field, the BN campaigned to retain the status quo claiming that it alone could 
“guarantee continued economic development, political stability, and, above all, 
untroubled interethnic relations”. 417  The government also played the ‘ethnic fears’ card 
informing the Malay voters “that only UMNO could preserve ‘Malay dominance’”418 
warning non-Malay voters “that only an UMNO-led coalition could safeguard them 
against ‘ethnic violence’ and an ‘Islamic state’”.419  The prime objective of the BA was 
to present as an attractive alternative to the ruling BN; a viable option which, if 
successful, could break the BN’s monopoly on state power.420  
The election outcome returned the BN to government with the crucial two-thirds 
majority in parliament; albeit significantly reduced.  For UMNO, the election results 
were unprecedented with the loss of 22 parliamentary and 55 state assembly seats.421  
The results indicated that its “share of the popular vote declined from 36.5 per cent to 
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29.5 per cent”422 while rival PAS, the most successful of BA’s member parties, had 
“obtained 43.5 per cent of total Malay votes”.423  Detailed analysis of election results 
revealed that the shift from UMNO/BN to PAS/BA in Malay contested seats was 
partially offset by a significant swing in Chinese/non-Malay votes towards BN 
candidates.  Non-Malay support for the BN countered the BA’s hopes of attaining a 
one-third share in parliament and is believed to have stemmed from a number of 
concerns including the spectre of an Islamic state – PAS’ long-standing objective424 - 
and violent political unrest, as had occurred in neighbouring Indonesia.  
In typical Mahathir fashion, the unfavourable results, which cast doubt on 
UMNO’s continuing dominance, led to the implementation of a number of repressive 
measures.  Khoo writes that “[a]ll forms of state power – the law, police and 
bureaucratic regulation”425 were brought to bear on opposing organisations and on 
individuals themselves.    
 
4.3.9  Mahathir’s Last Hurrah? 
Mahathir maintained his uncompromising combative style, with only the occasional 
introspective glimpse, until his retirement in October 2003.   Politically, in the closing 
stages of his leadership, there was a definite swing towards a multi-ethnic opposition 
drawn together to oppose the regime which had exerted political power over 
generations of Malaysian citizens; an opposition inclusive of a growing number of 
Malays.  At the societal level, a steady polarisation of ethnicities was apparent in the 
nation’s educational institutions.  Research indicated that students tended to socialise 
with students of the same ethnicity in preference to those of other culture identities.426        
Until the DAP’s withdrawal from the BA in September 2001, the opposition 
coalition was a tangible symbol, a magnet for those wanting a greater measure of 
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social justice.427  In October 2000, the force for change motivated thousands to gather 
at the gates of the Kamunting Detention Camp in remembrance of those arrested 
during Operation Lalang in October 1987 and to “protest ’40 years of the Internal 
Security Act’”.428  It was also the first time that Malay protestors outnumbered non-
Malay.429  The following month, in early November, a KeADILan-organised rally “in 
defence of civil liberties and the right to peaceful assembly”430 drew several hundred 
people.  The marchers, diverted by police road blocks, were met with violent police 
action which appalled many.   Once again, Malays protestors were in the majority 
The most decisive action indicative of the growing role of the BA as a political 
movement in contention was its success on 29 November, in the Lunas by-election, a 
seat held by the BN for the past 40 years.431   However, the choice of candidate, a 
KeADILan member, and not a DAP member as hoped, caused dissension within the 
BA and, with the advantage of hindsight, proved to be the beginning of the end for the 
coalition.432 
The tolerance Mahathir may have exhibited towards the protest marches of the 
previous year was exhausted by April 2001.  The force of the ISA was brought to bear 
on KeADILan with seven members of its leadership arrested along with several 
members of the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Malaysian Militant Group, KMM) a group 
believed to be plotting the overthrow of the government.433  The detentions increased 
intra-BA tension primarily within KeADILan and PAS.  Not only had KeADILan lost 
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most of “its determined and capable organizers”,434  included amongst the KMM 
members was the son of Nik Abdul Aziz, PAS leader and Kelantan Mentri Besar.   
The arrests may have been an attempt by Mahathir to capitalise on the intra-
party tension following the Lunas by-election, the ultimate outcome being the demise 
of the BA, the prime mover of BN opposition.  He could not, however, have predicted 
the fall-out over the arrests as set against the back-drop of events which unfolded as 
the year progressed.  
 
Global attention, drawn to the trials and unsavoury tribulations of Anwar in the late 
1990s, returned in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on American homeland, to 
speculate Malaysia’s role in the upsurge in terrorist activity across the region:  at worst 
a breeding ground for Muslim extremists, at least a conduit through which terrorism 
flowed between Southeast Asian states.  Revelations that representatives of a number 
of terrorist organisations from Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and the Philippines along 
with members of the KMM had met in KL in 1999 and formed a loose coalition, the 
Rabitatul Mujahidin (League of Mujahidin), illustrated the ease with which Islamic 
extremists could pass through the state.435   
The unequivocal support Mahathir had given towards addressing the problem 
of terrorism in 2001 was tempered by the comment that the international community 
should look further than at Islam.  However, while Mahathir disagreed that Muslims 
should be singled out over and above other suspects, the government took pains to 
reduce the likelihood of Islamic extremism in Malaysia.  Increased restrictions on PAS 
activities and membership saw the  Selangor state government extending the ban on 
PAS held meetings (those without appropriate police permit) to the closure a number 
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of PAS-run madrasahs along with the decision to follow the Johor practice of setting a 
school-wide religious programme to preclude PAS input in the syllabus.   
Mahathir was vociferous in his criticism of the US-led war in Iraq.  In a speech 
given to the Non-Aligned Movement in February 2003 he referred to the victim of the 
9/11 attacks as “collateral damage for long-standing mistakes in U.S. foreign policy”436 
setting back US-Malay relations.  At the UMNO general assembly meeting four-months 
later, Mahathir’s anti-Western rhetoric continued when he inferred that moral 
degeneration in the West was the cause of many problems ranging from theft to 
incest.437   
This tirade was vastly different from the address given the year before when, 
for reasons perhaps not even known to himself, Mahathir announced to a stunned 
audience that he intended to “resign as the party’s president and from all his positions 
in the Barisan Nasional”.438  In camera discussions with a “tearful Mahathir”439 resulted 
in the announcement that his resignation would not be effective until October after 
which time Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, would succeed him as prime 
minister of Malaysia and president of UMNO.440   
 
In October 2003, Dr Mahathir Mohamad retired as Malaysia’s longest serving prime 
minister.  It is improbable that a successful political career spanning several decades 
would not have its share of controversy.  While Mahathir’s determination to pursue and 
extend the Malay preferential policies of his predecessors was impeded by a number 
of issues which, to a large degree, fell beyond his control to contain, he is, 
nonetheless, credited with single-mindedly modernising Malaysian society.  In 
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acknowledgement of his 22-year career as first statesman in the land his appearance 
at political and social functions continues to command honour and respect. 
 
4.4  Regime Security vs Societal Security 
Through the progressive adoption of a range of policy to restructure Malaysian society 
over the three decade period 1970 to 2003, the prevailing Malay context was 
concomitantly affirmed and subsumed within a powerful Malay hegemon.   The 
ascendance of the hegemon, protected and strengthened by constitutional and 
legislative provisions, meant that non-Malay societies had to contend with a number of 
profound challenges which, despite assertions that non-Malay groups would not be 
detrimentally affected, threatened the survival of their individual identities.   
Of all the non-Malay groups, it was the Chinese who were at the forefront of 
protecting and securing non-Malay identity.  Politically the most articulate and 
mobilised group, the Chinese were able to accommodate the changing political climate 
through compromise and innovative practice.  In contrast, the Indian community, which 
became increasingly marginalised through this period, lacked a strong and cohesive 
political will.  It was not until 2007, under the leadership of Malaysia’s fifth Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi, that the Hindu Rights Action Front (HINDRAF) was able to 
give voice to the Indian lament.441 
In considering the position of the non-Malay groups through the period under 
review, comment is limited to the following domains: the political (with reference to 
PAS’ attempts to enforce Islamic principles and values in the states under its control, 
the impact of which contributed to the DAP decision to withdraw from the opposition 
coalition), economic and cultural aspects with concluding comments on the 
Federation’s electoral and dual judicial systems.   
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4.4.1  The Political Aspect 
Initially, political development formed on communal lines.  Over time, particular groups 
came together to create alliances or coalitions; not always voluntarily but rather 
prompted by political circumstance.  While scholars may proffer various reasons for the 
creation of the BN in 1974, perhaps it was simply a reflection of the Sun-Tzu quotation 
– ‘keep your friends close and your enemies closer’!  Ultimately, however, the 
successful restructuring of society necessitated co-operation amongst the political 
elites.   
Agreement to forge the new coalition did not necessarily translate to cabinet 
recognition.  Despite an apparent willingness to transfer commitment from the Alliance 
to the BN (though there was in fact little option) the poor showing of the MCA and the 
MIC in the 1969 elections saw the positions of leading politicians shifted to those of 
lesser responsibility in the post-1974 election cabinet.  Senior UMNO members were 
appointed to finance portfolios held by the MCA ministers prior to the May 1969 
elections and the sole remaining MIC politician in cabinet shifted from “Labour and 
Manpower…to the smaller Communications Ministry”.442   Leo Ah-Bang concludes that 
the cabinet reshuffle represented “a consolidation of Malay political dominance”.443 
Not that inter-ethnic mergers were easily wrought.  The clash of ideologies was 
apparent not only during negotiations to form the BN, previously covered, it also led to 
the withdrawal of PAS in 1977 and the DAP from the opposition coalition, the BA, in 
2001.444   
Apart from the four-year hiatus when PAS was a member of the BN coalition, 
the Islamic party challenged and, more often than not, accused UMNO of falling short 
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in its role as protector of Malay/Islamic hegemony, a role PAS had long disputed.445  
The introduction of a number of initiatives infusing universalistic Islamic principles 
throughout the state structure and machinery, under the leadership of Mahathir and 
Anwar, failed to stem the criticism of PAS stalwarts.  
For its part, from its inception as a political party in the mid-1950s, PAS 
consistently proclaimed its intention of establishing an Islamic state based on Islamic 
jurisprudence or Syariah law.446   Three and a half decades later, PAS had made little 
traction towards the successful achievement of its aim, one considered “obligatory to 
all Islamic leaders”.447  Greater ‘success’ had been achieved in being branded the 
‘watchdog of Islam’.448 
The 1989 PAS general assembly marked the rise of new leaders determined to 
achieve where previous leadership had failed.449  It is noteworthy that  Fadhil Noor, 
newly elected president, Abdul Hadi Awang, who would in time succeed Noor as 
president, and Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, the organisation’s spiritual leader, were  all 
educated in Middle Eastern universities.450  Prior to the 1990 general election, PAS 
and Semangat ’46 leadership agreed to form an opposition coalition of Muslim parties, 
the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (United Islamic Movement, APU), sometimes 
referred to as the Organisation for the Uplift of the Muslim Community or the Armed 
Ummah Unity.451  PAS leadership also resolved to contest a lesser number of seats 
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than the previous general election, focusing mainly on the UMNO-held Malay seats in 
the northeast of the peninsula.452  For the first time since Merdeka, the co-ordinated 
approach of the opposition parties in this general election presented the UMNO/BN 
with a viable opposition, one which had the potential to form the government.453 
Initially the BN’s campaign strategy centred on the “hastily formed” 454 
coalitions, suggesting that ideological differences between the parties would make the 
task of governing the Federation difficult.  There was no comment on the precedent set 
by Razak in the creation of the BN itself.  With the unexpected withdrawal from the 
ruling coalition of Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party), whose membership were 
largely Kadazan Christians, the BN changed tack and played the ethno/religious card, 
magnifying the impact an election upset might have on the special position of the 
Malays.  This was neatly exemplified in the election theme ‘Save Malaysia’.455 
In keeping with the modus operandi adopted in the mid 1980s, PAS was less 
strident in its calls for an Islamic state.  With an overarching theme ‘Develop with 
Islam’, the manifesto reassured non-Muslims that their societal identity would be 
protected, with freedom to worship, to retain cultural diversity, and the choice to 
participate politically.456    
The more muted campaign proved the correct choice.  The results for the 1990 
general elections showed that PAS was the most successful of the opposition parties 
regaining Kelantan, a state it had lost to the BN 12 years earlier.457  With the state’s 
long Islamic heritage and the commitment of PAS leadership, it was not surprising that, 
in the aftermath of the election success, PAS should declare its intention to “transform 
                                                                                                                                      
Razaleigh in 1988 following the deregistration of UMNO which resulted from the challenge to Mahathir’s 
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Kelantan into an Islamic State”;458 initially through the implementation of Islamic laws 
including hudud law.459  Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Abdul Aziz, stated that “while the 
rights of the 7 per cent non-Muslim in Kelantan…[would] be honoured, they …[would] 
also be made subject to the hudud laws”.460   
PAS replicated a similar election victory in the 1999 General Election retaining 
Kelantan and gaining neighbouring Terengganu.  The party, as it would do more 
overtly in the 2004 elections, bifurcated its electioneering.  The month before the 
November elections, PAS, along with the DAP, the PRM and the PKR agreed to 
contest the elections as coalition partners in the newly formed BA.  In this regard, PAS 
campaigned strongly for social justice reform:  “leaders, members and supporters 
placed themselves at the forefront of demonstrations against unjust laws, unfair 
rulings, unpopular policies, and unacceptable harassment”.461   
In Terengganu, PAS was candid regarding its intentions of moving the state 
closer to an Islamic model if it was successful in the poll.  PAS leader Nik Abdul Aziz 
asserted that the state government would adopt the Syariah criminal code or hudud 
“for Muslims, as they would understand that this law comes from Allah”.462  Differing 
from statements made earlier in Kelantan, non-Muslims would “be free to choose 
between the English law or the Islamic law”.463  Despite this reassurance, there was 
disquiet throughout several levels of Malaysian society particularly at PAS statements 
that the party would close down the Genting Highlands Casino, if it succeeded in 
gaining control of Pahang.  While Muslims, under the tenets of their faith, are 
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prohibited entry to the casino, the closure of the popular and highly profitable resort 
would not only impact on the millions of visitors the complex drew each year, but the 
financial donations Lim Goh Tong, founder of Genting, made to political parties on both 
sides of the house, might cease.464  
Once in power, the PAS state government in Terengganu steadily adopted a 
number of restrictions increasing social conservatism in accordance with the election 
manifesto.465   Despite the pre-election assurances that non-Muslims would be ‘free to 
choose’, the reality was otherwise.  The party proposed: 
that all Muslim women at work wear veils and that there be separate counters 
for men and women in supermarkets.  It was also suggested that there be a 
ban on unisex hair salons and karaoke lounges, no renewal of liquor 
licences…[and] an end to betting shops.
466
   
 
Inter-societal tension rose dramatically when the state government announced that it 
intended to place a kharaj tax on non-Muslim landowners within the state.  In 
explanation, Terengganu Chief Minister Abdul Hadi Awang stated that as there was no 
faith requirement for non-Muslims to contribute the zakat (charity) Muslims paid as part 
of their ibadah (belief), state authorities had decided to raise revenue in an alternative 
manner by charging non-Muslims the kharaj tax.467  Following talks between DAP and 
PAS leadership, the decision was rescinded.    
To the consternation of many, both the Kelantan and Terengganu state 
legislatures passed the hudud law code:  Kelantan in November 1993, and in August 
2002 the Terengganu state government voted in the Syariah Enactment.  In effect, 
however, the legislation remains suspended as, currently, states do not have provision 
to introduce alternate penal systems. 468   Without amendment to the federal 
constitution, the federal penal code has jurisdiction over states for the maintenance, 
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enforcement and sanction of criminal law.469  So while the statements concerning the 
proposed legislation may have ratcheted up political and civil tension, they were largely 
rhetoric but indicative that PAS was determined to pursue its Islamic state agenda. 
On 29 September 2001, three years after the BA was formed, the DAP 
leadership announced that it was no longer tenable for the party to remain a member 
of the opposition coalition.  In the period since the 1999 elections, controversial 
statements by PAS leadership on a range of issues had tested DAP resolve to remain 
in the BA.470  The party’s success in Terengganu had led to the implementation of 
measures which restricted the civil liberties not only of the state’s Muslim population 
but of all citizens irrespective of ethnicity.  The assurance that the non-Malays would 
retain freedom of choice as far as the hudud law was concerned had not been 
extended to the new initiatives.  The proposed limit on karaoke and betting along with 
plans for the personal non-Muslim tax - the kharaj - were keenly felt.   
Then came the 9/11 terrorist attacks which shattered Western complacency.  In 
the volatile environment, when sensitivity to ‘things Islamic’ was most extreme, PAS’ 
strident calls for the establishment of an Islamic state, along with jihad against the 
United States, brought relations between the coalition partners to breaking point.  The 
fact that Mahathir’s much quoted declaration that Malaysia was “already an Islamic 
state”471 was made during the same period was challenging but bearable to DAP 
membership.  What was irreconcilable were statements from an opposition partner 
organisation.  
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4.4.2  The Economic Aspect 
With successive administrations intent on achieving a 30 percent share of the 
corporate sector either owned or managed by the Malays (and Bumiputera) by 1990, 
the non-Malay groups were left with few options.472  The communities could either 
passively accept the continued roll-out of Malay affirmative policy, with the risk of 
becoming marginalised through the process, or adapt their practices to maximise 
economic opportunities.    
The promulgation of pro-Malay policy and legislation led the more 
entrepreneurial to adopt innovative and at times convoluted methods of circumventing 
the restrictions - methods which crossed the societal divide.  By forging close links with 
powerful political leaders, the development of new Chinese/Malay businesses was 
facilitated.  Patron-client relationships developed either directly between Malay 
politicians and wealthy Chinese businessmen or where the aspiring businessman 
could not call on a personal relationship or connection, then links were made through 
Chinese politicians. Where businesses were established, the Malay would, to all 
intents and purposes, act as the ‘front man’ while the Chinese might supply expertise 
and financial backing, in the role of a ‘sleeping partner’.  In these “so-called Ali-Baba 
arrangements…[Ali - the Malay ] surreptitiously transferred licenses and other 
privileges”473 to Baba - the non-Malay.   
In 1975, after much discussion and a change in leadership, the MCA issued the 
Five-Point Programme, a list of projects the energies of the organisation would focus 
on over the coming years.  These were:  
1.  The formation of a multipurpose corporate company to help the Chinese 
transform their family-type businesses into modern progressive companies for 
greater profits, 
2.  The construction of a multimillion dollar office complex as a fund-generating 
source to support the MCA machinery, 
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3.  The establishment of the Malaysian Chinese Cultural Society to ensure a place 
for Chinese culture in Malaysia, 
4.  The initiation of a series of membership drive campaigns to increase Chinese 
participation in MCA activities, and 
5.  The establishment of a technical college called the Tunku Abdul Rahman 
College for the education of youths for employment in commerce and industry.
474
 
 
The first project, the development of a corporate company, resulted in the 
setting up of Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPHB) which commenced operation in 
1977.475  MPHB operated as a ‘super’ DTC, a holding company, investing private 
contributions from the Chinese community in a myriad of businesses across a range of 
industries.476  By participating in the share-market economy, the DTCs became the 
Chinese equivalent to the government’s practice of obtaining shares solely for the 
Malays/Bumiputera through the acquisition of high-yield businesses.477  Regarded the 
leading co-operative in the field, the MPHB started trading “with an initial investment of 
26,000 shareholders and a paid-up capital of RM30million”.478   
Unfortunately the liberalising of the financial sector in the mid 1980s resulted in 
revelations of gross financial mismanagement and political collusion reaching almost 
“endemic proportions”.479  The rapid growth MPHB exhibited in the first decade of 
trading was halted in January 1986 with arrest of Tan Koon Swan.  Elected MCA 
president in November 1985, Tan, who had a fundamental role in establishing MPHB, 
was charged with fraudulent activity in the Pan-Electric Industries debacle (Pan-El). It 
was additionally alleged that he had channeled funds from MPHB to Pan-El in order 
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that the failing company could meet debt repayments.  As a result of this venture, and 
others, MPHB was “reputed to have lost $US60m in 1985”.480   
Before the former MCA president could commence his period of confinement, 
Tan, along with other members of the MCA leadership, was implicated in an 
investigation of 24 DTCs carried out by Bank Negara, Malaysia’s central bank.  In May 
1986, rumours of malfeasance involving Koperai Belia Bersatu Berhad (Kosatu), a 
major DTC, led to a run on its branches when members attempted to withdraw 
funds.481  Despite action to allay concern, depositors remained nervous.  Following a 
further run on Kosatu in July, Bank Negara raided the DTC “and its subsidiaries…and 
froze their assets“.482  In August, five days after the 1986 general elections, 23 other 
DTCs were ordered to suspend operations.  The bank’s investigation showed that of 
the 24 co-operatives, only three (one of which was Kosatu), were solvent.  The 21 
insolvent institutions had a “negative capital totaling RM629.5 million”.483  Once again, 
financial scandal surrounded senior members of the MCA leadership which did little to 
enhance peoples’ faith in the political organisation. 
Fiscal abuse was not the province of the Chinese community alone but 
occurred across the societal spectrum with ignominious episodes reported in the 
Malay society also.  In the most notorious incident, Malaysia’s state-owned Bank 
Bumiputra incurred an estimated US$1billion loss through the collapse of its 
subsidiary, Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Limited (BMF).  The lion’s share of BMF’s 
share portfolio had been invested in companies dealing in Hong Kong’s booming 
property market - a market for which BMF was not intended nor where banking staff 
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were sufficiently experienced, many of them being “young Malay graduates”.484  In 
addition to allegations of corruption and financial ineptitude leveled at senior banking 
officials and politicians, investigations into the murder of an internal auditor linked 
several powerful businessmen and high ranking politicians. 
In a second incident, under Mahathir’s leadership, the government adapted a 
scheme, initially introduced to support and protect the country’s tin producers (tin being 
a major export commodity), with the intent of controlling the global tin market. Under 
the guise of the Maminco Sdn Berhad, the government purchased large stocks of tin, 
both actual and as futures on the London Metal Exchange (LME).  These purchases 
were made in an attempt to raise the price of tin and create a demand which the state 
would eventually be able to satisfy - at the raised purchase price.   Unfortunately this 
venture, which ultimately cost the government approximately US$200 million, not only 
prompted the United States General Services Administration to “unload part of its 
strategic stockpile”,485 it also led the LME to review its trading rules with the effect that 
the price of tin collapsed, saddling Maminco “with a huge stock of unsold tin”.486 
The extent and magnitude of these incidents, and others not reported, called 
into question the deepening involvement of senior political leaders both Malay and 
Chinese.   Mahathir, due to his position as prime minister, was undoubtedly privy to 
many financial intrigues, even if only after the fact.   
 
4.4.3  The Cultural Aspect 
The retention of cultural integrity in a climate clearly favouring the Malays was the 
major objective confronting all non-Malay societies during this period, as it remains 
today.  For the East Malaysian states, geographical isolation from the peninsula was at 
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times a blessing as much as at others, a hindrance.  While immigration restrictions 
impeded the flow of citizens from Peninsula Malaysia to the East Malaysian states – 
Sarawak and Sabah - it also provided immunity, to a degree, from some of the threats 
assailing the non-Malay communities on the peninsula.487   
Remoteness, however, did not protect Sabah’s non-Malay citizens who were 
subjected to a period of enforced Malayanisation under the rule of Tun Mustapha 
Harun.  From 1967-1974, Mustapha governed Sabah as though it was his own 
domain, amassing a considerable fortune assisted by a cabal of loyal supporters who 
were gifted with “irregular rewards of public office”.488  He undertook an aggressive 
programme to assimilate the non-Malays into the Malay culture under the precepts that 
it was in keeping with federal government’s concept of national unity.  In 1973 Bahasa 
Malaysia was “adopted as the state’s sole official language”.489   The same year, 
freedom of worship was removed when Islam was declared the official religion.  By 
February 1974, the United Sabah Islamic Association’s campaign of mass conversion 
claimed to have embraced over 75,000 new adherents to the faith.   It was the 
intervention of the Tunku and federal government which positioned Mustapha as 
Sabah’s chief minister in 1967, and it was to be political manoeuvring which removed 
him – though Mustapha took the option to retire with an extremely beneficial pension for 
life – once rumours surfaced that he was considering Sabah’s secession from the 
Federation.490  
Sarawak has long been a state where its diverse cultures have co-existed 
peaceably.  From a viewpoint on the state capital’s century old Main Bazaar, it is 
possible to observe temples, shrines, cathedrals and mosques, places of worship for 
Kuching’s citizens.  It was not until the final years of Mahathir’s leadership that the 
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outward signs of Malay/Islamic encroachment became more apparent, particularly 
since 9/11.  Muslim women and girls wear the tudung in every street, shopping mall 
and school and increasing numbers of structures built in the Islamic style have 
appeared.    
It would be erroneous to assume that Kuching’s examples of diverse faiths, 
some dating back to the mid-1800s, are evidence that adherents of faiths other than 
Islam are free to worship without problem.  Despite the Federal Constitution 
guaranteeing freedom of worship, the bureaucratic mill can grind very slowly at times.  
It was no easy task to have applications to upgrade buildings approved let alone to 
establish new complexes.  An additional problem which cropped up occasionally was 
the use of particular ‘Islamic’ words by non-Muslims leading to the banning of 
‘offending’ bible and hymnals.491   
Most keenly felt by the non-Malay, and less privileged Malay, are the power, 
authority and wealth amassed by leading Malay politicians.  Since 1963, Sarawak has 
been governed by six Yang di-Pertua Negeri with the current, Pehin Sri Haji Abdul Taib 
Mahmoud, having served as both third and sixth governors of the state.  Sarawak has 
also had four chief ministers and, apart from Stephen Ningkan, all have been Malay.  
The consistent appointment of Malays to these top positions, even to members of the 
same family, has led to charges of nepotism and cronyism.  
The current chief minister, appointed in1981, is also leader of the PBB, one of 
the two power centres in the Sarawak BN.492   Precedent has the leader of the PBB 
appointed as chief minister.   Wresting control from the PBB would be no easy feat.  
Not only does the party enjoy the support and protection of the federal government as 
member-party of the BN, the organisation has formed strong connections with powerful 
and wealthy businessmen through decades of political patronage, timber concessions, 
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the awarding of untendered or limited contracts and the like.  Defeating the PBB in an 
election would necessitate the various Dayak parties forming a united front, a political 
organisation to attract voter appeal.  Whilst intense factional infighting makes this 
appear unlikely, it is not out of the realms of possibility or opportunity. 
Without the barrier afforded by the South China Sea, the non-Malay groups on 
the peninsula were most vulnerable to the impact of the pro-Malay policy.  In common 
with the East Malaysian states, religious freedom was increasingly under threat fuelled 
by the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s. The destruction of Indian temples, setting 
aside the question as to the legality of their siting, was causal to mounting tension 
between the Indian community and authorities.493   
The challenges confronting Chinese attempts to retain cultural integrity 
identified in the lead up to the October 1987 ISA sweep were not confined solely to the 
Mahathir administration.  Two decades earlier, moves by Chinese educationalists to 
establish a privately-funded university, the Merdeka University, were suspended by the 
1969 race riots. The initiative was motivated by concerns that there was limited 
opportunity for Chinese students to continue their education at the tertiary level.  By 
1977, the impact of the quota system introduced to promote further education for 
Malay students meant that less than 25 percent of admissions to universities were 
non-Malay.494  Despite being endorsed by the MCA, Gerakan and DAP, the decision to 
pursue the innovative institution was initially postponed by the government until after 
the 1978 elections and ultimately rejected “on the grounds that it would likely spark 
communal violence”.495  
By way of appeasement, the government promised to review the quota system. 
While, in the beginning, this may have allowed a greater number of non-Malay 
admissions, by 2001 mounting resentment at the enforced marginalisation of high-
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achieving students unable to attend university, largely Chinese students, caused the 
government to reconsider its initial objections.  Nor was the government prepared to 
lose the 27 percent Chinese vote.496  In July 2001, almost two decades after a 1982 
court ruling that the concept of a Chinese university was unconstitutional, the 
government gave approval for the establishment of the first campus of the Universiti 
Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) in KL.  Administered under the aegis of the MCA, in 
time, the UTAR would expand throughout other federal states.   
The adoption of contentious policy contributed to the challenges confronting 
communities endeavouring to maintain schools taught in the vernacular, Chinese or 
Tamil.  The 1996 Education Act repealed the 1961 Education Act, its 1963 
Amendment and the special orders relating to the East Malaysian states.  To 
accommodate the calls from pressure groups, the government implemented a parallel 
education system.497   The government funds primary schools irrespective of the 
medium of instruction, either in National Primary schools where pupils are taught in 
Bahasa Malaysia, or National-type Primary schools where pupils are taught in either 
Mandarin Chinese or Tamil Indian.498   
At the secondary level, pupils either attend a public or private school.  The 
government funds public secondary schools where the medium of instruction is 
Bahasa Malaysia.  Private secondary schools are either the Independent Chinese 
Secondary schools which are privately funded with pupils taught in Mandarin or the 
Islamic religious schools which the government funds and where the medium of 
instruction is Arabic or Bahasa Malaysia.  At the tertiary level, universities which elect 
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to teach in languages other than Bahasa Malaysia (Mandarin or English) are privately-
funded while the government funds those universities which teach in Bahasa Malaysia.  
In contrast to the Indian community where, for increasing numbers of Tamil 
Indian children, the right to attend school had become an even greater challenge than 
the language of instruction or funding, Chinese determination to retain vernacular 
schooling has been well served by an organisation formed in 1952, the Dong Jiao 
Zong (DJZ).499 The DJZ’s commitment to defend the retention of Chinese-medium 
schools stems from the belief that Mandarin is “the symbol of Chinese identity that 
needs to be protected”.500  Attempts by Malay authorities to replace Mandarin with 
either English or Bahasa Malaysia are viewed as an attack on the Chinese identity.   
In February 1997, the government announced its intentions of establishing 
seven Vision Schools – a component of Mahathir’s Vision 2020 programme the fruit of 
which was envisaged as one Malaysian nation - Bangsa Malaysia.  The scheme would 
position three primary schools on one site, Malay, Chinese and Tamil Indian.  While 
communal areas would be utilised for informal activities, separate administrations 
would be kept to “ensure that its cultural identity was maintained”.501  The proposal 
became an issue in the Lunas by-election in 2000, a constituency with a 37 percent 
Chinese vote.502  The DJZ, through its lobby group Suqiu, mobilised the Chinese 
voters to oppose the Vision Schools project.503  The DJZ’s opposition to the concept 
was based on the view that true equity was impossible and that, in time, the project 
would be dominated by the Malays.  The Suqiu-led campaign contributed to the 
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success of the BA candidate, a result which displeased Mahathir.504  Later in the year, 
Suqiu deputy chairman David Chua, was accused by Mahathir of breaching 
confidentially over comments he had made in an interview to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review.   As the issue spiralled, UMNO Youth were drawn in, threatening to 
raze the Selangor Chinese Hall.  This extreme reaction caused the more levelled 
headed politicians to organise mediation which diffused the inter-societal relations.505 
The strength of the DJZ’s advocacy in defending the retention of Mandarin as 
the language of instructions in Chinese primary schools continued to be tested.  In 
2002 the government announced that from 2003, maths and science would be taught 
in English in primary schools as part of its programme to ensure Malaysian citizens in 
the future would achieve “economic prosperity in a highly competitive global 
economy”.506  Neither was the proposal widely accepted by the Malay nationalists.  To 
them the language of choice should not be English but Bahasa Malaysia.  Verbal 
clashes with Mahathir, during which veiled reference to the events of 1987 were made, 
only served to make the UMNO/BN more obdurate in its stance to implement the 
changes by the planned date, which it duly did.507  The issue remained unresolved and 
although a compromise of sorts was reached concerning the frequency of lessons, 
with Mahathir’s retirement in October 2003, the issue was carried forward to the 
incoming administration. 
 
4.5  The Election Commission 
Analysts invariably describe Malaysia’s electoral system as gerrymandered in favour of 
the ruling UMNO/BN, particularly since the 1969 elections which shook the foundations 
                                                
504 By 2009, six Vision Schools had been established.  See Suseela Malakolunthu, , 2009 conference paper, 
(http://eprints-um-edu.my).  The circumstances surrounding the Lunas by-election are covered in 4.3.9 
Mahathir’s Last Hurrah? 
505 See Lee Kam Hing, 2004, pp. 96, 97. 
506 Collins, 2006, p. 313. 
507 This matter, “The Final Solution”, forms part of Collins’ review as he traces the journey of Chinese 
educationalists in their attempts to preserve the special character of the Chinese schools.  Collins, 2006, 
pp. 298-318. 
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of UMNO’s security.  Free and open elections are further hindered by the alleged 
corruptive practices of the Election Commission (EC), the agency constitutionally 
established in 1957 as a quasi-judicial body tasked with managing the elections in an 
unbiased and impartial manner.508 
Apart from the alleged inconsistency in the management of elections and the 
adoption of provisions which prefer the BN coalition, the practice which attracts the 
greatest criticism from opposition parties and civil rights activists is the manner in 
which constituencies are regularly reconfigured. 
The formulation of constituencies was problematic from the outset.  In the first 
general election in 1955 the British authorities neatly divided the population of Malaya 
into 52 constituencies each of similar size.  As the Report on the Parliamentary and 
State Elections 1959 later revealed, the population calculation was faulty in that it was 
based on the 1947 census figure.  Neither had the significant population shift which 
had occurred as a result of the Emergency been accommodated.  In an attempt to 
rectify the situation, government authorities decided that, for the first election after 
Independence (the 1959 general election), the initial 52 constituencies would be split in 
two making a total of 104 electoral districts.   In addition, under Article 116 of the 
Constitution, for elections post-1959, the number of constituencies would be reduced 
by four.  The EC was directed to ensure each of the remaining 100 constituencies 
contained a similar number of registered voters rather than a share of the population 
as had occurred in both the 1955 and 1959 elections. 509    
The implications of Article 116 concerned UMNO leadership.  If the electoral 
roll for the 100 constituencies was to be based on registered voters rather than on 
population, as the 1955 and 1959 elections had been, it would create a greater number 
of non-Malay majority constituencies than Malay, a situation which could ultimately 
                                                
508 Moten and Mokhtar, 2006, p. 321.  These processes include the keeping of electoral rolls, the management 
of elections on voting day, the redelineation of electoral districts, which the EC must undertake at an 
interval of not less than eight years, and such other practices as necessary.  See also Means, 1976, p. 180. 
509 Vasil, 1971, pp.8, 9. 
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remove political control from the Malays and place it in the hands of the non-Malay.510  
This dilemma was contrary to the intent of the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the 
foundations of which lay in the 1948 Federation of Malaya Constitution.  In essence 
these documents were promulgated to protect the special rights and privileges of the 
Malay and “the legitimate interests of other communities”,511 just as the combined 
strength of the Malays had led to the disestablishment of the Malayan Union so it 
resulted in the adoption of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962 and the repeal of 
Article 116.512   
Pursuant to the constitutional amendment was the inclusion of provisions, 
within the 1963 Malaysian Constitution, which gave greater weighting to the rural 
constituencies than those implemented initially in 1957.513  Whereas the Merdeka 
Constitution stipulated a disparity of no more than 15 percent (in the number of voters) 
between an average urban and rural constituency, in 1963 in some areas, the 
imbalance was as great as 50 percent.514  With the removal of any limitation on the 
disparity between urban and rural districts in 1973, the difference increased 
dramatically between particular districts.  Within a decade, in one instance, the largest 
urban constituency in Selangor (Petaling) had 114,704 voters while in the Kuala Krai 
constituency (in Kelantan), the EC documented a total of 24,445 people registered to 
vote.  Although the 1986 delineation reduced the disparity, four years later in 1990, the 
Selangor constituency of Selayang had 100,488 voters, much larger than Gua Musang 
in Kelantan which had 31,064.515  Again in the 1995 elections, In-Won notes that one 
electoral district in Sarawak had 15,849 voters whereas Ampang Jaya (Selangor), in 
the heart of KL, had 85,954 on the roll.  What made the process of rural weightage 
                                                
510 Ibid., p. 9.  The proposed formula would see the number of registered voters within a state divided by the 
number of designated constituencies in that particular state.   
511 Means, 1976, p. 180.  
512 Vasil, 1971, p. 9. 
513 The rural districts were compensated for their large geographical size and the difficulty of communicating 
across the often rugged terrain. 
514 Crouch, 1996, p.58. 
515 Ibid. 
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most controversial, from the perspective of the non-Malays, was the fact that “the rural 
areas were predominantly Malay and the urban areas predominantly non-Malay”.516 
Shortly after the 1990 general election, the EC undertook a controversial 
review of electoral boundaries.517  Not only were the boundaries of electoral districts 
altered, a further 12 constituencies were created.  In-Won contends that the addition of 
the new constituencies was impelled by the creation of 12 “new divisions of UMNO”,518 
an occurrence “a few months before”519  the EC decided to review constituency 
boundaries.  In Sabah, the process directly favoured the “newly launched Sabah 
UMNO, turning at least four Kadazan-Dusun majority areas into Muslim-dominated 
constituencies”.520   
The fairly regular reconfiguration of the electoral districts was not the only 
controversial practice, with a BN-bias undertaken by the EC.  In contrast to the 
accepted process of previous elections in which EC officers had assisted candidates, 
in 1978 the meticulous checking of nomination forms led to the disqualification of 113 
candidates of which only three had been proposed by the BN.521   
In 1990, the government amended the Elections Act for two reasons.  First, in a 
reversal from previous elections, provisions were introduced allowing votes to be 
counted on site.  The EC contended that removing the ballot boxes from the polling 
stations for the count, as had occurred in the past, increased the likelihood of 
fraudulent interference.  Second, the number of polling stations was increased (along 
with the limitation of 700 voters per station) because the EC did “not want the voters to 
                                                
516 Ibid. 
517 In-Won Hwang, 2003, p. 236.  Controversial for several reasons one being that it was undertaken not in 
accordance with constitutional provision which stated that the EC should review electoral boundaries at 
“an interval of not less than eight years” – the eight year period in this instance would not have expired 
until November 1992. 
518 Ibid. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid.   
521 Crouch, 1996, p. 60. He notes that in future elections, the EC reverted to accepted practice.  Milne and 
Mauzy also note that ballot numbers were also printed on the counterfoils which added to the sense of 
unease amongst voters:  Milne and Mauzy, 1999, p. 116.   
116 
 
wait in long queues, especially under the burning sun”. 522   Crouch writes that 
opposition supporters considered the amendments intimidatory:  they would be more 
easily identified and feared that funding for community services would be withheld from 
districts identified as anti-government.523   
Six months before the November 1999 general elections, the EC decided to 
conduct a voter registration drive.524  Instead of netting the usual number of 200,000 
new voters, the campaign attracted 681,000 of which 481,000 were believed to be 
non-Malay/Chinese middle-class, first time voters who had become politically 
mobilised by the opposition Reformasi movement.  Controversially, the Commission 
effectively disenfranchised all 681,000 on the basis that their registrations could not be 
actioned in time for the elections.  
 
 
4.6  The Judicial Structure 
The law is a complex issue made more so in Malaysia with the passage through 
Parliament in 1988 of legislation defining the jurisdiction of the High Courts.525 
Amendment 1A of Article 121of the Federal Constitution stated that the High Courts 
retained jurisdiction over criminal and civil laws but matters of an Islamic nature fell 
within the primacy of the state Syariah Courts.   
The year 1988 was turbulent for the Malaysian Bar Council.  In March, 
Mahathir, in tabling the amendments, questioned the impartiality of members of the 
judiciary accusing some of favouring those who opposed the government.526  The 
amendments had effectively “removed the judicial powers of the courts (vested in them 
                                                
522 Crouch, 1996, p. 61. 
523 In-Won Hwang, 2003, p. 191. 
524 See Khoo Boo Teik, 2003. p. 118; In-Won Hwang, 2003, p. 317. 
525 The Federal Constitution stipulates two High Courts:  one in the Malayan states – the High Court of 
Malaya; and the second, the High Court of Sarawak and Sabah. 
526 Stephen Chee, ‘Malaysia in 1988’ in Ng Chee Yuen (Ed), Southeast Asian Affairs 1989 (Pasir Panjang:  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), p. 219. 
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by the Constitution…), and endowed the Executive”.527  Letters of concern addressed to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Sultans led to the impeachment, and subsequent 
dismissal, of the chief of the judiciary, Lord President Tun Mohamed Salleh bin Abas 
and the suspension of five brother judges -  two subsequently dismissed.528  The 
judiciary was no longer the independent third arm of government. 
The rulings of the Syariah Courts are set in legislation passed by state 
legislatures.  However, as discussed in an earlier section on PAS’ attempts to 
implement Islamic jurisprudence in Kelantan and Terengganu, the power vested in the 
Syariah Courts by each state is governed by the Federal Constitution.  Also passed 
into law in 1988 was the review of the 1965 Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 
which increased “the powers of the …[courts] to mete out penalties under any state law 
to a RM5,000 fine, three years in jail and six strokes of the whip”.529   
While Syariah law is, in theory, only applicable to Muslims, increasingly, 
through the adoption of Islamisation policy, the line between Islamic and civil 
jurisprudence (federal law applicable to both Muslim and non-Muslim), has become 
blurred.  Under an amendment passed in 1987, a non-Muslim, party to an allegation of 
an infringement of Syariah law, may be detained for questioning “to enable the Islamic 
authorities to gather evidence against the accused Muslim party”.530  Inasmuch as this 
matter is discussed further in the following chapter, suffice it to say that the dual 
jurisdiction model is increasingly problematic and, more often than not, creates a 
dilemma for non-Muslims seeking recourse from the Syariah Courts.  
 
 
 
                                                
527 Ibid.  There were several amendments to Article 121. 
528 Ibid.  This issue stemmed from the power struggle within UMNO in 1987 and is discussed in depth by 
Stephen Chee.   
529 Ahmad, 2007, p. 225. 
530 Othman, 2003, p. 126. 
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4.7  Conclusion  
It has been posited that Tunku Abdul Rahman’s political raison d’etre was to lead 
Malaya to independence and oversee its transition to an authoritative power within the 
greater Federation of Malaysian states.531  For his successor, Tun Abdul Razak, it was 
to engineer and implement extensive socio-political reform designed to restore Malay 
supremacy.  The following sections will determine whether the mechanisms the 
Malays and non-Malays employed in securing their societal security requirements 
were protective or predatory and the degree to which the resultant actions of the 
Malays, as the dominant power in the Federation, alleviated or exacerbated the 
societal security of the non-Malays. 
 
4.7.1  Malay Societal Security Requirements 
From 1970, Razak’s new political agenda, with its raft of Malay preferential policy, was 
progressively imposed on Malaysian society.  The initial bundle of reforms was skilfully 
compiled, multi-faceted and comprehensive.   
Prior to the introduction of restrictive and repressive legislation, the government 
instituted the Rukunegara, a state ideology formulated with the aim of engendering a 
sense of national unity in Malaysia.  While opponents considered the sentiments 
prosaic and trite, criticism of the Rukunegara was viewed as an assault on the 
government’s desire to instil a sense of ‘being Malaysian’ before being anything else -  
Chinese, Indian or other. 
The promulgation of the Rukunegara was followed by legislation proscribing 
the discussion of subjects considered ‘sensitive’.  This provision was strictly enforced 
and severely restrained open and frank discussion.  
To strengthen the government, whilst concomitantly undermining the 
opposition, Razak negotiated agreements with several political parties creating a broad 
                                                
531 Shome, 2002, p. 87. 
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coalition.   Although the composition of parties altered from time to time, as parties 
either withdrew or merged with the coalition, the basic structure has remained largely 
unchanged.  
The government’s focus then moved to implementing a range of initiatives and 
strategies the outcome of which would ensure the Malays/Bumiputera received a 
greater portion of the economic pie.  Financial schemes, including special share offers 
and preferential rates on housing and cars (the proton) were made available to the 
Malays/Bumiputera only.  This exclusivity was also extended to legislation.  The 
adoption of the ICA, and its amendment, called for the employment of Malay workers 
when business growth reached a benchmark.  In cases where the business was 
Chinese-owned, the implementation of the provisions demanded a change in the 
dynamic of the traditional family-owned enterprise:  no longer was it strictly family-
oriented.   In education, the introduction of the quota system facilitated increased 
numbers of Malay admissions to tertiary institutions and the decision to adopt 
affirmative policy towards the employment of Malays in the civil service resulted in a 
workforce which was predominantly Malay. 
The new regime was sustained by a ruling coalition prepared to use the 
instruments of state (or where precedent was not in place, legislate for it) to neutralise 
an opposing or questioning voice.  Amendments to the Constitution, along with the 900 
or so pieces of legislation passed by parliament since Merdeka, have effectively 
truncated the freedoms originally guaranteed federal citizens. 532   In addition to 
legislative constraint, central government may invoke emergency powers if it considers 
the country’s stability is at risk.533  
                                                
532 Tommy Thomas, Human Rights in 21st Century Malaysia.  Thomas discusses the manner in which Malaysia’s 
Westminster model of governance has been impugned through bureaucratic meddling.   
533Ibid. Of concern to those opposing the government, are the machinations or lengths the authorities might 
go to or claim as reason to impose an emergency rather than contend with a strengthening opposition. 
Five emergencies have been imposed since independence in1957:  the first due to the communist 
insurgency finally ending in 1960; the second declared on 3 September 1964 because of the hostilities with 
Indonesia; the third in 1966 limited to Sarawak – the Ningkan controversy; the fourth – the 1969 race 
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4.7.1.1  Power-seeking? 
Determining whether the actions a group took to achieve its goal - in this instance the 
restoration of Malay supremacy - either security-seeking (protective) or power-seeking 
(predatory), is problematical.  Pivotal to the process is defining whether the actions 
which hindered or suppressed the reproduction of the non-Malay identity were 
deliberately imposed.534   
From the time the NOC was established in 1969 Tun Razak’s resolve was 
clear:  the state regime would focus its energies on restoring Malay dominance through 
a multiplicity of Malay affirmative initiatives and strategies.  Inasmuch as the demands 
of other groups would be secondary to those of the Malay, the Malay leadership 
recognised the danger a discontented populace was to the stability of the state.  To 
counter this threat, the government introduced the state ideology enforcing a sense of 
national unity, then adopted and employed draconian legislation to suppress 
dissension.  To this end, the extensive reforms instituted over a prolonged period were 
the result of a deliberate political decision to restore and protect Malay societal security 
and thus the actions of the Malay can be regarded as power-seeking.   
 
4.7.2  Non-Malay Societal Security 
With a ruling coalition whose political rhetoric was determinedly pro-Malay and steadily 
authoritarian in its outlook, maintaining non-Malay societal security became a matter of 
survival.   
Objectively, there was an expectation that the Bumiputera groups of East 
Malaysia would benefit from the reforms to the same degree as the Malays.  Despite 
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the indigenous groups the same privileges as 
                                                                                                                                      
riots; and the fifth in 1977 stemming from attempts to remove the Mentri Besar in Kelantan.  In the 40-
year period 1957 to 2000, the only period in which the Federation has had an emergency-free hiatus is 
from August 1960 to 2 September 1964.  See also Tun Haji Mhd. Salleh bin Abas, 1986, p. 127.    
534 Roe, 2005, pp.140, 141,147.    
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the Malays, this was not the case.  In reality the Borneo ethnies were gifted a ‘second 
class Bumiputera status’ and hence received lesser benefit than anticipated. 
The Chinese, being more politically adept and with greater resources upon 
which to draw than the other groups, had the greatest success adapting to the 
demands of the new regime.   Reciprocal practices and schemes were adopted 
designed to protect Chinese economic sector members and ensure the survival of 
long-standing business interests.  The special shares issues, having required little 
commitment or enterprise on the part of the Malays to acquire, were resold with ease 
and for profit to wealthier Chinese who also had the advantage of placing their children 
at education institutions internationally when admissions were unavailable in Malaysia, 
even to the most able students.535 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Indians, along with some of the smaller 
indigenous groups, became severely marginalised through the process.  Large 
numbers of Indian workers continued to receive barely minimal wages in factories and 
the plantations in the rural areas far from the amenities and services of the cities.  The 
discontent and unhappiness of the Indian community is discernibly palpable in their 
urban enclaves. There is little doubt that the social cost of repatriating this section of 
society will be extensive.536 
Despite Razak’s Sun Tzu-derived strategy of encouraging his enemies closer 
and nullifying the opposition political parties, the three-decade period under review did 
witness the coming together of groups intent on representing the voices of the other(s).   
Adversity does at times make for strange bedfellows and while the determination of 
some groups was eroded by the deluge of pro-Malay initiatives,  yet others formed 
monitoring  and social action groups prepared to speak out for the marginalised.  Civil 
                                                
535 In 2010 the Securities Commission Malaysia website confirms that the NDP requirement for the 30% 
Bumiputera equity is still applicable to companies wishing to list on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
(http://www.sc.com.my). 
536 This issue is discussed in the following chapter. 
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unrest became an ever-looming and tangible threat to the continued and unchallenged 
rule of the UMNO/BN. 
 
4.7.2.1  Security-seeking? 
The prime objective of the non-Malay groups was to ensure the survival of the many 
unique societal identities which, together with the Malay, form the multi-ethnic poly-
societal federation of states – Malaysia.   This task was made more difficult by the 
reality that the preponderance of political power was weighted firmly in favour of the 
ruling coalition, a power imbalance which became more pronounced during the 
Mahathir administration.  Clearly then the actions of the non- Malays, in endeavouring 
to maintain societal integrity, must be viewed as security-seeking.   
 
In conclusion, the new paradigm, Tun Razak’s legacy to the nation, precipitated a 
massive sea-change in the state’s political development.  While it benefited the elites 
and advantaged the rising Malay capitalist class, the new regime effectively 
disenfranchised large sections of non-Malay society.  The challenge before future 
leadership is to acknowledge that the new paradigm has been the cause of more 
social ills than a panacea.   The remedy lies in implementing pan-societal reforms of 
integrity and purpose, not just for one or other societal grouping but for all the poor and 
disenfranchised of Malaysian society irrespective of societal identity.  Failure to act is 
to contemplate a political tsunami that could wash away the foundations of Malay 
hegemony so diligently constructed over the past thirty years. 
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Chapter 5                            Unity in Opposition:    2004-2008 
 
   
 
Malaysia has conducted two general elections since Abdullah Badawi was confirmed 
as the Federation’s fifth prime minister in October 2003.  The first, in March 2004, 
delivered the BN the most successful election result since coming to power under the 
leadership of Tun Abdul Razak in 1974.  In stark contrast, the second, in March 2008, 
delivered the government the worst election result since independence in 1957.537  
Whilst the ruling coalition secured a simple majority, it failed to retain the two-thirds 
super-majority which had allowed it unobstructed constitutional amendment: a 
prerogative the UMNO-dominated government had closely guarded since the 1969 
elections.   
This chapter, the final in the case study on Malaysia’s societal and political 
transformation, covers a comparatively short time span from the 2004 election through 
to the post-2008 election period.  The first section takes a brief look at the 2004 
election focussing on the key issue of religion, and the differing views articulated by the 
leading political parties.  Within the context of the 2008 election, the second part 
examines the inter-societal contentions, grievances and concerns which precipitated a 
level of civil disorder unseen in Malaysia for a decade and which ultimately proved to 
be the catalyst for the significant shift in voter loyalty in the 2008 election: a shift that 
undermined UMNO’s major non-Malay partners in the ruling alliance: the MIC, MCA 
and Gerakan.  
 
 
                                                
537Malaysian elections poll votes for both parliamentary and state legislatures.  The 2008 general elections did 
not include state elections for Sarawak which held its election in 2006, nor for KL, Putrajaya and Labuan.               
See ‘Special Report:  Fast Facts and Figures’, Channelnewsasia, 20 February 2008.  
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/specialreport/view/1454/1/.html) 
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5.1  The 2004 General Election 
Moten and Mokhtar assert that the core issue of the 2004 election was religion, 
specifically the moderate view of Islam promoted by Abdullah (UMNO/BN) through the 
principles of Islam Hadhari, the radical Islamic doctrine of PAS,  and the vision of a 
secular state advanced by the DAP.538   
 
5.1.1  Islam Hadhari 
After 22 years of authoritarian rule by former Prime Minister Mahathir, public 
expectations ran high that Prime Minister Abdullah would deliver election promises in a 
campaign which pledged a better future.539  This, the BN party manifesto stated, would 
be achieved through a strengthened economy, an improved civil service and an 
accomplished education system.540  In the problematic areas of inter-ethnic relations 
and religion, the BN promised to improve inter-communal student integration and 
promote the principles of Islam Hadhari.541   
Islam Hadhari: a Model Approach for Development and Progress is a collection 
of 12 speeches Abdullah delivered over a 15-month period from September 2004 
through to December 2005.542  To Muslim and non-Muslim audiences, he outlined a 
unique approach to Islam first introduced to the public in the March 2004 election and 
upon which his administration was premised.   Central to Islam Hadhari (or 
Civilisational Islam), which Abdullah defined to the Asia Society of Australia 
                                                
538 Moten and Mokhtar, 2006, p. 328. 
539 Ibid., p. 326. 
540 Ibid.  The manifesto talked of introducing new wealth creation programmes, of improving the service 
delivery of government departments in particular the police force and by ensuring graduates were of a 
higher calibre.   
541 Ibid. 
542 A.A. Badawi, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress (Selangor:  MPH Group 
Publishing Sdn Bhd, 2006), p. xiii. 
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Conference in April 2005 as “an approach towards a progressive Islamic 
civilisation”,543 is the successful achievement of 10 main principles: 
1.     Faith and piety in Allah; 
2.     A just and trustworthy government; 
3.     A free and independent people; 
4.     A vigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge; 
5.     A balanced and comprehensive economic development; 
6.     A good quality of life for the people; 
7.     The protection of the rights of minority groups and women; 
8.     Cultural and moral integrity; 
9.     The safeguarding of natural resources and the environment; and  
10.    Strong defence capabilities.
544
 
 
Abdullah stated that the approach was not an attempt to pacify or mollify the West but 
was rather: 
an effort to bring the ummah (the worldwide community comprising all adherents of 
the Muslim faith) back to the basics of Islam, back to the fundamentals as 
prescribed in the Quran and the hadith which form the foundations for an Islamic 
Civilisation.
545
 
 
At UMNO’s 55th general assembly in September 2004, Abdullah expanded the key 
concepts of the approach.  He spoke of the indivisibility of the Malays, UMNO and 
Islam: that together the three “form a distinct culture and identity”.546  Abdullah spoke 
candidly of a Malay Agenda of the 21st century which placed demands not only on the 
government, but on the Malays and on UMNO itself.  As UMNO had been instrumental 
in the formation of the Federation of Malaya and the development of the Constitution, 
so the organisation was now tasked with ensuring the existence of an Islamic culture 
which would balance “the needs of this world with the next”.547   
The Agenda demanded a people that were outward-looking, that were 
“resolute, determined, purposeful and strong”548 armed with knowledge and skills to 
face the challenges of the global environment.  In order to advance as a nation, the 
Malays/Bumiputera had to understand that the:  
                                                
543 Ibid., p. 119.   
544 Ibid., p. 4. 
545 Ibid., pp. 3, 119. 
546 Ibid., p. 6. 
547 Ibid. 
548 Ibid., p. 13. 
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…competitive global economy does not recognise quotas, and will not allocate 
special project for Bumiputeras.  The global economic lexicon only acknowledges 
terms such as competition, competitiveness, productivity, innovation, creativity, 
originality, excellence and efficiency; in other words a level playing field where 
potential opportunity for advancement and development is dependant upon 
merit.
549 
 
In closing, Abdullah called on those who had achieved success through the initiatives 
of NEP to step forward and take up the challenge.  UMNO party members were urged 
to strengthen their faith, their mental resilience and physical strength in order to ensure 
the success of Islam Hadhari and thus “reinforce the struggle of our people, both in this 
world and in the Hereafter”.550 
 
5.1.2  The PAS Perspective 
The Islamic party contested the 2004 elections on two campaign platforms, a strategy 
which had proved successful in the previous general elections in 1999.  In a joint 
campaign with BA partner KeADILan, PAS tempered its zeal for an Islamic state 
focussing on a range of social justice issues promised in a united “New Malaysia…[with] 
Prosperity for All”.551  In addition to assertions that the BA would review “all restrictive 
laws”552 and lower or abolish taxes on a broad range of goods and services, the 
comprehensive manifesto also promised “free primary and secondary schooling to all 
Malaysians”.553  The document concluded with the PAS president hoping that “the 
people…[would] support us to form a new Malaysia and ensure prosperity for all”.554 
For the stronghold state of Terengganu, PAS adopted a separate campaign 
ideology with the hard-line message of ‘“Islam for All” and “Power with the Ulama” 
(Muslim religious scholars)”.555  The previous year, in November 2003, PAS moved to 
silence its critics, those who challenged the party to explain how an Islamic state would 
                                                
549 Ibid., p. 14. 
550 Ibid., p. 29. 
551 Ibid., p. 332. 
552 Ibid., p. 327. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Ibid. 
555 Ibid., p. 331. 
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function, with the launch of its blueprint “setting out guidelines on Islamic governance 
at the state level”.556  PAS leadership was determined that the states under its control, 
Kelantan and Terengganu, would maintain the trajectory of becoming fully functioning 
Islamic states.  The task confronting PAS, and other states wanting to impose some 
form of Islamic governance, is the reconciliation of traditional understandings of Islam 
with modernity, a dilemma Muslim intellectuals, scholars and ulama grapple with the 
world over.557   
Inasmuch as the focus of this thesis is not the debate between contemporary 
Islamists, there is general consensus that the ideal Islamic state was modelled during 
the reign of the Prophet Muhammad.  The Prophet governed the people of al-Madinah 
in accordance with a number of contracts, or covenants, he negotiated with the various 
communities of people in the area.  Over time, this became known as the Constitution, 
or Covenant, of al-Madinah.558  There is also agreement that, in the first instance, it is 
to the Qur’an and Sunnah that Muslim leaders must look for guidance in matters of 
governance.559  If solutions cannot be found within these two sources, then “the Islamic 
jurists and ulama should engage in ijtihad (creative, liberal interpretation, by the 
knowledgeable) and resort to ijma and qiyas that is, consultation and deliberation”.560  
Professor Abdullahi An-Naim defines Syariah, Islamic jurisprudence, as “a human 
understanding”561 of the Qur’an and Sunnah.  It is at this point that the issue becomes 
problematic for both Muslim and non-Muslim.  If the interpretation is given by 
conservative ulama, the judgement is more likely to be conservative.  The situation 
                                                
556 Welsh, 2004, p. 146. 
557 See Farish A. Noor, Crosscurrents:  Alternative Voices in Our Changing Times (Shah Alam:  Marshall Cavendish 
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, 2005) for the viewpoints of leading thinkers on this issue.  Ulama – Muslim clergy.  
558 Mutalib summarises the four major provisions of the Constitution as:  first, whilst Muslims are perforce 
citizens of various nation-states, under the Constitution they are members of a worldwide ummah; second, 
that the decisions of authority or governance in an Islamic state be based on the Qur’an and Sunnah; third, 
that the decision-making process incorporates aspects of consultation and consensus involving both 
people and leadership; and finally, that equity and justice be applied to all, “both Muslim and non-
Muslim”.  See Mutalib, 1993, p. 50.  The Constitution of al-Madina is also discussed by Patricia Martinez, 
‘Islamic State in Malaysia’ in Lee Hock Guan, (Ed), Civil Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp.36-40. 
559 Mutalib, 1993, p. 50. 
560 Ibid., p. 49. 
561 Noor, 2005, p. 35. 
128 
 
becomes further complex if the ulama do not recognise the value of resorting to ijtihad.  
If the interpretation is given by more liberal ulama, it is probable that the judgement will 
be liberal also.  For those casting votes in constituencies contested by PAS 
candidates, particularly in Terengganu, this issue demanded serious consideration.  
5.1.3  The DAP Perspective 
The publication of PAS’ blue-print for an Islamic state mended few bridges between 
DAP, a party with a strong multi-ethnic outlook, and the resolute Islamic party.  The 
following year, the DAP contested the 2004 elections on the premise that “real and 
meaningful”562 systemic change would only be truly successful if Malaysia was to 
remain the secular democracy envisaged by the writers of the Federation’s founding 
documents.  The DAP objected to the blue-print because it violated, not only the 46-
year social contract embedded within the “1957 Merdeka Constitution, the 1963 
Malaysia Agreement and the 1970 Rukunegara”,563 it also revoked the BA’s 1999 
“common manifesto ‘Towards a Just Malaysia’, to restore justice, freedom, democracy 
and good governance with clear commitment by all subscribing parties to uphold the 
fundamental principles of the Malaysian Constitution”,564 an accord the DAP believed 
entrusted PAS not to “pursue the establishment of an Islamic State while in the Barisan 
Alternative”.565    
Prior to the DAP’s withdrawal from the BA in September 2001, the party had 
proposed a five-point position paper on the “Islamic State issue”.566  The coalition 
agreed that legislation “which could impinge on the sensitivities of the different 
religions, communities and political parties”567 would not be adopted in Kelantan or 
Terengganu without prior consultation with the BA member parties. PAS, however, 
would not accept the clauses which obligated the party to place adherence to the BA 
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563 Lim Kit Siang, “Media Release,” Nov. 19, 2003. 
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manifesto above the pursuit of an Islamic state, or that an Islamic state was not 
suitable or practicable in a “plural society like Malaysia”.568 
Moten and Mokhtar comment that the BA’s election campaign was largely 
negative, focussing on areas the coalition considered had been mismanaged by the 
government.  The DAP, however, added a twist to their campaign.  Rather than 
echoing the BA and highlighting the government’s flaws, the party advised the 
constituency that a vote for the DAP would strengthen their ability to “monitor the 
implementation of the promises made by Abdullah Badawi”.569  This aside, the main 
thrust of the DAP’s election platform was the message that the vote was not a choice 
between the models of Islamic state promoted by UMNO/BN or PAS but a “vote for the 
preservation of a secular democracy”.570    
 
5.1.4  The Election Outcome 
In addition to the contesting ideologies of the major parties, the results of a 
controversial redelineation of constituency boundaries, completed by the EC in 2003, 
was also the cause of inter-party dissension in the 2004 elections.  The review, 
announced in 2002, created 26 new parliamentary seats bringing the total number to 
219.571  Opposition parties objected to the latest configuration of constituencies on the 
basis that the majority of the newly created districts, being Malay, strengthened the 
government’s position; a concern realised in the election outcome. 
The 2004 elections also marked the first time in Malaysia’s electoral history 
that Sabah’s state elections coincided with the federal elections and apart from five 
new districts awarded the East Malaysian state, the additional seats were all located 
on the peninsula.572  Of the remaining 21 seats, the Malays were the majority in 10 with 
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a Chinese-majority in two.  Moten and Mokhtar also identified six districts with a 
broader, more equal representation of ethnicities “…although the Malays…[were still] the 
largest plurality”.573  From this analysis, they conclude the emergence of a “pattern of 
increased mixed constituencies”,574 a supposition to be confirmed or otherwise by 
future delineations.   
The election results not only confirmed Abdullah as the populist choice for 
leader with the highest recorded poll for a prime minister in Malaysian history, it was 
also the most successful in the history of the BN with the coalition winning 198 
parliamentary seats and 453 out of 505 state seats.575  The overwhelming success of 
the coalition was viewed as a vote for the vision-filled ideology promoted by Abdullah 
et al – a “better future…[with] Excellence, Glory and Distinction”.576   
For the DAP, whose ideology took the middle ground calling for the retention of 
a secular democracy, the results of the election were more favourable than those of 
the previous with the party winning 12 parliamentary seats.577  The increase in popular 
support stemmed from a number of issues not the least being that the DAP presented 
an alternative to the ‘out-Islaming’ the other activities of the UMNO/BN and PAS.  
Analysts posit that the DAP’s routing in the 1999 elections was in part due to its link 
with PAS as BA members.  With the connection severed in September 2001, the party 
regained its voter appeal.578   
The election outcome was disastrous for the two parties forming the BA 
coalition (PAS and KeADILan).  The PAS failed utterly to sustain the momentum of the 
previous election.  Of the 26 PAS-held seats gained in 1999, the party managed to 
retain only seven, including Kelantan but losing Terengganu.579  KeADILan succeeded 
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576 Moten and Mokhtar, 2006, p. 326. 
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in retaining only one parliamentary seat – that of its President Wan Azizah Wan Ismail 
and this after five recounts with the final “done with a ring of police deployed around 
the counting center [sic]”.580 
Discontent within the PAS leadership was evident when, three days after 
acknowledging the loss of his Terengganu seat to a BN candidate, PAS President and, 
until the election, Mentri Besar, Abdul Hadi Awang, stated that “his party would not 
recognise the poll results…[citing] irregularities, foul play and a conspiracy between the 
EC and BN”.581  The EC chief Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman initially responded to the 
slurs on the integrity of the office by announcing that a royal commission of inquiry 
would be welcomed.  In addition to this high profile challenge, the police received a 
further 144 complaints considered minor by the authorities. 582 
Despite the posturing of opposing parties, the poll result remained unchanged, 
and the workings of the EC were not altered in any great degree.  In a recent 
publication, Malaysian lawyer Salbiah Ahmad outlines the difficulty of challenging an 
election result.  Not only is Malaysian law very prescriptive, it has become complicated 
by numerous amendments adopted, at times, to thwart efforts to make the legislation 
more transparent.    The year before the 2004 elections saw the passage through 
parliament of legislation amending and increasing the cost for challenging an election 
from RM2,000 to RM10,000, to “ensure ‘seriousness’ in these endeavours”.583 
 
5.2  The 2008 General Election 
One of the advantages of hindsight is that it makes visible the ironies of the political 
milieu.  Disciplined by Mahathir, along with his Team B associates in 1987, Abdullah’s 
redemption was complete with his appointment as deputy prime minister following 
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Anwar’s fall from grace a decade later. 584   A further decade on, and political 
commentators suggest that the decision to hold the general election in March 2008 
was, in part, precipitated by the probability that Anwar would return to political life the 
following month. 585 
Buoyed by his election success, Abdullah commenced his first full term as 
prime minister determined to effect the changes promised.  Consistent with the 
principles of Islam Hadhari, in April 2004 Abdullah announced the National Integrity 
Plan and established the Integrity Institute of Malaysia (IIM).  Initially a model of ideal 
behaviours applicable to the civil service, it was envisaged that the blueprint’s 
components of ethical principles, honourable behaviour and accountability would 
provide a framework of aspirational performance for all citizens.  The IIM was tasked 
with finding out “what the country …[thought] of itself”586 by conducting annual National 
Integrity Perception Index surveys.  Twenty thousand citizens were questioned for their 
views on corruption, the quality of the public service delivery system, business ethics 
and social responsibility, the quality of life and social well being, on courtesy and on 
the strength of family and community.587  The government proposed to develop future 
policy based on the surveys’ findings.588  
 
5.2.1  The Economy 
The 2004 decision to curb systemic cronyism in business by cancelling several large-
scale projects attracted the wrath of Mahathir and the chagrin of those who considered 
their interests were best served in maintaining the status quo.   The halt, however, was 
short-lived.  Within months the impact of the global downturn on the construction 
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industry was such that the government released funds totalling RM8.5 billion tagged 
for projects to raise the quality of life and alleviate poverty.589  Malaysia Inc was 
revamped with greater emphasis given to the private companies’ performance rather 
than on the partnership concept.  It was also announced that government-linked 
companies (GLCs), such as Malaysian Airlines, not delivering to the level expected 
would be more closely scrutinised.590 
In March 2006, the government launched the National Mission, a document 
intended to guide the country in its final stage towards becoming a fully developed 
nation by the year 2020.591  The following month, in April 2006, the government 
adopted the Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP) reconfirming its commitment to raise “the 
quality of life for all”.592  To generate sustained economic growth over the five-year 
period 2006-2010 the main thrust of 9MP, with its projected budget of RM200 billion, 
was directed at a range of initiatives.593 
 In manufacturing, while the posting of Proton’s first annual loss indicated the 
need for foreign investment to boost “sales locally and abroad”594 the electronics 
industry was expanded due to the demand for products, globally and domestically.595  
Foreign capital was also apparent in a joint venture development between Petroliam 
Nasional Bhd (Petronas) and the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC)  to drill a 
series of exploratory wells in the seas off Mindanao; due for completion in 2009.596 
In June 2007, the government released RM11 billion in funding for rural 
development.  Farmers who had joined Federal Land Development Authority (Felda) 
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schemes to replant land for new crops of crude oil palm received increased financial 
support.  As the crop could not be harvested for approximately ten years, farmers 
received loan funding with the proviso that loans would be repaid once the oil palm 
was processed.597  The increased resourcing was also evident in promised water 
supply systems and local amenity upgrades.598 
During Abdullah’s tenure as prime minister, the government launched several 
mega-projects designed to modernise Malaysia’s infrastructure with the aim of 
competing globally.  In November 2006, the government announced its intention to 
establish three major economic regions.  Each was envisaged as having an 
administrative centre with associated medical, education, logistical and information 
hubs.  The first, Iskandar Malaysia, a special economic zone in south Johor, has a 
landbank three times the size of Singapore.599  Foreign investment is promoted in the 
neighbouring Asian states:  Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and Singapore by the 
Associated Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia; and in Europe and 
the Middle East by Khazanah Nasional Bhd.600 
The Northern Corridor Economic Region and the Eastern Corridor Economic 
Region, both unveiled the following year, incorporate the northern peninsula states.   
Over an eighteen-year period, it is intended that these initiatives will address the 
problem of endemic poverty by injecting substantial funding to promote the agricultural, 
manufacturing and tourism sectors.601   
In 2007, the first contracts were signed in a scheme to pipe oil 300kms from 
one coast of Peninsula Malaysia to the other.  The trans-peninsula (TransPen) 
pipeline, costing RM25 billion, and funded by the government and foreign and local 
                                                
597 While the loan for oil palm was over 12 years, the term was halved for rubber to six.  Felda was 
established in 1956, prior to independence, as a government agency responsible for ensuring the 
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investment, will cross through the states of Kelantan, Perak and Kedah with a 
proposed completion date for the installation in 2011.602  The government’s intended 
construction schedule also includes upgrading domestic transport systems at a cost of 
approximately RM20 billion with further itemised works totalling RM22 billion.603 
While, at one end of the economic spectrum, the major projects attracted 
increased foreign investment, the deteriorating global financial market impacted on the 
price of basic commodities steadily increasing the rate of inflation.  In 2006, public 
disapproval was evident in a number of violent demonstrations protesting the sharp 
rise in fuel with the removal of government subsidies.  Over the two year period 2004-
2006 the price of petrol increased 40 percent with a massive 104 percent for diesel.  
Tension was not eased by a decision in May 2006 to increase electricity by 12 
percent.604  
The large-scale initiatives to establish economic zones spanning the peninsula 
have not been without controversy.   The rate of investment in Iskandar Malaysia was 
adversely affected by rising crime in the Johor region; a factor addressed by increased 
police resourcing.  In the public arena, fears were expressed that Singapore’s 
proposed investment in the southern state might, once again, place Malaysia’s 
sovereignty at risk as had just as happened in 1963.  
With the Abdullah government unable to stem corrupt practices at the high end 
of the economy, it is likely the global recession will highlight the wealth disparity in 
Malaysian society.  The well-connected 10 percent will continue to thrive while the 90 
percent will bear the brunt of the financial downturn. 
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5.2.2  Inter-ethnic Issues 
As the strident opposition thwarted Abdullah’s well-intentioned attempts to effect 
change, the optimism for a future where “[n]o individual…is more Malaysian than 
another”605 was eroded by the rhetoric of the ultra UMNO constantly “harping on”606 
about the Malay Agenda and its protection. In March 2007, Khairy Jamaluddin once 
again reiterated UMNO’s determination to pursue Malay affirmative policy.607  Two 
years previously, Khairy, with fellow UMNO Youth leader Hishamuddin Hussein, had 
vigorously promoted the adoption of the New National Agenda (NNA) effectively 
extending NEP for the next 15 years or until such time as the 30 percent Malay equity 
envisaged four decades earlier was achieved.608  The outcry from the ranks of the 
Malay nationalists disputing the veracity of statistics showing that the 30 percent target 
had in fact been met and overtaken indicated that while the ultra voice prevails it is 
unlikely that, for the foreseeable future, there will be agreement over the true level of 
Malay ownership.609 
Depending on perspective, Hishamuddin’s aggressive stance as an outspoken 
Malay nationalist has brought him a degree of infamy or kudos.  Son of the late 
Hussein Onn, former Malaysian prime minister, Hishamuddin’s penchant for 
brandishing a keris dripping with tomato sauce in the midst of speechmaking at  
UMNO annual meetings along with comments from likeminded Members of Parliament 
referring to “bath[ing] in…[Chinese] blood”610 is, unsurprisingly, sufficient inference to 
raise Chinese/non-Malay unease.611 
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In addition to the antics of the UMNO Youth leaders which do little to ease 
inter-ethnic tension, the intricacy of Malaysia’s dual legal system is a further dimension 
increasingly problematic in the plural society.  In Malaysia, an inter-ethnic marriage 
where one of the parties is Malay is legalised when the non-Malay partner adopts the 
Islamic faith.  In as much as the acceptance of Islam is not an issue in a non-Malay 
marriage, when it becomes known that one partner has converted to Islam, its 
importance increases significantly because it is then that the jurisdiction of the Syariah 
court comes into play.  In July 2004, ignorant of the conversion of her husband and 
children to Islam, Shamala Sathiayaseelan, a Hindu woman discovered she was 
unable to pursue a divorce from her Muslim-Indian husband through either the civil or 
Syariah courts.  The civil court asserted her husband’s conversion to Islam placed him 
under the jurisdiction of the Syariah while the Syariah court would not acknowledge her 
petition as she was not Muslim.612 
In late 2005/early 2006, the public’s attention was captured by two similar 
instances.  In December 2005, Kaliammal Sinnasamy, the widow of Maniam Moorthy, 
a former army commando and one of the first Malaysians to climb Everest, was 
informed by the Religious Affairs Department of the Federal Territory (JAWI) that as 
her husband had converted to Islam, she would be unable to perform Hindu funeral 
rites.   Despite the widow denying knowledge of her husband’s conversion, the fact that 
he had adopted Islam, changing his name in the process, meant the matter fell with the 
ambit of the Syariah courts.  Moorthy was subsequently buried in a Muslim 
cemetery.613   
An idiosyncrasy of Syariah law is that its interpretation may differ between 
states.  In this second case, within a month of the Moorthy case, the Seremban 
Syariah Court granted the petitions of the Buddhist family of Nyonya Tahir, a Chinese 
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woman with a Malay identity card, requesting for her to be buried as a Buddhist.  It was 
not until the mid-1980s, that Tahir, who had been adopted by her Malay grandmother, 
had married and a raised a Chinese Buddhist family, discovered she was officially 
regarded as Malay, thus Muslim.  In this landmark case, the Syariah Court set aside 
the identity card on evidence from the family that Tahir had never practised Islam.614 
The plight of families divided by faith and the courts’ jurisdictions prompted 
groups such as the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, 
Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS) and Article 11 to conduct a series of meetings in 
the first half of 2006, debating the issue of freedom of worship in Malaysia.615  Each 
meeting attracted growing numbers of Malay protestors, increasing the likelihood of a 
violent clash.  By July, shortly before Abdullah called a halt, Islamic leaders were 
sufficiently incensed to pass a resolution at the Syariah and Current Challenges Forum 
“calling for Muslims to defend the special position given Islam in the Constitution”.616  
In May 2007, Malaysia’s international standing as a country evincing religious 
diversity was not assisted by decisions to cancel the Building Bridges Islam-
Christianity Inter-faith Conference shortly before the scheduled dates, particularly as 
the Archbishop of Canterbury had indicated his intention to attend.  To counter opinion 
that it was cancelled because the government did not wish it to be held in the country, 
the Prime Minister’s Department asserted its cancellation was due to the unavailability 
of Abdullah.  It is noted however, that a public seminar held the following month in KL 
and addressed by Karen Armstrong, a former Roman Catholic nun and proponent of 
dialogue between the West and Islamic nations, continued despite Abdullah’s non-
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attendance. Former Prime Minister Mahathir’s attendance received a standing 
ovation.617 
A further example of an increasing intolerance for non-Muslim groups was 
witnessed by events early in January 2008 when the Internal Security Ministry (ISM) 
confiscated English language Christian children’s books on the basis that the 
illustrations of prophets were “offensive to the sensitivities of Muslims”.618  In response, 
the Council of Churches of Malaysia, in requesting a review of the decision, stated that 
the actions of the ISM had, in fact, offended the “sensitivities of Christians”.619  
 
5.2.3  Civil Unrest 
Mounting tension in the second half of 2007 was evident in the number of 
demonstrations and street rallies held increasingly without police approval.620  State 
authorities had not had to contend with the level of public disorder for a decade, not 
since the arrest and removal from office of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998.   
In the months preceding the 2008 elections, societal dissatisfaction had 
coalesced in three specific areas.  In addition to groups calling for reform within the 
judiciary and the electoral system, a groundswell within the Malaysian Indian 
community, unhappy at the creeping marginalisation of their identity since 1969, 
resulted in large and, at times, violent demonstrations in November 2007 and the 
subsequent detention, under the ISA, of five members of the protest group - the Hindu 
Rights Action Force. 
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With regard to the issue of legal reform, in July 2007, over a thousand lawyers took 
part in a street protest urging judicial reform.621 This was followed by demonstrations in 
September and again in December.  The protests were prompted by two particular 
instances which called into question, once again, the independence of Malaysia’s legal 
system.  The first issue concerned the release of a phone conversation taped five 
years before implicating “politically well-connected lawyer V.K. Lingam...over the fixing 
of appointment and promotion of judges”.622  September’s “Walk of Justice”623 urged 
the government to establish a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
authenticity of the conversation.  Released by Anwar Ibrahim, the tape, along with a 
second in November, was causal to the retirement of Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz in 
November 2007, the inference being that his progression from Chief Judge of Malaya 
and acting President of the Court of Appeal in 2002 to Chief Justice in 2003 was due in 
part to the impropriety suggested in the tapes.624  Secondly, for the most part of 2007 
and into the following year, the public was captivated by the trial of the three accused 
in the murder of the Mongolian model Altantuya Shaariibuu.  Interest stemmed from 
the alleged involvement of Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak: his friendship with the 
model, with one of the accused and the fact that the two members of the Special 
Forces accused of her demise were part of the police detail commissioned to protect 
Najib.625  The taint of political interference followed the trial through the convolutions of 
postponement and legal representation.   
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In terms of electoral reform,  concern that yet another general election could be 
conducted prior to a review of electoral practices led to BERSIH, a leading pressure 
group urging electoral reform, to organise a public rally on 10 November 2007.626  
Despite failing to obtain police approval, the rally, which attracted between 40,000 and 
60,000 people, was addressed by opposition leaders including Lim Kit Siang and 
Anwar Ibrahim.627   The police erected road blocks to impede the march of the 
protesters and resorted to tear gas and water cannons to disperse the crowds.628  
Several people were arrested but not before a petition requesting urgent electoral 
reforms was presented to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.629   
Attempts by opposition parties and social justice groups to gain a greater voice 
have been consistently thwarted by the government through the application of various 
authoritarian measures and also by the EC, the agency mandated to oversee the 
election process.630  On several occasions, the EC has been accused by opposition 
parties of implementing policies and strategies to the benefit of the incumbent 
government.631  
The government also controls most forms of media, either by direct ownership 
(UMNO) or through a BN partner organisation.  Those in alternative ownership, 
including the magazines or periodicals operated by opposition political parties, are 
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aware that they run the real risk of having their licences revoked should they publish 
articles or information highly critical of the government.  To circumvent this threat, 
organisations opposing the government are making greater user of the internet.  An 
increasing number of high profile politicians also operate their own blog sites. 
 
Finally, there was the plight of the Malaysian Indian community.  A fortnight after the 
BERSIH rally, the authorities were confronted with a second mass protest.632  Despite 
a warning not to organise or undertake public demonstrations without a police permit, 
the HINDRAF leadership went ahead with the protest march to publicise the plight of 
the ethnic Indians and lodge a multi-million dollar lawsuit with the British 
government.633   
The evening before the protest, thousands had gathered at the Batu Caves, a 
Hindu temple, on the outskirts of KL.   Calls by the police to disperse were ignored and 
as a result of the ensuing scuffles during which several police personnel were injured, 
a number of ethnic Indians were arrested on charges of attempted murder.634  The 
violence and subsequent arrest of Indian worshippers heightened societal tension 
evidenced in the upwards of 20,000 who marched the following day to protest the 
dismal situation of many in the Indian community.635 The police use of tear gas, 
chemical-laced water cannons and baton charges to disperse the crowds drew 
criticism and comment not only from leading political organisations and human rights 
                                                
632 Figures range from 8,000 to 100,000 depending upon the source. 
633 Hindraf is an international coalition of Hindu non-governmental organisations based in London.  
November’s rally was the last in a series of public meetings organised to raise awareness of the 
community’s concerns.   The class action charges Britain of being the origin of their economic problems 
ands seek US$4trillion in compensation for the families of the indentured workers brought to Malaysia 
150 years ago.  (www.hindraf.co.uk)  
634 According to an article posted in the January 2008 London Economist, the gates of the temple had, in fact, 
been locked by MIC supporters entrapping the worshippers within the confines of the temple forecourt.  
See “Asia:  Indian mutiny; Malaysia”, The Economist, London, 26 January 2008.  386(8), p. 66. 
635 Thomas Fuller, “Indian Discontents Fuels Malaysia’s Rising Tensions,” New York Times, 10 February 
2008, p. A8. 
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groups internationally but also from the United States and Indian governments.636  
Abdullah’s response was to assert that if he had to make a choice between public 
safety and public freedom, “I do not hesitate to say here that public safety will always 
win…Malaysians must never, ever take their peace for granted”.637 
In the month following the march, it was alleged that HINDRAF had links with 
militant groups including the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers and the National Volunteer’s 
Organisation, a Hindu fundamentalist group.638  While those arrested at the Batu 
Caves were eventually released, though not until mid-January 2008, the terrorism 
allegations facilitated the detention of five members of the group’s leadership under the 
provisions of the ISA.639  
Policy implemented to transform Malaysian society over the previous four 
decades has had little positive impact on the Indian community regarded as Malaysia’s 
third largest ethnicity at between 7.5 and 8 percent of the population.  Despite 
Abdullah’s denials in December 2007 that “the government had marginalised Indians 
in favour of boosting the status of Malays”,640 activists agitating for political reform for 
the Malaysian Indians catalogued a number of areas in which there is apparent 
injustice for the community they defend. 
A major and emotive source of concern for the Indian community is the fairly 
regular destruction of Hindu temples, claimed by HINDRAF to be once every three 
weeks. P. Waythamoorthy, Chairman of HINDRAF, lists the destruction and/or 
                                                
636 “US asks Malaysia to allow freedom of expression,” Channelnews Asia, 11 December 2007, 
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories.afp asiapacific/view/316732/1/.html) 
637 “Malaysian PM defends crackdown on dissent,” Channelnews Asia, 10 December 2007, 
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories.afp asiapacific/view/316567/1/.html) 
638 Report by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and, Labour, United States Department of State March 
2008 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100527.html) 
639 Detained without trial for two years from December 2007, the last of the members was released from 
custody in April 2009.  See “Five ethnic Indian activists held under Malaysia’s security law,” Channelnews 
Asia, 13 December 2007, (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories.afp asia 
pacific/view/317216/1/.html) and “Malaysia’s ethnic Indian activists accused of terror links,” Channelnews 
Asia, 6 December 2007, (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories.afp asia 
pacific/view/315839/1/.html). 
640 “Malaysian PM denounces ethnic Indian’s mistreatment claims: report,” Channelnews Asia, 2 December 
2007, (http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories.afp asiapacific/view/315044/1/.html)   
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desecration of 79 temples in the period February 2006 to June 2007.641  In some 
instances, the temples were erected during the early period of settlement by Indian 
labourers.  This makes them places of veneration for generations of Malaysian Indians.  
The proposed and eventual demolition in June 2007 of the 110 year old Mariamman 
temple was one such site which evoked communal outrage.  While the authorities may 
justify the action taken, the removal of the temples is a visible sign of inner turmoil for 
the Malaysian Indians. 
In common with other non-Malay groups, uniform access to quality education 
at all levels of society is a further issue; more so for the Indian community which lacks 
the political might to effect widespread reform.  Waythamoorthy describes the Tamil 
primary schools as being “cowshed like pre-war structures”642 while P. Uthayakumar, 
writing on the Frontline Defenders website states that 80 percent of the schools do not 
have “sports, recreational, computer and library facilities”.643  Further, in contrast to 99 
percent of national schools which have preschool facilities, 80 percent of Tamil schools 
lack similar advantage. 644   There are severe restrictions for entrance to tertiary 
institutions.  While the university intake for ethnic Indians was above 10 percent in 
1970, three decades later, this had fallen to 5.2 percent.  At the University of Malaya in 
2003, the number of medical seats available to Malaysian Indian students had dropped 
from 16 to one.645   
The government has acknowledged the dilemma for hundreds of Indians who 
remain undocumented; once again, a generational problem.  Without registration, 
                                                
641 In the case of the older temples, these were often erected on plantations once privately owned but with 
independence have become government owned.  Waytha Moorthy cited by blogger Seremcha, 
“Destruction of Ethnic Minorities Malaysia” in response to Pipes’ “Countries threatened with 
Extinction”. (http://www.danielpipes.org/4793/countries-threatened-with-extinction)  
642 Ponnusamy Waythamoorthy, “Malaysian Indian Minority and Human Rights Violations Annual Report 
2008 (Executive Summary)”, 15 January 2009.  
(http:www.hindraf4you.blogspot.com/2009_01_15_archive.html). 
643 Ponnusamy. Uthayakumar is elder brother to P. Waythamoorthy and considered de facto leader of 
HINDRAF.  He has been arrested on several occasions and also detained under ISA provisions.  
Frontline Defenders, founded in Dublin in 2001, is an organisation committed to protecting those who 
work for human rights in a nonviolent manner the world over.  
(http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/ru/node/362) 
644 Ibid. 
645 Ibid. 
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which is mandatory within 14 days of birth, no-one can be issued with MyKad – the 
form of identity Malaysian citizens must carry at all times.  In effect, they are stateless 
people and as such unable to access benefits available to Malaysian citizens.  This 
extends to marriage certificates and thus to the children of the stateless who are 
increasingly finding it difficult to attend school; particularly when changing from one 
school to another.  The various measures the government has adopted since the 
1990s to manage the vast numbers of illegal aliens seeking work in Malaysia, 
particularly from Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, has made it doubly 
challenging for the stateless Indians, even for those who have resided in Malaysia for 
decades, to apply for jobs, financial assistance or health care.646  A special committee 
established by parliament has, to date, failed to produce any remedy for the 50,000 
hapless Malaysian Indians.647  
Of equal concern is the extreme level of poverty.  Statistics reveal the per 
capita income of approximately 95 percent of the Indians is below the national average 
with 80 percent in the menial and labouring occupations.  Jeyakumar Devaraj, who 
successfully contested the Sungai Siput seat of MIC leader S. Samy Vellu in the 2008 
general elections, asserts that the disproportionate representation of Indians in 
negative statistical data cannot be solely apportioned to the strategies implemented to 
raise Malay status.648  He considers the generational poverty for the majority of Indians 
is more an outcome of the initial reasons which precipitated the influx of migrant 
                                                
646 According to the Asian Pacific Migration Research Network, there are approximately 1 million aliens 
working in Malaysia, with and without the necessary approval.  See Asian Pacific Migration Research 
Network, ‘Migration Issues in the Asia Pacific:  Issues paper from Malaysia’.  
(http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnwp9.htm) 
647 In a paper presented at the Centre for Southeast Asian and Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, 
Tirupati in October 2008, Dr Suryanaraya cited the research of the Singhvi Committee tasked with 
considering Indian diaspora that, of the 1,665,000 Indians resident in Malaysia in 2004, 1,600,000 were 
Malaysian citizens, 15,000 were non-resident with 50,000 stateless.  See V. Suryanaraya, ‘Malaysian Indian 
Society in Ferment’, South Asia Analysis Group.  (http://www.southasiaanalysis).  In common with other 
statistics, this figure is disputed.  Moorthy writes of there being 150,000 stateless Malaysian Indians.  See 
Executive Summary of Malaysian Indian Minority and Human Rights Violations Annual Report 2008, 15 January 
2008.  (http://www.hindraf4you.blogsport.com/2009_01_15archive.html)    
648 Jeyakumar Devaraj, ‘The Indian Poor:  Even More Difficult Times Ahead’ in Fong Chin Wei and Yin Ee 
Kiong (Eds), Out of the Tempurung:  Critical Essays on Malaysian Society (Kingsford:  East West Publishing Pty 
Ltd, 2008), p.136.  
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workers from the late 19th century – that of labouring primarily in the plantations and in 
the lowest levels in the service industries.  As the plantations were cleared for 
industrial use and later through the demands of the oil palm plantations, the workers 
were also moved, relocating in shambolic squatter settlements in the more rural areas 
or in enclaves in the larger cities were the discontent is virtually palpable.  Research in 
the mid-1960s confirmed that 92 percent of the Indian community were working class 
owning neither land nor the financial capability of effecting significant change.649  The 
introduction of Malay affirmative policy in the early 1970s in combination with the 
cyclical recessions assaulting the financial markets has effectively inhibited any real 
improvement to the socio-economic position of the Indian community.650    
It is perhaps inevitable that the demoralised status of many ethnic Indians 
should lead to an increase in tension between the Indians and Malays, the group 
considered most culpable for the dispirited circumstance of the Indian community.  In 
March 2001, antagonism between Indians and Malays escalated into violence in 
Kampong Medan, an impoverished area on the outskirts of KL, resulting in six deaths 
and injuries to several others.  Ian Stewart writes that initially the authorities were 
unsure as how to handle the incident, the first major instance of inter-ethnic violence 
since May 1969 - one which gave a negative portrayal of the government’s decades-
long racial harmony programme.651  In the end, investigations apportioned the violence 
to conflict between ethnic-based gangs, in this instance Malay – viewed as privileged 
and Indian – with barely subsistence income.  Stewart notes further the official view of 
Malaysian police that Indian gangs commit the “majority of criminal activities in the 
                                                
649 Ibid., p. 141. 
650 Malaysian Indian Minority and Human Rights Violations Annual Report, 2008.  Waytha Moorthy, 
contends that Indian employment in the civil service has dropped from an approximate 50 percent in the 
1960s to a mere 1 percent today.  According to figures published on a Malaysian blog, non-Malays have a 
5 percent representation in the new intakes of police, nursing and in the army with only 2 percent 
employed in Putrajaya, the administrative capital.  See Malaysian Race Humanity 2006.  
(http://chernjie.blogspot.com/2006/09/malaysian-race-humanity-2006.html).   
651 Ian Stewart, The Mahathir Legacy:  A Nation Divided, A Region At Risk (Singapore:  Allen & Unwin, 
2003),  pp.200-203. 
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country”.652  Social justice and human rights groups also note several cases of police 
victimisation and brutality against Indians:  men, women and children.653  In closing, 
the level of despondency in the Indian community is evident in the high suicide rate 
purported by Devaraj to be at “21.1 per 100,000 persons, compared to…2.6 per 
100,000 for Malays”.654   
 
5.2.4  Postscript – 2008 General Election Results 
The disastrous results of the 2008 general elections, from the perspective of the 
UMNO-dominated BN government, indicated the degree to which the public had 
become disaffected with the ruling coalition over the four years since the previous 
election.  It confirmed that the incidents of civil disobedience leading to the vote were 
not random acts orchestrated by discrete groups but indicators of a groundswell in 
Malaysian society disillusioned with the status quo and wanting more than verbal 
promises. 
Analysis of the results revealed a significant swing away from the BN coalition 
parties.  Whereas, in the outgoing parliament, the opposition parties, the DAP, PKR 
and PAS had 19 seats, the 2008 election increased this to 81.  In addition the BN also 
lost control of four further states: the DAP gained control of Penang, Abdullah’s home-
state; the PKR won control of Perak, Selangor and Kedah with PAS extending its 
majority in Kelantan, the state it ruled from 1990.655  
UMNO, the major partner in the coalition, was able to withstand the loss in 
voter loyalty, albeit dropping 30 parliamentary seats.  For the smaller communal 
parties, the MCA, Gerakan and the MIC, the substantial drop in support delivered the 
clear message that the membership no longer had faith in the leadership of the 
                                                
652 Ibid., p. 202. 
653 See P. Uthayakumar and US State Department annual reports. 
654 Devaraj, 2006, p. 138. 
655 “Malaysian Opposition Targets race policies, warns government,” ChannelnewsAsia, 12 March 2008. 
(http://.www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp asiapacific/view/334238/1/.html).  
148 
 
established race-based parties.  While the MCA’s parliamentary tally was halved from 
31 to 15, for Gerakan, the other major Chinese party in the coalition, the election result 
decimated the party.  Of the 10 parliamentary seats and 30 state seats held after the 
2004 elections, Gerakan managed to retain only 2 parliamentary and 4 state seats.  
Prior to the election, the MIC, the party which historically represented the ethnic Indian 
community, held nine parliamentary seats, but post-2008 it held only three. Party 
leadership was equally staggeringly unsuccessful.  Not only did S. Samy Vellu, leader 
for the past three decades, lose his seat but two vice-presidents, the leaders of the 
youth and women’s division were equally unsuccessful.656  
 
Prior to the election, the opposition parties agreed to set aside their differences and 
work co-operatively towards denying the BN its two-thirds parliamentary majority 
described by Lim Kit Siang as “the holy grail of Malaysian politics”.657  Rather than 
several opposition candidates contesting each constituency, in effect splitting the vote, 
the parties proposed one representative candidate; a tactic employed successfully in 
the past and which contributed to the unprecedented success of the parties in the 2008 
poll. Three weeks after the election, on 1 April 2008, this loose coalition was formalised 
with the creation of the strategic alliance Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Front, PK).   The 
PK consists of the DAP, PAS and PKR with each party collectively leading and 
managing the organisation.658   
With the transition of state rule from the BN to the PK, the new alliance governs 
five of Malaysia’s 13 states:  Kedah, Kelantan, Selangor, Penang and Perak, a 
                                                
656 Six parties aligned to oppose the BN:  the DAP, PKR, PAS, PSM (Parti Sosialis Malaysia), MDP (Parti 
Demokratik Malaysia) and PASOK ( United Pasok Nunukragang National Organisation) – Sabah’s oldest 
political organisation which was subsequently deregistered in June 2008; “Malaysia’s MIC chief Samy Vellu 
loses seat in general elections,” ChannelnewsAsia, 8 March 2008.  
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/southeastasia/view/333757/1/.html) 
657 “Malaysian opposition aiming for seismic shift at the polls,” ChannelnewsAsia, 17 February 2008.  
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp asiapacific/view/329332/1/.html) 
658 In August 3008, Anwar Ibrahim rejoined parliament as the chief leader of the PK taking over the 
leadership of the PKR from his wife Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. 
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situation unparalleled in Malaysian history.  If the PK can consolidate and capitalise on 
its ascendancy, there is a possibility of effecting real political change. 
 
5.3  Conclusion 
There are winners and losers in every election and while the BN managed to retain its 
hold on governance, Abdullah was perhaps the greatest loser. Malaysian political 
history will forever record him with the honour, in 2004, of being elected with the 
highest recorded poll for a prime minister in Malaysian history.  Conversely, he will also 
be remembered as the prime minister who, in 2008, led to the government to its worst 
ever election result. 
It would be facile to consider Abdullah’s tasks ahead simple to accomplish or 
that they were achievable within a single term.  The hope of a better future, fostered in 
2004 by the BN’s secure mandate to govern, was gradually diminished by a growing 
number of controversies.   
Money politics is an issue which both contributed to, and was causal in 
rampant corruption embedded within Malaysia’s political and economic culture.  The 
stigma of pervasive corruption is not Malaysia’s alone.  Many states contend with 
similar problems where political patronage and collusion are aided by long-standing 
systemic failure with few checks and balances and, in Malaysia’s case, a society 
resigned to rasuah.659  During Abdullah’s term in office, charges of alleged corruption 
were levelled against several leading figures across the spectrum of Malaysian 
society; but found against few. 
From the very beginnings of the Federation of Malaya, staunch Malay 
nationalists were determined that the ‘land of the Malays’ would be governed by 
Malays, not by “a mixture of races”.660 Critics allege that Abdullah’s consensual style of 
governance allowed the radical ‘ultra’ Malays the freedom to voice their fear and anger 
                                                
659 rasuah - bribery 
660 Vasil, 1971, p. 12. 
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that non-Malay wants and needs were imperilling the special provisions of the Malays, 
worsening inter-communal relations.  From the viewpoint of the Indians, the current 
political agenda has progressively marginalised their community.  With little prospect of 
improvement for generations to come and an ineffectual political leadership sold out to 
the Malays, in late 2007 the Hindraf leadership began agitating for political reform and 
financial compensation on behalf of Malaysia’s Indian community.   The threat of arrest 
under the ISA did not dissuade the leaders from organising a massive rally and despite 
being detained, without trial for two years along with four other members in December 
2007, DAP candidate Manoharan Malayalam was successful in his bid for the central 
Selangor state seat in the 2008 elections.661   
Setting aside the debate over the contestability of democracy, the concept of 
holding elections free from interference, political or civil, is considered part and parcel 
of a fully democratic society.  The workings of the EC continued to cause problems for 
non-BN parties in particular.  The 2008 elections saw further instances of malfeasance 
apart from the fiasco over the intended use of indelible ink.662  Amy Freedman, in 
discussing political change in several Southeast Asian states, asserts that: 
For a political system to reach a more ideal state…political institutions and 
processes needs [sic] to be more transparent and the playing field more level.  
And, most importantly, the state and its elected officials need to be committed to 
upholding the very laws that they create and supposedly enforce.
663
 
 
The level of political interference in successive general elections leads scholars to 
question Malaysia’s purported transition to democracy since gaining independence five 
decades ago.  
                                                
661 “Malaysia rejects calls to release detained state legislator,” ChannelnewsAsia, 28 March 2008. The final 
members in custody were released in April 2009. 
662 In northeastern Terengganu PAS supporters stopped several cars and buses suspected of carrying 
fraudulent voters brought in by the BN to skew the final vote count.  Police intervention to disperse the 
crowds, using tear gas, resulted in the arrest of several individuals.  See “Malaysian police use tear gas in 
scuffle with PAS party supporters,” ChannelnewsAsia, 8 March 2008. 
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp.asiapacific/vie/333694/1/.html) 
663 Amy L. Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea 
and Malaysia (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 3-4. 
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The juxtaposition between the more radical form of Islam and the moderate 
view, explored and articulated by Abdullah in his views on Islam Hadhari, continues to 
concern political and civil leaders, both Malay and non-Malay, working towards long-
term inter-societal harmony.  Despite the Constitution acknowledging and providing for 
religious diversity, within the constraints of a state-adopted Islamic faith, non-Islamic 
groups continue to document instances of bureaucratic stonewalling.  The insecurity 
dogmatic Islam presents is fomented by factions in both UMNO and its chief political 
rival PAS.  It must be acknowledged that the strident calls from within PAS have been 
softened somewhat of late but the question which has to be asked is how long will this 
less aggressive voice continue? 
Malaysia’s dual legal system is problematic particularly for those who 
unwittingly ‘stray’ across cultural lines falling into the gambit of the Syariah courts thus 
bringing them into conflict with religious authorities.  Areas of compromise are possible 
as evidenced by the actions of the courts in some states.  Petitions calling for judicial 
review were the impetus for several protest marches by members of the judiciary 
during 2007.664  
To conclude, Abdullah’s political opponents charged the beleaguered Prime 
Minister with failing to deliver the bright, new future where excellence, glory and 
distinction would be shared by all.  To his credit, and in his defence, the success of the 
initiatives and strategies implemented at the outset of his premiership were 
undermined by two issues beyond Abdullah’s control.  First, the deterioration of the 
global financial markets meant that constraints placed on high-yielding projects were 
rescinded with the flow-on effect that avenues for possible corruption were re-opened.  
Second, and of greater significance, Abdullah’s attempts at innovative reform in a 
                                                
664 In April 2008, the government announced its commitment to undertake reform by setting up a judicial 
commission.  See “M’sia committed to undertake broad-based judicial reforms,” ChannelnewsAsia, 10 April 
2008.  (http://www.channelnesasia.com/stories.southeastasia/vie/340646/1/.html). 
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political culture with entrenched corrupt practices were thwarted by powerful politicians 
and personalities intent on maintaining the status quo. 
In common with party politics the world over, it is the leader who bears the 
brunt of criticism.  In addition to the assertion that the BN’s drop in popularity prior to 
the 2008 elections was indicative of Abdullah’s poor leadership style, he was also 
subjected to scathing criticism from his predecessor, Mahathir.  With the vision of a 
new and more equitable world dissipating, the public, who initially welcomed his 
reforms, became  increasingly discontented and communal frustrations rose at the lack 
of progress Abdullah’s government had made towards the 2004 election promises.   
The unprecedented success of the opposition parties in the 2008 general 
election resulted in, little in the political milieu which can be cast in concrete and the 
second incarnation of an opposition coalition, the Pakatan Rakyat and the 
announcement by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi that he would resign the 
premiership in favour of his deputy, Najib Razak, in March 2009.665  There is, however 
little in the political milieu which can be cast in concrete and the challenge for the new 
alliance lies in acknowledging the diverse ideologies of the coalition partners, PAS and 
DAP, whilst concentrating on the common goals of seeking justice, opposing 
corruption and promoting human rights.666    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
665 “Malaysian opposition forms pact after poll gains,” ChannelnewsAsia, 1 April 2008.  
(http://channelnewsasia.com/stiries/afp_asiapacific/view/338626/1/.html) and “Malaysia’s future PM 
sees “tough” challenge ahead,” ChannelnewsAsia, 24 November 2008.  
(http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/391860/1/.html); Abdullah 
subsequently resigned as Prime Minister in April 2009.  
666 Ibid., “Malaysian opposition forms pact after poll gains”. 
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In hindsight, the inter-racial violence in May 1969 was the fuse which accelerated 
Malaysia’s transition from the more accommodative form of democracy in the first few 
years of federal development, to the authoritarian democratic state of today.  The 
conflict, regarded as a water-shed event in Malaysia’s political history, suspended 
parliamentary democracy for a period of 20 months, negated the May 1969 general 
election results and ushered in a Malay-centric agenda under the leadership of the 
Federation’s second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak. 
The first chapter of the case study (Chapter 3:  1969-1970) established the 
societal identities of the Malay and non-Malay groups.  Malay societal identity is 
predicated on the belief that as ‘the original sons of the soil’, the Malays have a pre-
eminent position in the Federation, a standing unchallenged by the non-Malay political 
elite at Merdeka in 1957 and again at the promulgation of the Constitution of the 
Federation of Malaysia in September 1963.  Historical documents record the 
agreement of the non-Malay political leaders to the inclusion of Article 153 of the 
Merdeka Constitution guaranteeing the Malay (and subsequent to the creation of the 
Federation of Malaysia, the Bumiputera of Sarawak and Sabah) special preferential 
provisions, in return for federal citizenship.  Despite numerous amendments to the 
Constitution, Article 153 remains unaltered with any inference that it should be 
amended construed as an attack on Malay paramountcy – a point driven home, at 
times, by the keris waving antics of the UMNO youth leaders which do little to forge 
Malay/non-Malay relations.  Non-Malay societal identity was focused on retaining and 
maintaining the unique aspects of each particular ethnie in a political climate which 
progressively gave greater prominence to the demands of the Malay political 
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leadership.  For the ultra Malays, this was to ensure that the provisions of Article 153 
should be met first and not impugned in any way.   
The case study also identified the political naivety of the non-Malay groups in 
Borneo.  This allowed for comparatively unhindered federal interference in the state 
affairs of Sarawak and Sabah whilst similar interactions were met with strenuous 
objection by Singapore.  The withdrawal of Chinese-majority Singapore in August 
1965, not only altered the ethnic balance, at the outset the Chinese/non-Malay and 
Malay populations were fairly evenly proportionate, it tipped the societal and political 
scales more firmly in the favour of the Malays. 
However, as the non-Malay groups in the peripheral states became politically 
mobilised, central government’s input was met with increasing protest.  In Sarawak, 
this led to the declaration of a state of emergency and the removal of the state’s first, 
and to date, only indigenous chief minister - his replacement a Malay.  For Sabah, 
political wrangling for control of the state was more prolonged and tortuous.  Ultimately 
however, state leadership was also placed with the Malays. 
In 1967, inter-societal relations were further strained over proposals to review 
constitutional provisions on the national language.  In the prevailing climate which 
privileged the Malay, the amendment to the provisions was viewed as a further attempt 
by the Malay political elite to curtail yet another aspect of non-Malay identity; in this 
instance, the option to regard languages other than Bahasa Malaysia as national 
and/or official languages.   
Dissension over the issue was causal to a significant switch in voter loyalty in 
the May 1969 general elections.  The success of the alternative parties and the inter-
racial violence which followed highlighted the fragility of the federal ties that linked the 
states.   Responsibility for halting the civil unrest was placed with the NOC, a body 
specifically tasked with restoring and maintaining ‘peace and harmony’; a mission it 
pursued through a series of measures.   First, to build an over-arching sense of 
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identity, the Rukunegara, or national ideology, was implemented without communal 
consultation.  To counter criticism that it was contrived and meaningless, severe 
sanctions were also adopted.  Second, Malay affirmative initiatives were progressively 
instituted with the justification that the Malays were in need of political and economic 
redress.  Finally, to thwart criticism of the initiatives, legislation was adopted which 
proscribed public discussion of issues the NOC deemed ‘sensitive’. 
The second part of the case study (Chapter 4:  1970-2003) outlined the various 
ways Malay political supremacy was consolidated under the administrations of Tun 
Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Onn and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and considered the 
impact of the developing Malay-centric paradigm on the major non-Malay groups.  Tun 
Abdul Razak (1970-1975), the master-mind behind Malaysia’s transformation, 
engineered radical reform with two major emphases:   to mitigate the socio-economic 
position of the Malays, and restore UMNO political dominance through a number of 
initiatives and strategies.  To Tun Hussein Onn (1976-1981), son of the founder of 
UMNO, the task fell to expand on the work of his predecessor in an administration 
fraught with factional discontent along with the mounting demands of Islamic groups.   
It was the administration of Malaysia’s most enduring leader, Tun Dr Mahathir 
Mohamad (1981-2003), which perhaps had the most profound effect on the non-Malay 
groups.  Mahathir had been critical of the Tunku’s style of governance during the 
1960s, charging the elder statesman with being too accommodating of the non-Malay 
minorities.  As prime minister, Mahathir’s authoritative leadership style placed the 
Malay Agenda to the forefront in every aspect of Malaysian society.  With the co-option 
of ABIM leader Anwar Ibrahim, Mahathir embarked on a programme to Islamise 
government machinery - a controversial decision which contributed to non-Malay 
discontent.  From the rule of the Malay sultans to the role of the judiciary, Mahathir was 
prepared to give primacy to Malay issues.  It was during his term of governance, 
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however, that the various ethnies became polarised in recognised enclaves; a situation 
acknowledged by Mahathir in the closing period of his prime ministership.  
The final of the case study chapters (Chapter 5:  2004-2008) provided a 
synopsis of the short administration of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi.  In contrast to 
the previous three prime ministers whose efforts were concentrated on promoting 
Malay issues, Abdullah’s style of leadership was more reminiscent of the Tunku’s 
consensual governance.  The demanding Islamic imperative of Abdullah’s 
predecessor was tempered by the more moderate Islam Hadhari which advocated a 
distancing from Islamic extremism and a revival of the traditional precepts of the 
Qur’an and hadith.  Politically, the massive mandate proclaimed by the people in the 
2004 general elections reflected the hopes for a brighter future freed from Mahathir’s 
authoritarian persuasion.  However, Abdullah’s failure to act decisively on election 
promises failed to sustain the promised momentum.  Mounting discontent and civil 
unrest issuing from several quarters led to the gradual dissipation of public good will 
and the eventual resignation of Abdullah after one ill-feted term.  
 
This thesis has examined Malaysia’s political development from 1963 to 2008, with 
particular focus on relations between its major ethnic groups, through the lens of the 
theoretical framework of SST as formulated by the CPRI.  In SST, the referent object of 
security shifts from the state to the society, more specifically, the identity which 
constitutes the society.  SST posits that a state which does not ensure the survival of 
its societies is at risk of imploding.  Simply put, the failure of a state’s societies equates 
to the failure of the state.667  
The construction of identity is problematic. 668   Critics assert the CPRI’s 
conception of identity and society was constructed with little regard for the fluid, non-
                                                
667 This is discussed in section 2.7. 
668 Ibid. 
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static nature of societies. In 2007, discussing the application of the theory in non-
European contexts, Wilkinson contended that assumptions had been made regarding 
“a degree of continuity, stability and cohesion...not present in many Second and Third 
World countries”,669   a claim which could not be made about Malaysian society.  
Despite attempts by successive governments to instil a degree of societal 
equanimity either ‘voluntarily’ through the Rukunegara or judicially through legislation, 
the Malaysian identity remains a fallacy per se.   Though the country lacks a strong 
national identity which all citizens can equally proclaim, there is stability and cohesion 
within each ethnie.  Of the major groupings there is the Chinese Malaysian identity, the 
Indian Malaysian identity and the Malay Malaysian identity which, while having geo-
political commonalities, maintain significant diversity in cultural tradition.   Tradition and 
long-held beliefs may assist in defining a group’s identity but it can never be set in 
concrete.  What is also at stake is the freedom to ‘own’ an identity as opposed to a 
state’s instruments of repression which call for the homogenisation of cultures for the 
sake of national identity. 
 
In contrast to classical security theory which has states pursuing security 
through military measures, the CPRI’s expanded security agenda posits that, while the 
strategies the discrete groups adopt to secure their respective identities may be of a 
military nature, especially if the ownership of territory is disputed, the option of calling 
on military power for many minority groups is not an option.   In Malaysia, the dominant 
Malay elite resorted to the military rarely, preferring to rely on the police when civil 
disorder reached a particular threat level.  From the 1970s, the government introduced 
oppressive legislation which, in addition to the precious two-thirds parliamentary 
majority, severely curtailed the freedoms of the populace and made the task of 
sustaining non-Malay identity increasingly challenging.  
                                                
669 Wilkinson, 2005, p. 10; see n.22. 
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With Roe’s 2005 expansion of the societal security dilemma (SSD) in mind, this 
thesis, in examining the measures adopted by both the Malay and non-Malay to 
maintain their unique cultural integrities, has argued that a SSD had led to the inter-
ethnic conflict in May 1969.670  Utilising Roe’s terminology, the thesis found that the 
requirements of non-Malay societal security, within the prevailing context of the 
powerful Malay hegemony, were security-seeking, the prime objective of the non-
Malay being the survival of their identities.  For the Malays, the thesis resolved that 
they were power-seeking as the reforms instituted by the Malay political leadership 
were directed towards restoring and protecting Malay societal security whilst at the 
same time, recognising the implicit threat a discontented society posed the security of 
the state. 
 
Despite four decades of Malay affirmative policy adopted and implemented to restore 
and reinforce Malay political supremacy, the results of the 12th General Election in 
March 2008 brought into sharp relief the discontent and deep political malaise within 
Malaysian society.  Abdullah’s succession to first statesman in the land had been 
confirmed with an unprecedented margin by the people in 2004, yet four years later he 
was the sacrificial lamb slaughtered by the party faithful for the sake of the UMNO/BN’s 
future.   
Ironically, it was dissatisfaction with Abdullah’s leadership - a lack of progress 
with promised reforms, failure to tackle systemic corruption, mounting fiscal debt and 
civil unrest in various quarters - which made strange bedfellows of former rivals.  The 
CPRI claims that minority societies without recourse to either military or political might 
choose to defend their identity by banding together to better withstand the attempts of 
the dominant group. In this instance, the massive voter swing involved both Malay and 
non-Malay voters who selected the opposition parties to such a degree that a two-party 
                                                
670 See n.22 and section 2.10. 
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parliamentary system became a palpable reality.  Negotiations between the leading 
opposition parties saw the creation of a strategic alliance, the multi-ethnic PK, a 
coalition of the willing prepared to present an alternate voice of dissent. 
Whether the two-party system is assured or whether the establishment of the 
structure could be undermined by the defections of politicians enticed to cross the 
floor, in essence abandoning those who elected them into office, is debated by political 
analysts and the subject of future analysis.  For the moment, analysts, academics and 
citizens across Malaysia speculate a new political landscape fraught with new 
challenges but containing within it the seeds to generate a climate which no longer 
polarises groups according to identity but which bridges the ethnic divide valuing all 
citizens equally. 
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